

**NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT:
Deciding How to Manage
Violent Conflicts**

**by
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ABSTRACT

The thesis is an attempt to fill the theoretical and empirical gap in current conflict management research, which has failed to examine methods of conflict management comparatively. Two dominant paradigms exist, neither of which is adequate to the task of comparing negotiation and mediation in the real world of international politics: the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm. An alternative theoretical framework, the Contingency framework of negotiation and mediation was therefore, constructed. This model suggests that negotiation and mediation are conceptually and empirically different, and specifies a series of contextual and process variables which are vital to any examination of conflict management.

Utilising a unique data set of thousands of cases of negotiation and mediation coded according to the variables specified in the Contingency model, a general bivariate analysis, followed by a more in-depth multivariate analysis, revealed a number of important differences and similarities between the two methods. The results suggest that negotiation and mediation are different forms of conflict management, which are most likely to be successful under contrasting conditions in international politics. Negotiation is the most successful method overall, but tends to be limited to low intensity, interstate conflicts. Mediation tends to occur in the most intense, intractable, and primarily civil conflicts, and is useful under a number of onerous circumstances.

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Chapter 1

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION

1.1 Introduction: The Problems of Managing Complex International Conflicts

Controlling the destructive consequences of international conflict has been a central feature of international relations since the formation of the League of Nations at the end of World War I. Unfortunately, the catastrophic outcome of World War II and the estimated 15-30 million people killed in inter-state and civil wars since 1945 (see Brogan, 1989) seems to belie this concern. The failure to deal peacefully with conflicts between states is more than just an intellectual failure; it is the empirical reality of lives and property destroyed. Although solving the puzzle of the pacific settlement of international conflict does not automatically furnish the political will for such an outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions almost certainly precludes it. In other words, the task of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of international conflict management is perhaps, the pressing issue of international politics today.

At the heart of many unsuccessful attempts to manage violent international disputes is a basic confusion over the application of alternative conflict management methods and approaches. For example, when former US president Jimmy Carter announced in December 1994 that he was accepting the invitation of the Bosnian Serbs to mediate in the Yugoslavian civil conflict, he was only adding to a plethora of diplomatic interventions by various bodies. The Carter mediation came at a time when the UN and EU seemed to have lost the initiative, and there were deep divisions between the Contact Group and NATO on how and when to proceed with different proposals and forms of intervention (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 307-308). The failure to effectively manage this conflict resulted in the dislocation and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, and major political instability across the whole Balkan region.

The confusion over matching appropriate interventions to conflicts has been a constant feature of the post-war period, and an even greater problem in the post-cold war era, when the predominant form of international conflict changed from primarily interstate disputes to intractable, often ethnically-motivated intrastate conflicts (see Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997; Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). Today, conflicts are being fought with varying degrees of ferocity in Afghanistan, Central Africa, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Tadjikistan, and until recently, in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnia. Furthermore, violent conflicts still plague the Middle East, Latin American states like Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, and Asian states like India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, and the Philippines. Virtually all of these conflicts have seen international intervention of some sort, but for the most part, these efforts have been *ad hoc*, uncoordinated, sometimes inappropriate, and as a result, largely ineffective. Their (mis)management reveals a fundamental bewilderment about how best to deal with international conflict. The muddled attempts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia (see Webb et al, 1996), as we have already mentioned, are a potent example of this.

The challenges facing the international community in the post-cold war environment are twofold: (1) how to make international conflict management more effective; and (2) how to match appropriate forms of intervention to individual cases of conflict. The second challenge follows logically from the first, in that conflict management methods (specifically, mediation, negotiation, humanitarian intervention, multilateral conferences) and conflict management in general, cannot be made more effective until they are applied appropriately. For example, mediation will not be effective no matter how well planned and executed, if it is applied to situations where it is fundamentally inappropriate.

The attempts by diplomats to manage international conflicts have been mirrored in recent years by an upsurge in scholarly interest in the field (see Bercovitch, 1996; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Princen, 1992a; Touval and Zartman, 1985). While much of this research has been focused in the area of mediation and third party intermediary intervention, it is concerned with the same vexing questions: how can international conflict management be made more effective,

what types of interventions are most effective, and at what juncture and to which situations should they be applied?

This thesis was written in part to further explore this problem and the issues it raises. It does more than that, however. This research addresses two key problems that currently characterise the study of international conflict management: the **comparative** problem (how to know which forms of conflict management should be applied to which conflicts?), and the related **empirical** problem (what do we really know about the application of different forms of conflict management?).

It appears that there are two large gaps in current research. First, there is a theoretical and empirical gap in the area of comparing different forms of international conflict management (eg, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, international organisations, third party consultation) to determine which are the most successful, and under what conditions or in what circumstances they are successful. Efforts in this area have been sorely lacking to date¹, and the surprising fact is, that there are no studies to tell us; we simply do not know (Dixon, 1996: 654).

Second, there is an empirical gap in the area of international negotiation specifically. To date, no systematic empirical studies have been done on international negotiations involving more than a few cases, while such large-scale studies are becoming increasingly common in the area of third party intervention (see Bercovitch, 1986, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Dixon, 1996). Negotiation studies, in contrast to some mediation studies, tend to rely on singular historical case studies, game-theoretic approaches, or theorising from laboratory research (see Campbell, 1976; Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Cottman, 1985; Druckman, 1986; Hamner, 1974; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Kremenjuk, 1991).

Furthermore, much of the negotiation literature is practitioner-oriented and therefore atheoretical. In this sense, the literature does not always provide us with evidence of whether the prescriptions offered really work or in what context. In other words, while we know something about the conditions under which mediation is effective in international politics, we know very little about the conditions under which negotiation is effective under the same circumstances.

¹ There are a few exceptions to this, and these works will be discussed in a later section.

This thesis is an attempt to fill these gaps. As such it is aimed more at scholars than practitioners, although it has obvious prescriptive possibilities. The practical usefulness of current conflict management research is severely impaired by the existing lack of knowledge about the efficacy of different conflict management methods, and by the current tendency to recommend mediation for most cases without a solid understanding of the effectiveness of bilateral negotiation. This over-reliance on one method needs to be re-examined (Keashly and Fisher, 1996: 257), because it poses the risk that mediation could be misapplied, and as such, damaging to conflict management efforts generally. Only when a better understanding of both the relative efficacy of mediation and alternative methods, and the conditions under which negotiation is likely to be effective is arrived at, can this danger be avoided. In this sense then, this study should be regarded as an exercise that will be both of scholarly interest and policy relevant.

1.2 Key Questions and Design of the Study

In order to examine what is essentially an empirical question (eg, how effective are different conflict management techniques, and under what conditions are they effective?), we need to proceed from a sound theoretical base. In general, a sound theoretical framework should, first of all, be grounded in existing theory and research. This is not to say however, that it should accept blindly, or simply duplicate existing research. Rather, it should challenge, critique, and extend existing paradigms and findings.

Second, in order to answer the questions posed here, a theoretical framework should allow for a comparison of negotiation and mediation. This is perhaps its most important aspect in terms of the problem we have stated here. In other words, negotiation and mediation need to be carefully conceptualised in such a way that a logically sound and meaningful comparison can be made. A beneficial and important side-effect of this thesis will be to aid in the development of an integrated theory that embraces both negotiation and mediation; the lack of any such theory currently has been recognised as a serious problem in existing paradigms (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 196). Lastly, such a theory will provide the tools necessary for the excavation of

the bedrock of empirical inquiry by: (a) generating relevant and testable hypotheses; and (b) providing a framework for the interpretation of the results of empirical research.

The direction of this study, and the sequence of tasks necessary for its completion are evident in the key questions that have guided this thesis:

- 1 To what extent does current conflict management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare negotiation and mediation in international politics?
- 2 Is there an approach which will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and mediation?
- 3 Can such an approach be applied to the real world of international conflict management?
- 4 What can this approach add to current conflict management theory, and what are its implications for international conflict management practice?

Answering these questions implies a simple three-step process: (1) an examination of existing literature on international conflict management; (2) the construction of a theoretical framework for comparing negotiation and mediation; and (3) an empirical study utilising the framework. Such a simple and systematic process appears straightforward, but as will become obvious in later sections, there are numerous pitfalls along the way to be avoided, not the least of which are the problems involved in quantitative analysis. The empirical stage of the study will utilise and expand on a unique and original dataset which has coded 1,154 discrete cases of negotiation and 1,666 cases of mediation according to 68 variables relating to the context, process, and outcomes of each episode of conflict management. This provides a rich source of data on which to base an investigation.

The justification for approaching negotiation and mediation in this manner involves three primary considerations:

(1) Theoretical Considerations.

As has already been mentioned, this study was prompted by a perceived gap in the theoretical literature on international conflict management. Scant attention has been paid to the twin problems of: (a) comparing methods of conflict management, and (b) the nature of international negotiations in the real world. Furthermore, as will be made clear, current approaches are inadequate for such a task, and need to be expanded and refined considerably if they are to become relevant. This is why the construction of a new framework through which different forms of conflict management, especially negotiation and mediation, can be comparatively examined is paramount. Part of the originality of this study then, lies in its attempt to create a theoretical framework for the study of multiple methods of conflict management in similar contexts. To paraphrase Klieboer and t'Hart, an understanding of the issue of the efficacy of different conflict management methods at the international level is inevitably embedded in a more comprehensive theory of conflict management (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 337).

(2) Methodological Considerations.

This thesis includes an empirical examination because little research into international negotiation and mediation has managed to successfully combine systemic theoretical models with empirical analysis (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 299). Rather, it has tended to be limited to studies of specific aspects or cases of negotiation or mediation, frequently in anecdotal and descriptive terms, rather than in systematic and empirical terms. In other words, this study is aiming for a level of generalisability not permitted by historical case studies or extrapolation from research at interpersonal or interorganisational levels, which unfortunately, tends to be the norm in current negotiation and mediation research. For this, a large number of cases was necessary. Furthermore, the potential value of such a large study was considerable, in light of the fact that virtually no such studies have been attempted.

(3) Pragmatic Considerations.

Pragmatic considerations have played an important role in the approach taken here, as they do in most research, especially in regard to the use of a large data set on international conflict management. Access to Bercovitch's Correlates of Mediation data set (Bercovitch, 1996) convinced me of the value that would accrue from building a similar data set on negotiation as the basis of a comparison. Such a project was felt to be a valuable and original contribution, and a complement to the work being done by Bercovitch and his colleagues on international mediation. The negotiation data set was constructed using the same variables as the Correlates of Mediation dataset, and added 1,154 cases of negotiation.

1.3 Conceptual Clarifications: Negotiation, Mediation, and Outcomes

Negotiation and Mediation in Perspective

This thesis is about managing conflict in potentially violent, or violent international conflict involving states and sometimes, important non-state international actors like liberation movements or stateless ethnic groups (eg, The Tamil Tigers, The Kurds, the PLO). In other words, it is limited to the management of interstate conflicts, or intrastate conflicts with international dimensions which then become of concern to the international community. Logically, international conflicts, or any conflict for that matter, can only be dealt with in three possible modes: unilaterally, bilaterally, or with the help of a third party (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 11). The unilateral mode may involve attempting to win over the opponent through violence, or it may involve withdrawal or avoidance. The bilateral mode implies some form of bargaining and compromise, and the third party assistance mode means the intervention of a party not directly involved in the conflict. Here we are concerned primarily with the second and third modes, namely, negotiation and third party assistance².

² The discussion here will be introductory, as the theoretical aspects of negotiation and mediation will be given a more comprehensive treatment in chapters two and three.

Negotiation refers specifically to a means of conflict management where the principal parties to a conflict of interest communicate directly or indirectly about how they will resolve their differences and manage their future relationship (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1966: 466; Stephenson and Morely, 1977: 26). Mediation on the other hand, is a means of conflict management where the parties to a dispute seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from a party not directly involved in the conflict, to resolve their differences without invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 8).

The differences between mediation and other forms of third party intervention often remains unclear at the international level. Of the many types of third party assistance distinguished in the literature, four appear to overlap with mediation: conciliation, good offices, fact-finding, and consultation. Conciliation refers to the efforts of a trusted intermediary acting as an informal communications link between the disputing parties, aimed at identifying major issues, lowering tension, and encouraging direct negotiations. Related to this, good offices refers to an intermediary who acts as a go-between when the parties cannot or will not meet face-to-face, while fact-finding involves an intermediary assessing the situation and providing a statement back to the parties. The last form, consultation, is a relatively recent addition to the list of possible third party roles, and involves a trusted and trained third party who facilitates conflict analysis and the development of creative alternatives through controlled communication and diagnosis based on social-scientific understanding (Fisher, 1996: 40-41). In practice however, all these methods overlap with each other and with mediation, and I consider them all part of mediator activities in order to avoid unnecessary conceptual confusion.

Differences do exist between negotiation, mediation, and judicial conflict management, the other primary form of third party intervention. I include judicial methods (arbitration and adjudication) here as a point of departure in the discussion of negotiation and mediation. Together these forms of conflict management can be compared along four main dimensions. First, as a mode of conflict management, negotiation is strictly bilateral, involving only the principal parties to the conflict. Mediation and judicial methods are of a different mode, and the insertion of a third party into the dyadic conflict system profoundly alters the nature of the process

(Gulliver, 1979: 7; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 63; Wall, 1981: 159). Exactly how third parties transform the negotiation system will be examined in later chapters.

Second, the aim of the conflict management in negotiation and mediation is to settle a dispute, resolve a difference, or manage an ongoing relationship. In international mediation, objectives are usually confined to controlling violence or seeking an immediate settlement (see Bercovitch, 1984; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 315). In contrast, judicial methods are focused on, and limited to, ruling on a point of law.

COMPARATIVE POINTS	TYPES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT		
	Negotiation	Mediation	Judicial Methods
Form of conflict management	Bilateral, dyadic mode	Third Party, triadic mode	Third Party, triadic mode
Aim of management effort	Conflict management, resolution	Conflict management, resolution	Ruling on point of law
Decision-making process	Joint, voluntary, social influence	Joint, voluntary, social influence	Third Party, involuntary, rulings
Nature of outcomes	Non-binding, compromise, win-win	Non-binding, compromise, win-win	Binding, win-lose

Table 1.1 A Comparison of Negotiation, Mediation, and Judicial Settlement

Third, negotiation and mediation both involve joint and voluntary decision-making processes dominated by social influence strategies. In contrast, judicial methods take the decision-making power out of the hands of the parties and put it in the hands of the third party, who rules, rather than attempting to influence. Lastly, the nature of the outcomes of negotiation and mediation are such that they are always non-binding, and usually involve a form of compromise or win-win formula. Judicial methods, on the other hand, produce binding outcomes which are necessarily of a win-

lose character. Table 1.1 summarises the main points of difference and similarity between these three basic types of conflict management.

The Problem of Conflict Management Outcomes

The challenge involved in examining and evaluating a highly complex process such as international conflict management begins with conceptualising the phenomenon and then developing standards for the assessment of outcomes. However, the issue of assessing outcomes in international conflict management is not as straightforward as it might appear. Often, evaluation criteria are taken for granted, but as soon as one starts reflecting upon them, they tend to raise more questions than answers (Klieboer, 1996: 361).

The first problem which is often encountered in assessing outcomes is the temporal problem (eg, when does a conflict management episode terminate? Should outcomes be examined immediately after the conflict management, or, should a time lag be allowed for? If so, should we allow for a brief time lag, or a long time lag?). For the most part, within recent conflict management research there has been “little or no agreement on which episode constitutes the outcome or how to identify a terminal point in dealing with a dynamic and ever-changing process” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 17; see also Bercovitch, 1984: 112).

The second problem is the perceptual problem. That is, conflict management outcomes may be perceived and defined very differently by each of the principal parties themselves, outside observers, the international community, or, in the case of mediation, by the mediators themselves (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 9). For example, outcomes that appear satisfactory or successful to one party may be perceived by another party as containing the seeds of future conflict (Bercovitch, 1984: 113). Or, outcomes that are perceived as useful at one particular moment of history may subsequently be seen to have been rather less so.

A third problem with assessing outcomes is the evaluative problem, which relates to the normative criteria employed by the observer. Analysts often use very different vantage points and criteria for judging outcomes: some adhere to what is termed in peace research as a “negative” conception of peace (eg, the absence of physical

violence and war), while others cling to a “positive” approach to peace (eg, a concern for social justice and welfare) (Klieboer, 1997: 13). From the positive peace approach then, conflict management outcomes are successful or unsuccessful depending on the extent to which they meet certain normative criteria such as greater fairness, efficiency, legitimacy, justice, and so on (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 19). Alternatively, they may be evaluated in terms of either their short-term or long-term consequences.

A review of current conflict management research reveals that typically, analysts have tackled the issue of how to assess outcomes in four ways (Klieboer, 1997: 12-13). The first approach has been to neglect or avoid the issue altogether, assuming that success or failure is “common knowledge”. For example, Assefa’s analysis of mediation in the Sudan civil war uses a series of hypotheses identifying conditions for successful mediation outcomes (Assefa, 1987: 29-30), but then leaves the reader puzzled about what success actually constitutes in his view (see also Carnevale et al, 1989; Princen, 1992b).

A second strategy has been to formulate a specific definition of success based on criteria important to the analyst themselves. In these cases, scholars opt for idiosyncratic but parsimonious operationalisations to facilitate systematic analysis and measurement. In Frei’s important study, for instance, he defines success as “a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator and a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt” (Frei, 1976: 69). Another study by Susskind and Babbitt argues that “successful mediation can result in: the cessation of violence; agreements that allow each party to save face both internationally and domestically; good precedents in the eyes of the world community; arrangements that will insure implementation of whatever agreements have been reached; and better relationships among the disputing parties” (Susskind and Babbitt, 1992: 31). They argue that the extent of success can be measured by the number of objectives reached.

A third group of analysts equates conflict management success with effectiveness in terms of the parties’ or mediator’s objectives as the crucial benchmark for evaluation (Klieboer, 1997: 13). Thus, in analysing the efforts of the Reagan administration to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 1981-1983,

Inbar (1991) evaluates the outcomes in terms of US goals, which were a pull out of all foreign forces and the strengthening of the pro-Western Gemayel regime. Judged from this vantage point, the mediation was clearly unsuccessful (see also Smith, 1985; Touval and Zartman, 1985: 14).

The final approach taken by analysts has been to conceptualise conflict management success in terms of what the protagonists might define as the underlying roots of their conflict. For example, in the work of Burton (1972a; 1987) and followers of the conflict resolution school (see Fisher and associates), conflict and war are assumed to be the result of patterns of dominance in human relationships. Conflict management can be considered successful to the extent that it produces durable solutions which are accepted and supported by all disputants, and if it creates institutions and practices that serve the needs of individuals and groups in society and legitimise authority. For Burton, this often requires a change in existing relationships between rulers and ruled both within and between states.

Partly for operational reasons³, and in order to sidestep some of the conceptual disagreements involved in evaluating outcomes, this thesis employs the term conflict management success in a strictly behavioural sense. That is, it focuses on the behavioural consequences of conflict management rather than on such factors as efficiency, legitimacy, satisfaction, fairness, or long-term success. A conflict management episode is considered to be successful when it has made a considerable and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the subsequent interaction between the parties. Conflict management failure, on the other hand, results in no discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties' subsequent behaviour (see Bercovitch and associates).

1.4 Research Comparing Negotiation and Mediation

Empirical research which compares different methods of conflict management in international politics, and negotiation and mediation in particular, is noted more for its brevity, than its insights. A foundational study by Holsti in 1966 focused on 77 international conflicts between 1919 and 1965 (later expanded to 97 conflicts in the

³ The operational justifications for taking this approach are given in Chapter 4, section 4.2.

period 1919-1986). Each conflict was coded according to six possible outcomes (conquest, compromise, successful deterrence, award, avoidance, passive settlement), and then examined for the ways it was peacefully managed. Holsti found, among other things, that negotiation was successful in 47% of its attempts, while mediation had a 22% success rate, multilateral conferences had a 44% success rate, referrals to international organisations had a 37% success rate, and judicial methods had a 45% success rate (see Holsti, 1966, 1968, 1988). Unfortunately, Holsti never pursued the comparative aspects of the study any further than the unidimensional correlation between conflict management type and outcomes. Also, he never expanded the data set to examine more cases or different types of international conflict.

Northedge and Donelan took a similar approach in their study of 50 major international disputes between 1945 and 1970 (see Northedge and Donelan, 1971). Examining their data, one finds that mediation was used in 31 (62%) of the disputes and had success in 7 (23%) of these cases. Judicial methods were used in only 12 (24%) of the disputes and had no successes, while UN intervention occurred in 42 (84%) of the disputes and had success in 8 (19%) of these cases. Unfortunately, when Northedge and Donelan looked at the cases in which negotiation occurred⁴, they found that other forms of conflict management (eg, mediation, arbitration, UN intervention) were also involved, and they were thus unable to determine whether success or failure was the result of negotiation or outside intervention (Northedge and Donelan, 1971: 295). This limited the comparative usefulness of this study, somewhat.

From this foundation, comparative studies on forms of conflict management began to focus on aspects of third party intervention. Butterworth's seminal work offered a detailed account of institutional intervention in international disputes (Butterworth, 1976), and noted that of 310 disputes between 1945 and 1974, a third party was involved in 255 (82%) of the cases. Frei's important study on the conditions for success in international mediation set the scene for a plethora of empirical studies on aspects of mediation by Bercovitch and his associates (Frei, 1976; Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; etc). More recently, Dixon demonstrated how effective mediation is as a form of third

⁴ They imply that virtually all the disputes involved some form of negotiation, even if it was to agree on which other forms of conflict management to adopt (Northedge and Donelan, 1971: 294-295).

party intervention compared with public appeals, communication, observation, intervention, humanitarian aid, and adjudication (Dixon, 1996). Similarly, Raymond examined comparative aspects of mediation and arbitration in disputes involving democracies (Raymond, 1994), while Diehl focused on peacekeeping (Diehl, 1993).

By this stage it should be clear that the field of conflict management research is suffering from a serious empirical gap. Recent work by Fisher and associates has attempted to build a theoretical framework which could form the basis of an empirical comparison of negotiation and mediation, but it has yet to be applied to a data set (see Fisher, 1996; Keashly and Fisher, 1996). Later chapters will return to this important work. This thesis then, is an attempt to fill this empirical gap by conducting a large scale empirical study on comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation in international politics. As such, it is something of a return to Holsti, albeit with a narrower focus on comparing negotiation and mediation.

1.5 A Preview of the Thesis

Context of the Study

This thesis fits squarely into the field of international conflict management research. Furthermore, it falls into the tradition of social science which places an onus of responsibility on the shoulders of social scientists to do more than observe. The point of research such as this is *praxis*. In this case, it is aimed at improving and strengthening the effectiveness of international conflict management in order to facilitate constructive, as opposed to destructive, relations among nations.

While some believed that the end of the Cold War and the fundamental changes that have taken place in international politics over the past few years would lead to a new era of relative peace among nations, this expectation proved to be as erroneous as it was ephemeral. This misplaced optimism has been replaced by a growing realisation that conflicts are likely to remain with us whether the international system is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. Furthermore, the new international system is as conflict-prone, some would argue even more so, than any previous one (Bercovitch, 1996: 1; see also Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). In short, as long as conflict is a regular feature of

international politics, the possibility of serious damage exists, as does the need to effectively prevent or manage such conflicts. This thesis then, stands side by side with other efforts to understand and improve conflict management today (see Albin, 1997, for example).

In terms of the specific approach taken here, this study fits into that relatively small, but clearly delineated research tradition which employs systematic comparisons over large numbers of cases in a deliberate attempt to establish empirically grounded generalisations (see Bercovitch and associates; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Raymond, 1994). That is, it employs quantitative methods in order to achieve a high degree of generalisability, as opposed to laboratory experiments or computer simulations which seek a high degree of control in the precision and measurement of variables, or single case studies which aim at a high degree of descriptive accuracy.

The growing body of research which employs quantitative methods, including this thesis, is partly motivated by a dissatisfaction with current methodologies. For example, of the criticisms levelled at laboratory studies (Gordon, Schmitt, and Schneider, 1984), its tendency to over-extrapolate (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 182) particularly limits its applicability to the world of international politics (see also Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11; Carnevale et al, 1989: 364; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 195). The dominant methodology in international politics to date has been the case study, or, descriptive approach. This approach emphasises the unique aspects of every case, implying implicitly or explicitly that all cases are different and nothing meaningful can be said about conflict management in general.

Despairing of the ideographic consequences of single-case description, the normative approach offers in a generic fashion, a set of recommendations that could lead to successful outcomes in all types of disputes, from the inter-personal to the international (Burton, 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1987; Doob, 1970; Fisher, 1983, 1989). That is, the normative, or prescriptive approach “concerns itself with a wide range of disputes and collectivities, emphasises subjective elements of perception and communication, assumes that no dispute is too intractable for an experienced third party, and usually ends up as advice for mediation practitioners” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 14-15). Needless to say, neither of these approaches has really

stimulated much-needed empirical research (Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Ott, 1972; Rubin, 1980; Young, 1967).

At another level, this study was undertaken in the context of a research tradition which considered conflict management unidimensionally in terms of its focal points. For example, one focus of study has been third party intermediary assistance (see Bercovitch and associates; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Young, 1967). Another focus point has been international negotiation (see Bazerman and Lewicki, 1975; Druckman, 1973, 1986; Ikle, 1964; Jonsson, 1989, 1991; Kremenyuk, 1991; Lall, 1966). To date, there has been no multidimensional, comparative research tradition which looks at more than one form of conflict management simultaneously. No-one has taken up the challenge posed by Holsti to develop a comparative framework and gather data on different forms of conflict management. This thesis is an attempt to do just that.

In other words, this study, while firmly established in the context of recent quantitative research, represents somewhat of a necessary departure from the dominant approach. This is because it is comparatively focused at two different types of conflict management. Apart from Holsti (1966, 1968), no study has compared negotiation and mediation using quantitative techniques and in the international context. This is surprising considering that negotiation and mediation are eminently comparable (see chapter three), are the most used forms of conflict management in international politics, and are often used in tandem by diplomats. Furthermore, to date, there has been no large-scale data set compiled on international negotiation. The vast majority of negotiation studies have relied on single-case analysis (Hopmann and Smith, 1977), or a few selected cases (Druckman, 1986; Stoll and McAndrew, 1986).

This study, then, attempts to bridge the gap between the different foci of studies, namely, negotiation studies and third party assistance studies. By applying the same analytical framework to both forms of conflict management, it will be possible to widen our understanding of what conditions are associated with successful outcomes across different types of conflict management, and not just in the third party assistance mode. As a result, this thesis will also initiate the development of a unified theory of negotiation and mediation, a critical task for the field as a whole (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 198).

Contribution of the Study to the Field of Conflict Management Research

The specific contributions of this thesis will be both theoretical and empirical. Its theoretical contributions include the identification of weaknesses and gaps in current conflict management research (see chapter two). While the task of reviewing and evaluating the research in one's field of study is only a first and basic step, it is nonetheless a vital one, more so if it reveals fundamental areas of neglect. This study then, is important for highlighting the need for greater research efforts to be directed at filling the comparative and empirical gaps discussed in section 1.1. Until more is known about the success of different forms of conflict management, little can be done to improve their application to the real conflicts presently underway in international politics.

Second, this study presents a theoretical framework that not only identifies the most important contextual and process factors in international negotiation and mediation, but which also provides a useful device for comparative studies (see chapter three). The Contingency framework, while still in a fairly rudimentary form, can be used to conduct studies comparing negotiation, mediation, arbitration, the UN, or any other method of conflict management commonly used in international politics. In an area of research which lacks both theoretical tools and previous studies, the Contingency framework outlined in this dissertation represents something of a watershed. As a by-product, this study also advances a large number of testable propositions which could form the basis for later studies.

Third, this thesis contributes a unique and vital discussion of the differences and similarities between negotiation and mediation. Although negotiation and mediation have been discussed in the same context (see Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt, 1986), until now, no attempt has been made to carefully articulate the specific nature of their differences and similarities. The attempt in this thesis to bridge the two foci of study provides the beginnings of an integrated theory of negotiation and mediation, a vital step on the road to improving international conflict management.

The empirical contributions of this study are no less important than the theoretical ones. In the first place, given the relative dearth of quantitative, generalisable studies of international conflict management, the construction of a unique large-scale

comparative data set is a laudable achievement. For this thesis, I carefully examined 295 international armed conflicts between 1945 and 1995 and documented more than 600 cases of international negotiation. Each case was coded according to more than 60 variables. This data was combined with Bercovitch's Correlates of Mediation data set to produce a substantial comparative data base⁵.

Furthermore, the compilation of the first large-scale data set on international negotiation of its kind represents a very important contribution, and opens up a whole new research area. Here we actually have an analysis of negotiations based on more than 1000 real international cases in the last fifty years. This in itself is a substantial achievement. The need to collect generalisable data has been one of the primary weaknesses in the area of international conflict management research for some time.

The application of the data set employed here to the propositions generated by the Contingency framework (chapters four and five), confirmed in some cases, and rejected in others, numerous theoretical notions. For example, it confirmed that negotiation and mediation do behave differently in international politics. While some might consider this notion axiomatic, until now this theoretical idea had not been demonstrated empirically by any research. The process of testing theoretical notions by way of empirical studies is perhaps the most important scientific exercise of all. In other words, the results of this study allow us to be a little more certain about some of the theoretical notions we often take for granted.

Similar to this, the study has independently confirmed the findings of a number of previous studies. Such independent confirmation is again, a vital step in the scientific process. Only after extensive independent confirmatory studies can researchers begin to feel confident about what is known. For example, this study has found that conflict management efforts are enhanced by a mutual willingness on the part of the disputing parties to settle peacefully (see chapters four and five). This confirms the same findings of numerous previous studies conducted in a variety of different contexts (Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Klieboer, 1991; Brett and Goldberg, 1983; Skratek, 1990; Tourval and Zartman, 1989).

Methodologically, this study makes a small contribution to the search for appropriate empirical tools by confirming the utility of the loglinear approach in

⁵ See Chapter 4, section 4.2 for a more detailed description of the data collection process.

political science. Appropriate and effective empirical methodologies are sorely needed in the current research milieu. To date, loglinear techniques of statistical analysis have been little used in the field of political science. Loglinear methodology has attained a much higher profile in psychology, sociology, and psychometrics, for the simple reason that it offers advantages over traditional techniques in both theory and application (see chapter five). This thesis demonstrates again its utility as a research tool (see also Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Langley, 1993; Houston, forthcoming).

The danger of engaging in an empirical study of this nature is that it leaves one open to the charge that the exercise is merely one of inductive “number-crunching”. The thesis has far greater theoretical significance than this, however. Although a statistical analysis lies at the heart of the study, it is based on an examination of negotiation and mediation in the real world of international politics. It is not a case of pure abstraction, and the results of the analysis cause us to re-examine our perceptions and beliefs about how negotiation and mediation function in actual situations of international conflict. Furthermore, the study has genuine practical applications for conflict management and conflict prevention (see Chapter 6), and as such, puts forward socially useful knowledge. In the concluding chapter, I review the important empirical and theoretical contributions of this study (see section 6.2).

Overall then, this thesis contributes a valuable context, direction, and foundation for further comparative studies into international conflict management. Furthermore, it also opens the way for quantitative research into international negotiation, and offers a few practical lessons for the practitioners of conflict management.

Limitations of the Study.

It should be obvious by this stage that this thesis will not be the basis of a practitioner’s manual on how to make negotiation or mediation more successful, even though the study does make a few practical recommendations in the final chapter. Others have already done this (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Zartman, 1976). Furthermore, this thesis will not presume to construct a full-blown theory of international conflict management, or of negotiation and mediation. Although theorising will take place, the

primary focus will be on the comparative empirical aspects of the problem of negotiation and mediation. In this sense, the study should be regarded as an empirical exercise; it is an attempt to contribute some empirical findings to the world of conflict management theory, and not the other way around. Even here, however, a caveat is in order. This study is by nature, exploratory. It will not necessarily answer the empirical question satisfactorily; rather, it will uncover the important factors which can be associated with successful conflict management and suggest potentially fruitful avenues of further research. It is simply a starting point to the question of the comparative effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in international conflict.

Another empirical limitation of the study is the sequential problem. In the real world of international politics, negotiation and mediation are not always independent of each other, or occur in sequence. In some cases, negotiations may take place, only to be complemented by mediation, and then back again to negotiation. Solutions to the methodological problems posed by this are not easy. As this study is primarily exploratory, the construction of effective methodologies to analyse this effect will be left to a later stage. For the time being however, it is enough to acknowledge the problem and be aware of the inferential limitations it places on the findings⁶.

In terms of the theoretical parameters of the thesis, the study is limited to the examination of conflict management in cases of armed conflict, as the title suggests. That is, it is concerned with negotiation and mediation that takes place *after* violence has been employed. As later discussions suggest (see chapters two and three), there is a conceptual difference that can be inferred between both armed conflict and non-armed conflict, and between the conflict management efforts applied to each type. This means that until further studies can compare them, one cannot assume that the findings presented here (ie, findings related to conflict management in violent conflicts) should be applied to the usual process of institutional negotiation and mediation designed to *prevent* violence between states. In other words, the study is limited to cases where normal diplomatic processes of conflict management have failed somewhat and the threshold of force has been crossed.

Lastly, as has already been alluded to in the previous discussion on conflict management outcomes (see section 1.3), and as the title of the thesis suggests, this

⁶ This problem is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, section 6.2.

study is focused on the limited goal of conflict management, or, conflict settlement, rather than conflict resolution. That is, a conflict can be considered *settled* when violent and destructive behaviour has been reduced, and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast, a conflict can be said to be *resolved* when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to the violent and destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes have been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the disputants. Negotiation and mediation can therefore, be directed at conflict settlement – the aim of the vast majority of diplomatic efforts – or, it can be directed toward achieving the more complex, if enduring, outcome of conflict resolution. Here we focus on the more limited efforts by diplomats of conflict settlement.

Thesis Structure and Chapter Outlines.

The structure of the thesis follows the questions outlined in section 1.2. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on conflict management research, evaluating current paradigms for their ability to systematically analyse and compare negotiation and mediation in international conflict (question 1). An argument is made here that two dominant paradigms predominate in the field, the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm. Neither approach is entirely adequate for the question at hand. Chapter 3 introduces an improved theoretical framework which can systematically compare negotiation and mediation, and generate testable propositions (question 2). A number of initial and exploratory propositions are then suggested here. Chapters 4 and 5 make up the heart of the study by applying the framework to the real world of international conflict management, testing the propositions on a large-scale data set, and evaluating the results (question 3). In chapter 6, I review and discuss the findings of the study, and evaluate its theoretical implications and practical lessons (question 4).

Chapter 2

EXAMINING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: TWO PARADIGMS

2.1 Conflict Management Research: The State of the Art

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate existing conflict management paradigms, specifically, their ability to analyse and compare negotiation and mediation. This is the first step along the path to the construction of a framework conducive to an empirical investigation. The initial challenge however, is to identify which paradigms dominate the field and the yardsticks by which they can be evaluated. Every social scientific theory attempts to understand, explain, and predict the phenomenon which it holds as its focus of inquiry by examining it through an organising framework, or paradigm. A framework is made up, first of all, of a series of assumptions concerning such objects as: the nature of reality (eg, subjective versus objective), human nature (eg, voluntaristic versus deterministic), appropriate methodologies (eg, ideographic versus nomothetic), etc. For example, one theory of conflict management may assume that conflict is inherently and necessarily destructive; another may assume that it is potentially constructive.

Second, a framework is made up of a series of related conceptualisations, definitions, and distinctions which delineate the phenomenon from related phenomenon. For example, a theory of conflict management will have definitions of both conflict and what it means to manage a conflict, and will distinguish conflict management from conflict resolution. Third, frameworks attempt to identify the most important variables which affect the phenomenon. Thus, a theory of conflict management might specify that the motives of the parties in conflict will determine the type and outcome of its conflict management. Lastly, frameworks are often identified by the type of scientific methodology they adopt; the methodology utilised is determined by the variables which the framework specifies as important. If motives

are thought to be the most important variable in conflict management, then for example, psychological methods will be needed to examine them.

Therefore, we begin the task of identifying and evaluating current paradigms on conflict management by asking the following set of questions:

- 1 What assumptions does this framework make about international conflict, states, the goals of conflict management, and the nature of negotiation and mediation?
- 2 How does the framework define and conceptualise international relations, conflict, and conflict management, and how does it distinguish between negotiation and mediation?
- 3 Which variables does the framework focus on as having the greatest explanatory power?
- 4 What primary methodologies does the framework tend to employ?

Conflict management research - especially research on negotiation and mediation - is remarkably interdisciplinary, with important contributions coming from the fields of international relations, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, legal studies, industrial relations, organisational studies, and the field of communications. In particular, and reflecting a rapid proliferation in practice, studies on mediation have increased dramatically in the past few decades. Long an important part of industrial relations and international negotiation, mediation is now found in realms as diverse as neighbourhood feuds, civil and criminal litigation, police interventions, family disputes and divorce, public disputes, environmental planning and siting, and organisational decision-making (see Carnevale and Pruitt, 1993: 561). Negotiation is no less multifarious.

Despite the burgeoning number of studies in recent years however, conflict management studies suffer from a number of unfortunate conditions. For negotiation, it is that the vast majority of studies concentrate in the field of psychology, and focus on aspects of decision-making or the approaches and tactics negotiators use (see

Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Hamner, 1974; Kimmel et al, 1980; Pruitt, 1991). Furthermore, these studies rely almost entirely on laboratory studies for their methodologies (Gilkey and Greenhalgh, 1986: 245; Druckman and Harris, 1990: 234; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992: 538). When mediation is discussed in this context, it is generally of a prescriptive nature, outlining what mediators can do to help negotiators overcome their difficulties (Princen, 1992a: 13; see also Bigoness, 1976; Haynes, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Jones, 1989). Furthermore, at the level of international relations, the study of negotiation is largely confined to historical case studies, and is not intended to be the basis for broad generalisations (see Campbell, 1976; Cottman, 1985; Druckman, 1986; Hopmann and Smith, 1977; Koh, 1990; Touval, 1982).

Mediation studies, with a few notable exceptions (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1992; Dixon, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Princen, 1992a), reflect the same limitations. Many studies of mediation come from the fields of psychology or labour relations, and also tend to use laboratory studies for their main methodology (see Bartenuk et al, 1975; Barsky, 1983; Carnevale, 1986; McLaughlin et al, 1991; Rubin, 1980; Wall, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1981, 1984). At the level of international relations, again, most research concentrates on detailed case studies with little intent towards generalising (see Assefa, 1987, 1988, 1992; Bailey, 1985; Brown, 1990; Hume, 1994; Jabri, 1990; Princen, 1987; Rubin, 1981; Stein, 1985; Touval, 1982; Touval and Zartman, 1985).

Using the four guiding questions outlined above, it is possible to identify and distinguish between two paradigms, or theoretical frameworks, that tend to dominate the field. The first can be termed the Psychology Paradigm. This approach, derived from psychological theories of conflict, produces the vast majority of all research on conflict management. The second approach I have termed the Third Party Intervention Paradigm. This approach tends to be concentrated in the field of international relations, and has also produced voluminous research in recent years (see Bercovitch, 1996; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Princen, 1992a; Rubin, 1981; Touval and Zartman, 1985; Touval, 1982). Each paradigm can be distinguished in terms of its underlying assumptions, its definitions and conceptualisations, its focus on the specific variables it sees as the primary explanatory variables, and its primary methodologies.

In section 2.2 of this chapter, I will outline the four dimensions of a theory of conflict management that will be used to compare the two paradigms. Section 2.3 and 2.4 will then examine each paradigm with respect to the four dimensions. The final section in the chapter will give a brief analysis and evaluation. Here we will attempt to answer the question posed in chapter one: To what extent does current conflict management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare negotiation and mediation in international politics? I will make an argument that neither of these two paradigms are sufficiently equipped for the task.

Caveats

A number of caveats are in order at this point. First, this discussion will not be a comprehensive classification of existing theories of conflict and conflict management. The two approaches under examination here - the Psychological and Third Party Intervention approaches - have already been identified as such (see Klieboer, 1996; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 7-8), along with a number of other approaches. However, they have yet to be examined with regard to the specific question posed here; namely, the relative efficacy of negotiation and mediation¹. This chapter will confine itself to discussing the two paradigms which it sees as being of primary interest and importance to the topic.

Second, there will be no comprehensive descriptions covering all the intricacies and subtleties of these currents of thought. Rather, broad brush-strokes will be used to highlight how each paradigm tends to focus on specific aspects of conflict management, and as a result, makes certain assumptions. The purpose here is not to provide a deep theoretical critique, but simply to examine the parameters of each paradigm in terms of its ability to study and compare negotiation and mediation.

A third important caveat applies mainly to the Third Party Intervention paradigm, but also concerns the Psychology paradigm. For some crucial areas of each paradigm, the underlying theoretical assumptions have remained largely unarticulated (Klieboer

¹ See also Bercovitch, 1982, 1984; Kolb and Babbitt, 1995; Kremenjuk, 1991, for further discussion of different approaches to the study of negotiation and mediation.

and t'Hart, 1995: 309). Thus, in order to draw out these underlying beliefs, I have had, at times, to logically extend existing assumptions and beliefs.

Lastly, in examining these two paradigms, I will be drawing on a body of literature that is multi-level in terms of focus (eg, from inter-personal conflict management to international conflict management), multi-disciplinary, and which employs multiple methodologies (eg, historical case studies, laboratory and field research, large-scale quantitative research, game-theoretic approaches, etc.). While it is possible to point to areas of overlap between the two paradigms, and to authors who seem to take eclectic approaches, I believe that it is possible and prudent to distinguish between them.

2.2 Paradigmatic Comparison

Theories of conflict management can be compared along three key dimensions: (1) the nature of conflict (including international conflict); (2) the nature of (international) conflict management; and (3) the primary methodological approaches to studying the phenomenon. A fourth dimension can be added to this when we focus specifically on the nature of (international) negotiation and mediation. In order to comb the literature and uncover competing theories of conflict management, it is necessary to transform these broad dimensions into a specific set of questions which can guide the search. In Table 2.1 the four key dimensions are disaggregated into a series of specific research questions based loosely on the questions posed earlier in section 2.1. Thus, dimensions 1-3a reflect the need to uncover the assumptions, definitions, and conceptualisations of conflict management expressed in questions 1 and 2, while dimension 3b corresponds to question 3, and dimension 4 corresponds to question 4.

Using this approach, I will attempt to draw out the unique features of each paradigm, highlighting how the manner in which each paradigm deals with the earlier questions ultimately determines its ability to effectively deal with the comparative question of negotiation and mediation. In other words, there is a logic in the sequence of questions posed; the way negotiation and mediation are conceptualised and studied, is largely dependent on the assumptions, definitions, and conceptualisations of international politics, conflict, and conflict management.

Table 2.1 Comparing Paradigms: Four Key Dimensions

KEY QUESTIONS:
DIMENSION 1 THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a what kind of actors are there in international politics?; b what is conflict, is international conflict unique?
DIMENSION 2 THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a what are the key functions and goals of international conflict management?; b how is international conflict managed, how should it be managed?
DIMENSION 3 THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a how are negotiation and mediation conceptualised, how are they compared?; b what are the most important factors affecting negotiation and mediation?
DIMENSION 4 STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a can negotiation and mediation be compared, are they compared?; b what are the primary methodologies for studying negotiation and mediation?

2.3 The Psychology Paradigm: Generic Conflict Management

The origins of the Psychology Paradigm² can be found in conflict research conducted primarily in the fields of psychology, economic game-theoretic studies, and organisational studies. The number of studies utilising this paradigm numbers in the hundreds (see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992, for a review), although only a few have applied it directly to the level of international relations (see Burton, 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1987; Druckman, 1973; Fisher, 1989, 1995, 1996; Kelman, 1965, 1972; Zartman, 1977, 1978, 1991; Holsti, 1976; Jonsson, 1982, 1989, 1991; Cross, 1977; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Larson, 1991). Along with the field of

² Although it would be more accurate to refer to this approach as the “Socio-Psychology” paradigm in light of the fact that both social interaction and psychological factors are commonly utilised, I employ the term Psychology paradigm for two simple reasons. First, to avoid confusions over its usage, and second, to provide relevance and continuity to previous authors who follow my terminology (see Bercovitch, 1984a; Klieboer, 1994, 1996, 1997).

conflict research, foreign policy decision-making studies also make extensive use of psychological approaches to international relations (see Allison, 1971).

A comprehensive outline and critique of the Psychological approach is not possible here. In any case, this has already been attempted (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). A brief outline of its main features, as related to the question of the relative efficacy of negotiation and mediation, will suffice. While the Psychology paradigm has been examined in a comparative manner with regard to other questions (see Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995), it has yet to be applied to the question under examination here.

I The Nature of International Conflict

As its starting point, the Psychology paradigm rejects the traditional neorealist so-called billiard ball approach to international politics, where actors are assumed to be homogenous and unitary, and the decision-making process is “black-boxed”. Rather, international actors are assumed to be complex entities made up of leaders, agencies, bureaucratic organisations, factions, and constituencies, all of which consist of individuals who have to make decisions in the context of competing demands, role expectations, and internal and external pressures. This view contrasts with the neorealist view, where foreign policy decisions are made rationally in the national interest, which is itself a reflection of the logic of the state’s position in the international system (see Section 2.4 below).

In other words, international politics can best be understood by focusing on the behavioural motives and policy-making processes of the individuals concerned. Specifically, the Psychology paradigm focuses on: (1) the personal variables of policy makers, such as identity and attribute factors (eg gender, ethnicity, friendliness, sense of humour, etc), attitudinal and perceptual variables (eg degree of flexibility or cooperativeness), and cognitive process factors (eg cognitive complexity, cognitive consistency); (2) the organisational dimensions of decision-making, such as the role of expectations on individuals, the interplay between personalities and routinised procedures, levels of accountability, the occupation of boundary roles, and bureaucratic factional competition; and (3) the role of domestic constraints within

which policy-makers operate, such as political parties, pressure groups, and public opinion. In short, international politics is conceived of here as simply a complex form of problem solving, similar in every other respect to the types of decisions made by individuals and organisational elites at every other social level. International interaction is the interplay between systems of decision-making.

Within the Psychology paradigm it is assumed that the perceived similarities between conflicts at different levels (eg the similarities between interpersonal conflict and inter-organisational conflict), justifies its study as a distinct field (Mitchell, 1981: 3; Boulding, 1962: 1). It follows from this that the study of conflict at one level, for example the level of international politics, can be informed by studies at another level, such as the interpersonal level. Within this paradigm, conflict has been defined as: "... a perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously" (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994: 5). Similarly, it has been argued that "a conflict situation is one where two or more social entities (or parties) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals" (Mitchell, 1981: 17), or, "conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of future potential positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other" (Boulding, 1962).

In other words, the Psychology paradigm takes a generic approach to conflict. International conflict is not a special case or especially unique, but rather is simply the same phenomenon at another level of social interaction. Combined with earlier assumptions about international actors, it follows that international conflict is caused by perceptions of mutually incompatible goals, or diverging interests, by policy elites. They arise because political leaders harbour subjective, situation-specific images of the national interest and the actions and motives of competing national leaders, and not necessarily because of any objective incompatibilities (see Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995). In this sense, conflict is subjectively construed, and the essential problem of international conflict is the perceptions of relationship, need, and goal incompatibilities, and at times, misperceptions about the meaning of certain behaviours. The most important causes of international conflict are misperceptions arising from distrust and underestimation and overestimation of the other's

capabilities to exert coercion. This can lead to an escalatory spiral of self-reinforcing misperceptions and conflictual actions leading to violence (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 321).

II The Nature of International Conflict Management

Conflict as such, is neither good nor bad. At times, parties can be dissatisfied with the outcomes and feel that they have lost as a result of the conflict, or, they may be satisfied with the outcome and feel that they have gained as a result of the conflict. In other words, there are destructive conflicts and constructive conflicts (Deutsch, 1969: 10). The problems with conflict at the international level are twofold: (1) from a decision-making perspective, conflicts at this level often have built-in escalation mechanisms which can cause them to spiral out of control; and (2) conflicts at this level have tremendous destructive potential.

The good news is, however, that because conflict is subjectively construed, constructive management of international conflict is in principle, possible. That is, because conflict is seen here to be largely in the eye of the beholder, there is no reason why its complete resolution should be impossible (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 321). A conflict can be considered settled when destructive behaviour has been reduced and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast to that, a conflict is said to be resolved when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the parties in conflict. Conflict management can, therefore, be directed toward conflict settlement, or it can be directed toward achieving the more complex, if enduring, outcome of conflict resolution (Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997).

On this basis then, the goal of international conflict management is to alter the behaviour and perceptions of decision-makers in order to arrest conflict spirals and resolve deep-rooted differences. This is done by working with decision-makers to build trust, re-align perceptions, identify underlying needs, construct innovative solutions, and improve relationships. This implies that in practice, the very process of initiating and sustaining a dialogue in a conflict is as important as reaching a resolution.

The primary method of conflict management is bargaining and negotiation. This is true at all levels of conflict, and is not surprising given that joint bilateral decision-making has greater advantages and less risks than dealing with a conflict unilaterally (eg struggle, withdrawal, submission), or allowing a third party to adjudicate (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 2-6). It is certainly the principal means of handling all international disputes, and is employed more frequently than all other techniques of conflict management put together (Merrills, 1991: 2). This is because:

...direct negotiation between sides in a dispute is the ideal way to resolve conflict on all levels. It is the most efficient method because it requires the least formality, eliminates the expense of third parties and helps avoid adversary proceedings which often aggravate hostility. The complexity of the communication problem may be reduced... privacy of discussion allows for flexibility and candour so important issues can be discussed with fewer risks. One of the major advantages of bilateral negotiations is that they can be more binding. Mutual consent to a resolution gives it legitimacy... (Suter, 1986: 10)

From this viewpoint, the way to improve international conflict management is to improve negotiator (eg, foreign policy-makers') skills, if necessary, by employing skilled facilitators who can educate and teach negotiators how to find creative solutions to their conflicts. Facilitators need to be neutral actors with analytical and communication skills who can bring into practice the lessons of applied conflict analysis (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 321-322).

III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation and mediation are both voluntary conflict management methods with non-binding outcomes (see chapter one). This is the basis for considering them together. Within the Psychology paradigm, mediation is considered to be simply, "a special case of negotiation", in that "mediation is like negotiation except that a third party helps the disputants reach agreement" (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165, 4). In other words, mediation is a variation of negotiation, and there are few essential differences between them (see also Gulliver, 1979; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Touval, 1982; Princen, 1992a; Schelling, 1960; Faure, 1989).

The basis for treating negotiation and mediation as a singular conflict management method comes from two primary considerations: (1) the mediator as bargainer; and (2)

the differences between negotiation and mediation on the one hand, and adjudication on the other. First, the task of a mediator consists largely of “trying to persuade each party to accept the largest concession which the other is willing to make” (Pruitt, 1971: 230). In this sense, mediators can be conceived of as influence agents, themselves functioning in a bargaining role (Rubin and Brown, 1975: 63). That is, mediators transform a dyadic bargaining structure into a triadic bargaining structure (see Figure 2.1), and become another party to a bargaining relationship. Gulliver expresses it in the following terms when he argues that a mediator:

interacts with each party and with both together, and they may communicate to and through him. He becomes a party in the negotiations. He becomes a negotiator and as such, he inevitably brings with him, deliberately or not, certain ideas, knowledge and assumptions, as well as certain interests and concerns of his own and those of the people he represents (Gulliver, 1979: 7).

What Gulliver is emphasising here, and what can be seen in Figure 2.1, is that mediators have the same characteristics as negotiators. Mediators bring with them to the negotiations their own goals, motivations, orientations, and constituencies (Faure, 1989: 425). Furthermore, mediators then engage in a series of social influence strategies, bargaining with the principal negotiators in an effort to help them overcome the difficulties of negotiating a voluntary agreement (see Touval, 1982; Princen, 1992: 221).


In a mediated negotiation system (see Figure 2.1), a number of different bargaining dynamics are possible. First, the mediator can try to strike a side deal by bargaining directly with one of the disputants. Second, the mediator can threaten to form a coalition with one disputant in order to compel a concession from the other. Third, a mediator can “create a three-way, circular bargain in which the mediator makes a deal with one disputant who, in turn, makes a deal with the other disputant who, to complete the circle, makes a deal with the mediator” (Princen, 1992: 23). In other words, as Figure 2.1 clearly illustrates, mediators expand and complicate the relational possibilities, and the communication dynamics of a negotiation system. What was once a relatively simple, essentially bilateral process, becomes with mediation, a highly complicated multi-lateral bargain.

However, an important caveat to the notion of mediator as bargainer, is that if mediators go too far in pursuing their interests, turning the negotiation into a coalition

game for instance, they negate the mediation process. In other words, mediators, while functioning to a large degree as negotiators in their own right, are circumscribed in their behaviour by the voluntary nature of the process. An example from international mediation occurred in the case of Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war, when Syria's intervention as a military force in June 1976 on the side of the Maronites turned it from a peacemaker to a direct participant.

Second, one of the most important characteristics delimiting various kinds of conflict management techniques is that of voluntarism. There is a vast psychological

Figure 2.1 The Transformation of a Dyadic Negotiation System into a Triadic Mediated Negotiation System (adapted from Wall, 1981: 159).



difference between techniques where full responsibility for the outcome is in the hands of the main protagonists, such as in negotiation and mediation, and those where it is in the hands of a disinterested third party, such as adjudication and other judicial or semi-judicial processes (Morley and Stephenson, 1977: 24-25). Accordingly, the Psychology paradigm excludes all judicial and semi-judicial methods of conflict management from categories of negotiating behaviour, while treating mediation as a form of bargaining (Lall, 1966, 1985; Morley and Stephenson, 1977: 25). In other words, the primary distinction between species of conflict management techniques, as it were, is drawn between negotiation (and its adjunct, mediation), and adjudication.

Voluntarism also has important implications for the behaviour of the parties to a negotiation. It means that both negotiation and mediation are systems of social influence, where the parties use social influence strategies to alter the perceptions and behaviour of the other parties. They cannot use coercion or sanctions, as adjudicators can.

Based on the preceding assumptions and conceptualisations of international politics, conflict, and conflict management, the Psychology paradigm denotes three clusters of variables that affect negotiation and mediation: (1) situational or contextual factors; (2) personal and role factors; and (3) interactional factors. Situational or contextual factors refer here to all the social and physical conditions under which the negotiations take place, each of which can impinge upon the conflict management process and exert a powerful influence on its nature and quality (Druckman, 1971). Situational factors include: (a) physical components, such as the location of the negotiation, the neutrality of the site, or the physical arrangements for discussions; (b) social components, such as the number of parties involved in the process, the presence or absence of audiences, or the presence of third parties; and (c) issue components, such as the type of issues (tangible or intangible), the number of issues, or the availability of alternative solutions (Bercovitch, 1984: 131).

Second, it seems logical that personal factors influence bargaining and negotiation in as much as it is an activity undertaken by human subjects. The effect of personal and role factors on the bargaining process is perhaps the most widely studied area of negotiation and mediation research within the Psychology paradigm, producing

hundreds of laboratory experiments designed to determine the effect of personal factors on negotiating behaviour, or to understand the cognitive processes of negotiators (see Benton, 1975; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Gilkey and Greenhalgh, 1986; Kimmel et al, 1980; Rubin et al, 1990; Thompson, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1991; Wall, 1976).

Personal factors include all of the individual characteristics, needs, attributes, expectations, and other enduring dispositions which the actors bring with them to the negotiation. These personality traits predispose the individual to certain perceptions and behaviour, and include characteristics such as age, gender, religion, intelligence, and cognitive complexity, as well as motivations and attitudes such as trusting, cooperativeness, authoritarianism, or machiavellism. Role factors, on the other hand, describe a set of influences which stem from the negotiator's reference group, or from expectations attached to their position (Bercovitch, 1984: 130). They determine the decision-latitude of the negotiator by producing a field of pressure in which each actor has to be responsive to the needs and expectations of their own constituency (see Kahn, 1991).

Interactional factors refer to the multitude of variables which affect the conflict interactions between the parties; that is, the way each party responds to the other during the negotiations. These factors highlight the importance of the antagonists' prior relationship and the nature of their present interdependence. They are normally considered under the following clusters: (a) the parties' motivational orientation towards each other, whether it is of a cooperative, competitive, or individualistic nature; (b) the distribution of power between the parties, whether it is equal or unequal; (c) the process of communication, whether it is open and trusting, or misleading and controlled; and (d) the parties' utilisation of social influence strategies, such as rewarding or coercive strategies (Bercovitch, 1984: 131-132; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 38-39; Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965: 471-486). It is argued that the process of the negotiation and its eventual outcome will be, to a large degree, determined by the way the parties perceive each other, and perceive the actions of the other during the bargaining process.

IV *Studying Negotiation and Mediation*

Comparing negotiation and mediation within this paradigm is difficult, and in one sense, pointless. This is because it is assumed that they are essentially the same process, and the factors which affect the one will affect the other in a similar way. Thus, studies within this paradigm tend to focus on the effect that mediators have on negotiator behaviour (see Bartunek et al, 1975; Bigoness, 1976; Brookmire and Sistrunk, 1980; Conlon and Fasolo, 1990; Harris and Carnevale, 1990; Johnson and

THE PSYCHOLOGY PARADIGM	
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	
Actors	States akin to individuals and organisations; state leaders as individuals; intermeshing of domestic and international politics
Nature of Conflict	Generic; similar at all levels; essential problem of international conflict is relationships, needs, misperceptions, goal incompatibilities; a complex form of problem-solving
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	
Goal of International Conflict Management	Improve relationships, meet underlying needs, realign perceptions; conflict resolution
Methods of Conflict Management	Primarily negotiation; improve negotiator skills, if necessary, by using skilled facilitators
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Conceptualising Negotiation and Mediation	Mediation as a variation of negotiation; few essential differences; treated as singular conflict management method
Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation	Cognitive, psychological, role factors most important; focus on interaction/process of negotiation
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Comparing Negotiation and Mediation	Difficult due to underlying assumption that negotiation and mediation are essentially the same process; not attempted
Methodology	Laboratory studies, organisational field studies, case studies, mathematical approaches; quantitative and qualitative; descriptive and prescriptive

Table 2.2 Paradigm 1: The Psychology Paradigm

Tullar, 1972; Rubin, 1980; Wall, 1984). Little or no work has been attempted on comparing them as two distinct methods of conflict management, which has been recognised as a major weakness of the paradigm (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165-192, 196).

In order to understand international conflict management, and given the underlying assumptions of this paradigm, researchers have a variety of appropriate methodologies (see Gordon et al, 1984). Laboratory studies at the level of interpersonal conflict, and field studies at the level of inter-organisational conflict can all inform our understanding of international conflict. Similarly, game theoretic approaches can form the basis of prescriptive studies designed to enhance negotiator strategy choice, while in-depth historical studies (see Beriker and Druckman, 1991) can shed light on the motivations and personal dispositions of key players in past cases of negotiation and mediation. In other words, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are appropriate here. Table 2.2 summarises the basic tenets of the Psychology paradigm of international conflict management.

2.4 The Third Party Intervention Paradigm: Special Conflict Management

The origins of the Third Party Intervention paradigm can be found in two separate, but related, developments within international relations literature. The first development was an emerging critique of the Psychology paradigm, in particular, its efforts to apply findings from laboratory studies on interpersonal conflict to the level of international conflict. It is an oft heard cry within the Third Party Intervention literature that extrapolating from the interpersonal context to the complex world of international politics is an exercise in futility, as “international disputes are not interpersonal disputes writ large” (Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11).

The second development has been the increasing tendency to rely on detailed case studies of international negotiation and mediation (see Campbell, 1976; Asseffa, 1987; Ikle, 1964; Inbar, 1991; Jabri, 1990; Lall, 1962; Hume, 1994; Mandel, 1990, 1996; Princen, 1987, 1991, 1992b; Rubin, 1981; Touval, 1982, 1992). Such narrow and detailed focus inevitably highlighted the complexities and unique aspects of international conflict, reinforcing the existing criticism of the Psychology paradigm.

The Third Party Intervention paradigm is almost exclusively limited to international relations scholars, and is embedded in neorealist theory³. However, many of the authors in this paradigm rely on research conducted in the labour and industrial relations literature for notions of third party intervention in conflict (see Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1985, 1989; Jones, 1989; Kochan and Jick, 1978; Kolb, 1983a, 1983b, 1985; and Wall, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1984).

A comprehensive outline of this approach is not possible here and will not be attempted. Rather, a brief overview of the main assumptions and conceptualisations at the heart of the paradigm will be given, with emphasis on how negotiation and mediation are conceptualised and compared. Although this paradigm has been identified and examined in regard to other questions (Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995), it has so far avoided examination in regard to the question of the comparative efficacy of negotiation and mediation.

I The Nature of International Conflict

States are a special kind of social entity. Their unique roles, functions, and abilities set them apart from other social actors. In opposition to the Complex Interdependence School, and other structuralist views of the erosion and diffusion of state sovereignty in contemporary international relations (see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 28-38; Keohane and Nye, 1988; Holsti, 1989), the Third Party Intervention approach assumes that states are the only actors that enjoy sovereignty. That is, they possess inherent absolute, indivisible, and unlimited power and authority over a given territory, and this authority is recognised under international law. States also command allegiance of a people inhabiting a certain territory, having a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical coercion. Non-state actors then, exist and operate only with the consent of states. Furthermore, only states possess the right and ability to wage war, and unlike most non-state actors, governments are responsible for a full range of welfare and security issues for the population they govern.

³ Important contributors within this paradigm include Bercovitch and associates, Dixon, 1996, Gross-Stein, 1985, Kriesberg, 1991, 1996, Mandell, 1990, 1996, Touval and Zartman, 1985, Young, 1967, 1972. The Third Party Intervention paradigm does not have to make neo-realist assumptions, but in its most common manifestations it does. Thus, the following discussion describes it in such terms.

On this basis then, the Third Party Intervention paradigm assumes that states are the primary actors in international politics, and that the most important political activity in the contemporary world still takes place among them. The nature of the interaction between states is unique, because states themselves are unique. Thus, the domestic and international spheres of politics are bifurcated, each having distinctive characteristics and subject to their own laws of behaviour.

One of the distinctive features of international politics is its complexity. All states seek to rationally pursue their national interests. The primary national interest is to secure physical, political, and cultural survival through the maintenance of territorial integrity, preservation of the existing political-economic regime, and enforcing ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historical norms within states. Secondary national interests follow and may include maintaining spheres of influence or standing in the hierarchy of states, securing access to markets and resources, maintaining systems of commerce, creating allies by preserving or creating similar political regimes, or promoting international cooperation through intergovernmental organisations. The pursuit of a myriad of interests and needs by an increasing number of state actors makes international politics - the balancing of each state's needs and interests - a highly complex affair.

Although states are judicially equal, in reality there exists major inequalities between them. This fuels rivalry and attempts to gain comparative advantage (eg, the struggle for power) as states pursue limited resources and values. This competition is reinforced by the decentralised and anarchical structure of the international system, which has no legally and politically superordinate authoritative political institution wielding a monopoly of power capable of regulating such competition. Without such an institution, the potential always exists that competition will turn into violent conflict. This creates the need for states to arm themselves in order to feel secure, leading to a paradoxical situation whereby the means by which one state provides for its security enhances the insecurity of others. In short, conflict is embedded in the very structure of the international system; it is both inherent and ubiquitous.

Furthermore, international conflict is a special case of conflict due to, first of all, its potential level of violence and destruction. Technological advances have meant that today, international conflicts have the potential to threaten the very existence of

the international system if they reach the point of nuclear escalation. Second, international conflicts possess significant contagion elements, whereby conflict can spread far beyond its initial centre of contact. The two world wars are an example of this effect. Third, international conflict is resistant to traditional forms of conflict management. When two states go to war, there is no judge or police force which can rule on the dispute and forcibly separate them, nor is there any reason why they should submit to the norms of bargaining. Lastly, international conflicts are, like all aspects of international politics, extremely complex. Each state's needs and interests, the limited and sometimes indivisible nature of resources, and the increasing levels of interdependence and interaction between groups and organisations, mean that every international conflict is exceedingly complicated. In short, international conflict cannot meaningfully be compared to conflict at lower levels.

II The Nature of International Conflict Management

Conflict management is often confused with conflict prevention or conflict control. This is a common confusion. To suggest that conflicts can be managed implies that conflicts are dynamic social processes, moving from an incipient, latent stage, to maturity and termination. It also suggests that conflicts have certain consequences for the parties involved as well as for the environment in which they occur. The proper concern of conflict management is thus with increasing values and beneficial consequences and decreasing costs and harmful consequences. Conflict management is an attempt to inject learning into the process of conflict, learning which can make conflict more productive and less costly (see Bar-Simon-Tov, 1994).

The primary purpose of conflict management is to arrest the expansion and escalation of conflicts and create a structure or conditions which would be conducive to realising beneficial consequences. Because the anarchical structure of the international system makes it almost impossible to completely resolve the roots of international conflict, the goal of conflict management can only feasibly be conflict settlement; that is, the containment of conflict, the minimisation of its destabilising effects, crisis management, or the deescalation of violence and war. In other words, given the parameters of this paradigm, the best that conflict management can achieve

is the control or lessening of violence, and the maintenance of some kind of stable order.

The primary method of international conflict management is third party intervention, or mediation. This is because typically, war or acute conflict is usually associated with the breaking off of diplomatic relations, making bilateral negotiations difficult (Frankel, 1969: 146). Furthermore, when negotiations fail, as they usually do in the lead-up to a confrontation, this can encourage the use of force by seeming to eliminate other alternatives (Merrills, 1991: 22-26). The other main form of conflict management, judicial methods, also suffers from a number of handicaps. Apart from the unenforcibility of its decisions in the international arena due to the lack of capable enforcement agencies, international law is unsuited to complex political questions, which make up the majority of conflicts in international politics, and states are thus reluctant to submit their disputes to judicial bodies (Merrills, 1991: 140, 150). Legal methods are also inherently inflexible, and as indicated in section 1.3, take the decision-making power away from states.

From this viewpoint then, the way to improve international conflict management is to enhance mediator abilities. This means improving mediator leverage, as well as mediator skills. The mediator needs to discern when the “ripe” moment for intervention is, and what strategies to apply and how much leverage to exert (see Klieboer and t’Hart, 1995; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996). Improving mediator effectiveness will lead to reductions in the levels of destructive conflict in international politics.

III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation

States in conflict logically, have only three choices. They can manage peacefully, they can confront violently, or they can withdraw altogether from the conflict. In the context of international politics, these alternatives have been expressed as “diplomacy, war, or renunciation” (Morganthau, quoted in Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965: 466). That is, they can attempt to peacefully settle their conflict through diplomatic means such as negotiation, mediation, international arbitration or UN forums. Either that, or they can go to war and use military force in the attempt to simply physically

overwhelm their opponent, or, they can withdraw from the conflict and renounce their claims. This is often a useful choice if the costs of pursuing the conflict are higher than the expected gains of winning or compromising. Alternately, states can voluntarily withdraw from the conflict and cease those actions which started it in the first place.

A more refined typology comes from Holsti, who outlines six theoretical modes of behaviour available to states in conflict (Holsti, 1968: 543-551). First, states can avoid or voluntarily withdraw by ceasing those acts which caused the conflict, and desisting from any attempts to press their claims. This is extremely common, especially among states which have friendly or cordial relationships which they may not want to jeopardise. Second, states can attempt to resolve their conflicts by physically overwhelming their opponent through the use of force, or, violent conquest. Third, states can decide to submit to their opponent's demands or withdraw in the face of threats of violence or ultimata. The difference between submission and conquest is that in conquest the threat of force is implemented. Fourth, states can manage their conflict through some sort of compromise, in which all parties agree to a partial or complete solution by withdrawing or modifying their objectives, positions, demands, activities. Normally this is achieved by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or some other pacific method of conflict management. Fifth, states can agree to settle their conflict by award. This involves a third party arbitrating or adjudicating according to internationally prescribed rules found in treaties, custom, or general principles of international law. Finally, conflicts can be passively settled when after a long period of time the parties implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate, and quietly reduce the degree of their commitment to a specific objective.

Expressed another way, states can be said to attempt to settle or manage their conflicts unilaterally, as in avoidance or voluntary withdrawal, violent conquest, and forced submission. Or, they may attempt a bilateral solution, such as when they agree to a compromise or passive settlement. Lastly, a third party may become involved, such as in the case when states agree to solve their differences through award.

Excluding the unilateral modes (eg violent conquest, avoidance, withdrawal, submission), it is possible to discern three overall approaches to conflict management in international relations. The first approach, which is advocated and pursued largely

by states themselves, attempts to maintain the primacy of states in the international system and their absolute sovereignty by keeping the conflict management process solely in their hands. Bilateral and direct methods of conflict management (eg negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry) express the desire of states to maintain control over all their relationships.

The second approach, advocated by both individuals concerned for international peace and order, and international lawyers, sees the establishment of international law as the panacea for international conflict (see Delbruck, 1987). If states could be convinced or forced to submit their conflicts to international courts or tribunals, the peaceful rule of law would prevail. This approach is at odds with the state-centred bilateral approach, as arbitration and judicial settlement take away a great deal of control from states themselves during the conflict management process. This factor alone has made legal techniques of conflict management unpopular. Out of the hundreds of conflicts between states every year, the ICJ considers only a handful. Even then, when a state gets a judgement it believes unfavourable, it will disregard the ruling. When the ICJ ruled in favour of Chile in the Beagle Channel Dispute (1952-68), Argentina simply ignored the ruling and pressed its claims militarily.

Thirdly, what is called the functionalist approach sees the establishment of international organisations with specialised roles, such as the UN, as the most promising means of achieving peace and order in international relations. If states can cooperate in international organisations and utilise their peaceful settlement mechanisms, eventually these organisations could fulfil similar functions to that of national governments and national legal systems. They might be able to provide order in international society. Again, however, states are reluctant to relinquish any sovereignty to a body they cannot directly control. Morocco, which has been fighting the Saharan nationalist group, Polisario, for control of the territory of Western Sahara (1974-present day), has been delaying UN attempts to hold a referendum in the territory since 1992. It wants to run the referendum on its own terms, fearing the outcome of a UN-sponsored event.

Negotiation and mediation then, are particular types of conflict management, namely, they are essentially bilateral, diplomatic methods. However, in contrast to the Psychology paradigm which treats them as a singular form of conflict management

(eg as variants of negotiation), the Third Party Intervention paradigm sees them as two very different forms of conflict management, treating mediation as a separate, autonomous topic (see Bercovitch, 1985, 1986, 1989; Brett et al, 1986; Dixon, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1996). This is because the injection of a third party into a bargaining situation affects: (1) aspects of the social context of negotiation; (2) the parties in the negotiation; and (3) the process of the negotiation.

The addition of a mediator to a negotiation alters the context of the negotiation in a number of ways. Most noticeably, the presence of a mediator upsets the social component of the negotiation by increasing the number of parties to the bargain. This can dramatically affect the nature of the parties' interaction, as has already been discussed. Also, the mediator brings with them their own set of constituencies and/or audiences (see Figure 2.1). In terms of the issue component of the bargain, the involvement of a mediator can expand or contract the number of issues, and it can expand the number and availability of alternative solutions.

Second, the injection of a mediator affects the parties in the negotiation, because when mediators join a negotiation system as third bargainers, they bring with them a whole new set of personality traits, motivations, interests, orientations, and role expectations. These personal and role factors affect the way they perceive the other parties, and the way they behave towards them. Similarly, the parties' perception of the mediator, their orientation towards them and their antagonist, will all affect the way they behave. In this sense, mediators change the psychological environment of the negotiation simply by being present. However, if a mediator has only a minor interest in the outcome of the negotiation and perceives their role as non-interventionist and limited to communication-facilitation, then the effect of their presence may be minimal.

Lastly, mediators alter the process of negotiation. The mere presence of a third party profoundly changes the interaction between the disputing parties, simply by changing the relational possibilities in the bargain (Rubin et al, 1994: 198). That is, the possibility of the mediator siding with the opponent forces the negotiator to rethink their strategy. However, the mediator can also be much more active than this, and can attempt to alter their interaction in a number of important areas. The mediator can alter the parties' motivational orientation towards each other through supplying

information, enhancing communication, promoting trust, etc. Similarly, the mediator can alter the distribution of power between the parties by siding with the weaker party or giving more weight to their suggestions. In short, through the use of social influence strategies mediators can profoundly alter the way the parties behave towards each other. Again however, the impact of the mediator will be determined somewhat by the degree and intensity of their intervention.

In this context then, mediation is very different from negotiation. Furthermore, its unique qualities make it ideally suited to the complex world of international politics. It is flexible, with mediators able to perform a variety of roles in a multitude of contexts. Skilled mediators are able to adapt a variety of strategies to enable the parties to overcome deadlock or impasse. And, as has already been discussed, mediation enables states to retain control over the process and outcome of the bargain. The utility of mediation is reflected in its extensive use in international politics. Butterworth found that of the 310 disputes between 1945 and 1974, a mediator was involved in 255 (82%) of the cases (Butterworth, 1976).

Based on the underlying assumptions and conceptualisations of the Third Party Intervention paradigm, three clusters of variables are thought to be the most important for explaining mediation. These are: (1) the situational or contextual factors inherent in the conflict itself; (2) the identity and characteristics of the mediator; and (3) the strategies and behaviour of the mediator. Contextual factors refer to such components as the issues in conflict, the intensity of the conflict, the nature and number of the parties, the international environment, the distribution of power between the parties, and the availability of alternative solutions. However, of more interest are the variables to do with the mediator and their activities.

While some scholars see mediators as vital actors who can alter the antagonists' behaviour and affect the outcome of the negotiation (see Brett et al, 1986; Carnevale, 1986; Young, 1967; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Donohue and Burrell, 1988), others do not see the mediator as a critical determinant and play down the importance of mediators' personal characteristics (see Harbottle, 1979; Kochan and Jick, 1978; Ott, 1972). Among the studies that do consider mediator attributes as central to the process and outcome of mediation, there are a number of variables that stand out.

Mediator rank and identity is thought to play a very important role. For example, whether a mediator is a representative or not carries important implications in terms of legitimacy in the eyes of the disputants, and constituent pressures. Mediators can act purely as individuals, representing their own idiosyncratic points of view, or they can occupy representative roles instead (Rubin et al, 1994: 199-200). Representative roles have the advantage of being able to speak for constituencies that may possess vast sources of legitimacy or resources. For example, part of Richard Holbrooke's success in the Bosnian conflict was attributable to his status as representative of an extremely powerful state with many resources. However, if the constituency represented is seen by the disputants as being illegitimate or lacking in desirable resources, mediator effectiveness will be hampered. The legitimacy of US mediation in the Middle East has often been questioned.

Mediator rank and identity also raises the important issue of mediator **acceptability**. Mediators are not necessarily accepted because they are thought to be neutral and impartial, but because the mediator may help the disputants to realise some of their aims and interests, and because they use a cost-benefit paradigm. That is, mediators are accepted to the extent that they are thought capable of bringing about an acceptable outcome (Zartman and Touval, 1985: 36), and to the extent that the disputants view the costs of rejecting the mediation as being higher than the benefits to be accrued (Touval and Zartman, 1985: 15).

Mediator acceptability is also part and parcel of the notion of mediator **leverage** (see Zartman and Touval, 1985: 40-43), which is the mediator's power or ability to employ successful strategies that will realise the disputants' (and the mediator's) interests. Mediators will, to some degree, be acceptable if they are perceived to have leverage. Leverage has its most important source in the disputants' need for a solution. The mediator's power comes from the disputants' perception that the mediator has the power to engender an acceptable solution. Thus, in order to increase the mediator's source of leverage, they may need to foster the perception that the conflict is unsolvable without their help, and the costs of non-settlement are higher than the costs of the mediator's proposed settlement. Other sources of mediator leverage include their coalition-making ability, and the material and non-material resources which the mediator brings to the bargain, and which the disputants value.

The mediator's relationship to the parties is also an important variable. Here we refer to such factors as mediator **bias**, or **impartiality**, the level of trust between the mediator and the parties, and whether or not there is a continuing relationship between the mediator and the parties (see Donohue and Ramesh, 1992: 211-212). As Bercovitch and Houston observe, "a mediator who shares a common experience or affiliation with the parties may enhance the effectiveness of mediation through the existence of intimacy, understanding, trust, commitment, interdependence, rapport, and confidence" (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 302). It was once assumed that for a mediator to be both acceptable and effective, they had to be neutral and impartial, and only interested in resolving the conflict (see Folberg and Taylor, 1984; Moore, 1986; Ott, 1972). This notion has been successfully challenged within the Third Party Intervention paradigm on a number of grounds. First, it has been noted that in many recent instances of successful international mediation, the mediator has been neither neutral nor impartial (Touval, 1982: 12; see also Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Smith, 1985). The mediation by Kissinger in the Middle East comes to mind here.

Second, assuming that the disputants use a rational cost-benefit paradigm in their conflict management attempts, the partiality of the mediator may be considered an asset (Zartman and Touval, 1985: 35-37). That is, if one disputant views the mediator as being closer to the other disputant, they may assume that the mediator will be able to wield more influence over their opponent, and extract more concessions from them than would otherwise be possible. At the same time, perceived mediator bias may encourage either party to offer concessions in an effort to avoid being left out of a coalition.

Third, the fact that mediators become negotiators in a three-cornered bargain makes the communication process that much more complex. Negotiators interpret information according to their perceptions, biases, and orientations, and will of necessity, take into account any perceived bias or partiality on the part of the mediator when assessing mediator communications. In other words, if either or both of the disputants regard the mediator as partial, this need not detract from the mediator's role as a communication channel (Touval, 1982: 17).

The mediator's skill and experience are important factors influencing the outcome of mediation. Among the specific attributes cited by practitioners and researchers as

being important for effective mediation are skill, energy, effort, credibility, confidence, knowledge, authority, originality of ideas, rapport, intelligence, and a sense of humour (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1986, 1991; Gross-Stein, 1985; Kolb, 1983a, 1983b; Wehr, 1979; Young, 1967). Clearly, many of these aspects of the mediator's character are regulated by their own goals, interests, motivations, and orientations.

The behaviour of the mediator has been suggested by some scholars to be the crucial determinant of the success or failure of the intervention. The two most important aspects of mediator behaviour are thought to be: (1) the timing of the mediator's intervention; and (2) the mediator's choice of strategy. **Timing** is crucial, because it seems reasonable to assume that in the course of a conflict there will be an optimum moment when the conditions are more conducive to mediation than at any other time. However, it is also problematic because there is scant agreement or empirical evidence to suggest when that optimum point in time is. Some have argued that mediation early in the conflict is more likely to be effective, because the disputants are still reasonably flexible, and their positions have not yet hardened (Touval, 1982: 8-10). Others however, claim that a "hurting stalemate" later on in the conflict provides the best motivation for policy changes, and hence, the mediator has the best opportunity to move the parties towards deescalation and agreement (Touval and Zartman, 1985: 9-10).

Of greater importance is the mediator's choice of **strategy**, as this can often be the crucial element in getting talks started, breaking a deadlock, or creating momentum towards agreement. The most widely used typology of mediator strategies in international politics is that offered by Touval and Zartman, who classify all mediation strategies as either communication, formulation, or manipulation approaches (Touval and Zartman, 1985). Communication strategies consist of searching for, supplying, and clarifying information; that is, acting as a go-between. Formulation strategies are designed to help the mediator gain and retain control over the process of interaction, using such tactics as setting the agenda and controlling the environment. The most active strategy, that of manipulation, involves the mediator directly in changing the parties' decision-making process through rewards, offering solutions, or exerting pressure.

Numerous studies have attempted to uncover which strategies are effective under different conditions (see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Young, 1972; Pruitt, 1971; Wilson, 1992; Carnevale and Pagnetter, 1985; Donohue, 1989; Donohue and Burrell, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989). How mediators decide which strategy to employ is an important related question, not without controversy (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). For the most part, mediators' behaviour is not based on a predetermined plan of action, but reflects the context of the dispute, and the needs and interests of the parties. Furthermore, as the dynamics of the dispute and context of a mediation change, so too will mediators adapt their strategies (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 304).

IV Studying Negotiation and Mediation

Comparing negotiation and mediation within this paradigm is difficult and rarely, if ever, attempted. This is because they are assumed to be very different processes, with different dynamics and casual factors. That is, mediation transforms the negotiation so completely that comparing the two results only in underlining the singularity and uniqueness of mediation as a method of conflict management. In this sense, it implies the old chestnut of comparing apples and oranges, as it were. Thus, the vast majority of studies within this paradigm tend to focus solely on aspects of mediation, without considering comparative aspects of negotiation (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1992; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Langely, 1993; Brown, 1990; Carnevale and Arad, 1996; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Gross-Stein, 1985; Hume, 1994; Inbar, 1991; Rubin, 1981; Touval 1975, 1982; Touval and Zartman, 1985).

Given the underlying assumptions of this paradigm, two main methodologies are used to collect data and explain mediation. Firstly, historical case studies provide in-depth understanding of the strategies and goals of the mediator, the effect that they had on the negotiation, and the outcome of the intervention. Most studies on international mediation fall within this category. Second, there has been a recent attempt to conduct large-scale, quantitative studies of international mediation using data sets which code mediator behaviour and dispute characteristics according to quantifiable variables (see Bercovitch, 1986; Frei, 1976; Dixon, 1996). These studies

attempt to find associations between variables, thus providing the beginnings of generalisations. In both methodologies, studies normally attempt to describe as well as prescribe. Table 2.3 summarises the main features of the Third Party Intervention paradigm.

Table 2.3 Paradigm 2: The Third Party Intervention Paradigm

THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION PARADIGM	
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	
Actors	States primarily; unique among social actors; complexity of interests, needs, dilemmas; strict boundary domestic and international politics
Nature of Conflict	Special case defined by its complexity, violence, resistance to traditional forms of conflict management; caused by system-induced clash of competing national interests in an anarchical society
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	
Goal of International Conflict Management	Control violence; conflict regulation or management; the maintenance of order
Methods of Conflict Management	Primarily mediation; improve mediator skills, resources, abilities to intervene; mediation as system regulation
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Conceptualising Negotiation and Mediation	Important differences between bilateral and third party methods; mediation as a special form of conflict management, ideally suited to international conflict
Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation	Largely contextual and interactional; power, parties, strategies, outcomes; international context
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Comparing Negotiation and Mediation	Difficult due to implicit assumptions of uniqueness of mediation; not attempted
Methodology	Historical case studies; large-scale quantitative studies; association-building, generalising; descriptive and prescriptive

2.5 Evaluating Current Conflict Management Paradigms

In this chapter, I have outlined two currently dominant approaches to the study of international conflict management. Neither approach appears adequate to the task of meaningfully comparing negotiation and mediation at the conceptual and empirical levels. For the Psychology paradigm, this inadequacy is related to three specific aspects: (1) its generic approach to conflict; (2) its lack of a comparative theory of negotiation and mediation; and (3) its reliance on experimental methodologies.

First, conceptualising conflict as generic fails to acknowledge the important differences between international conflict and conflict at other levels. Actually, the Psychology paradigm often fails to distinguish between individuals and groups, even though groups make decisions in very different ways to individuals (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 196). International conflict, due to its sheer scale and potential level of destruction, is different to conflict at other levels. Thus, not only is extrapolating from other levels problematic, but it logically follows that managing conflict at the international level will require different methods to those at other levels. In this, the Third Party Intervention approach is correct; international conflict is best dealt with employing conflict management methods suited to international politics.

Furthermore, even if one were to concede that international conflict and its management was essentially a problem of the psychology of elite decision-makers, the level of complexity at the international level is so much greater than at other levels that it would still have to be considered a special case. This is not to say that findings from the Psychology framework are completely irrelevant to international politics, but simply to highlight the limitations involved in extrapolating from these findings to the world of international conflict management.

Second, the Psychology paradigm's conceptualisation of mediation as essentially the same as negotiation leaves it with a weak theoretical basis for comparison. In this view, mediation is not only the same genus as negotiation, it is essentially the same phenomenon and thus, there is little basis for comparison. That is, scholars from this perspective see mediation as "assisted negotiation", or, as a slightly more complex form of "three-cornered negotiation". Lastly, trapped as it is within psychological constructions of negotiation and mediation, the paradigm has no option but to pursue

knowledge using methodologies which are ill-suited to the world of international politics (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11; Carnevale et al, 1989: 364; Gordon, Schmitt, and Schnieder, 1984; Wall and Lynn, 1993: 182). Furthermore, the focus on personal and role variables seems to exclude a world of relevant contextual or environmental factors which impinge on conflict management (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 195).

In other words, the Psychology paradigm does not provide an adequate theoretical basis for a comparison of negotiation and mediation, and its limitations precludes its adoption here. Although the Third Party Intervention paradigm is a vast improvement on the Psychology approach, it also fosters a number of limitations: (1) an incomplete conceptualisation of international conflict; (2) an over-emphasis on the differences between negotiation and mediation; and (3) its tendency to rely, for the most part, on historical methodologies.

First, the Third Party Intervention paradigm, without going into detail, appears to take an undifferentiated approach to international conflict. That is, it does not distinguish conceptually between armed conflict and non-armed conflict, even though there would appear to be important differences. Armed conflict threatens the very existence of a state by threatening its territoriality. This puts it in a very different category to political incidents, diplomatic exchanges, or economic conflicts (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). In this sense, it is a “one-off” dispute which cannot be dealt with through normal diplomatic practice (see Princen, 1992a: 7-8). Furthermore, once the threshold of violence has been crossed in international conflict, most often, states break off diplomatic contact. This makes negotiation difficult. It follows that international armed conflict requires different conflict management methods than non-armed international conflict. By not specifying which type of conflict management fits which type of conflict at the international level, this approach could be characterised as an incomplete contingency approach.

Second, the Third Party Intervention paradigm over-emphasises the differences between negotiation and mediation, implying that mediation is a separate type of conflict management. This again, is not to say scholars from this perspective do not recognise similarities between the two methods, but simply that they tend to underplay the similarities in order to highlight the differences for the purposes of their

research. If indeed it is the case that negotiation and mediation are of a different genus as it were, then again, comparison becomes difficult. In other words, this paradigm too, lacks a comparative theory of negotiation and mediation which could provide a solid basis for an empirical study. Related to this, the emphasis on mediation has, as we have already stressed, led to an empirical neglect in the area of international negotiation. The lack of studies on international negotiation, or comparative studies involving several methods of conflict management, has meant a serious empirical gap remains unfilled. Lastly, the Third Party Intervention paradigm's reliance on historical case studies with little or no generalising power hampers the quest for knowledge about international conflict management that could be applied prescriptively. What is required are more large-scale quantitative studies that can generate knowledge about negotiation and mediation in general.

In short, the Third Party Intervention paradigm also poses limitations for the comparative study of negotiation and mediation, although it is clearly an improvement over the Psychology paradigm. What is required is a modified Third Party Intervention framework that specifies which type of conflict management methods fit which type of conflict at the level of international politics, and which also provides a theoretical framework for comparing negotiation and mediation. In the next chapter, I will propose a more complete contingency approach which will do just that, and which will provide the basis for an empirical study in chapters four and five.

Table 2.4 summarises and compares the two paradigms discussed in this chapter.

Table 2.4 Conflict Management Paradigms in Comparative Perspective

	I THE PSYCHOLOGY PARADIGM	II THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION PARADIGM
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT		
Actors	States akin to individuals and organisations; state leaders as individuals; intermeshing of domestic and international politics	States primary; unique among social actors; complexity of interest, needs, dilemmas; strict boundary domestic and international politics
Nature of Conflict	Generic; similar at all levels; essential problem of international conflict is relationships, needs, misperceptions, goal incompatibilities; a complex form of problem-solving	Special case defined by its complexity, violence, resistance to traditional forms of conflict management; caused by system-induced clash of competing national interests in an anarchical society
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT		
Goal of Conflict Management	Improve relationships, meet underlying needs, realign perceptions; conflict resolution	Control violence; conflict regulation or management; the maintenance of order
Methods of Conflict Management	Primarily negotiation; improve negotiator skills, if necessary by using skilled facilitators	Primarily mediation; improve mediator skills, resources, abilities to intervene; mediation as system regulation
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION		
Conceptualising Negotiation and Mediation	Mediation as a variation of negotiation; few essential differences; treated as a singular conflict management method	Important differences between bilateral and third party methods; mediation as a special form of conflict management ideally suited to international politics
Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation	Psychological, role factors most important; focus on interactional process of negotiation	Largely contextual and interactional; power, parties, strategies, outcomes, international context
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION		
Comparing Negotiation and Mediation	Difficult due to underlying assumption that negotiation and mediation essentially the same; not attempted	Difficult due to emphasis on differences
Methodology	Laboratory studies, organisational field studies, case histories, mathematical approaches; quantitative and qualitative; descriptive and prescriptive	Historical case studies, large-scale quantitative studies; association-building, generalising; descriptive and prescriptive

Chapter 3

CONTINGENT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: TOWARDS A COMPARISON OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

3.1 Comparing Negotiation and Mediation: An Alternative Framework

In chapter one I posed the question: To what extent does current conflict management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare negotiation and mediation in international politics? Chapter two examined two dominant paradigms, and concluded that current conflict management theory is inadequate to the task, lacking the necessary theoretical tools for comparative analysis. In this chapter we move on to the next question and ask: Is there an approach which will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and mediation? Answering this question in the affirmative, and outlining such an approach, will take us some way toward discerning which forms of conflict management should be applied to which conflicts.

In terms of comparing negotiation and mediation in international politics, current paradigms suffer from two predominant defects. First, they fail to provide a framework for understanding the different dynamics of conflict at different levels of social interaction. As a consequence, they also fail to appreciate that different types of conflict may require different methods of conflict management. Second, and most importantly, current paradigms lack a sound or articulate theoretical basis for comparing different methods of conflict management, such as negotiation and mediation. That is, although negotiation and mediation have been mentioned together on occasion (Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt, 1986), no attempt has been made to dissect or systematically evaluate the differences and similarities between them.

The task of this chapter is threefold: first, it aims to develop an alternative approach to current paradigms which can provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of conflict at different levels of social interaction. This will provide a general theoretical context for evaluating different forms of conflict management.

Second, the chapter will attempt to articulate a theoretical model which can be used as a comparative device for evaluating negotiation and mediation. This model will identify the most important contextual, process, and outcome variables in the study of conflict management. The utility of this model is that it can be used to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare different forms of conflict management (eg, negotiation, mediation, arbitration). Alternatively, it can be used to study the same form of conflict management, such as negotiation, across different levels of social conflict (eg, inter-personal, inter-organisational, international). Lastly, this chapter aims to generate a series of testable propositions which can form the basis of an empirical study.

The general approach developed in this chapter for the purpose of facilitating a comparative inquiry of negotiation and mediation has been termed the Contingency approach. The Contingency framework is predicated on the notion that conflict management is a social process whose outcomes are dependent upon, or contingent on, aspects of the structure and process of the conflict. That is, outcomes are determined by the interaction of certain input variables mediated through the structure and actual situation of the conflict management (Bercovitch, 1984: 140). As mentioned, at the heart of this approach are three clusters of variables which impact on the conflict management: contextual, process, and outcome variables. This implies that successful conflict management outcomes (eg, negotiation outcomes and mediation outcomes) are associated with particular variables. Logically then, assuming that negotiation and mediation are different methods of conflict management (eg, not a singular type), the specific variables which are associated with mediation success will be different to the variables associated with negotiation success.

The advantages of taking such an approach are many. In the first place, and perhaps most importantly, the Contingency framework is a comparative device which can be used to compare conflict management across types, or across social levels. For example, the effect of large disparities in power between the protagonists could be examined and compared in cases where the disputants negotiated bilaterally, engaged a mediator, or submitted their dispute to the UN. Similarly, the same power disparity

effect could be compared in cases of negotiation at the inter-personal, inter-organisational, or international levels.

Second, the Contingency framework encourages systematic empirical research, because it stipulates variables and attributes with explicit operational criteria (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 9). That is, it encourages data collection, the lack of which poses a serious obstacle to our understanding of conflict management. Third, the approach helps to identify variables which have been observed as associated with, or facilitators of, successful outcomes (Bercovitch, 1984: 140). Furthermore, it offers a useful framework for organising and integrating much of the research on conflict management. Fourth, it facilitates theory development by articulating a rudimentary theory of conflict management (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 673). In this sense, it improves upon current paradigms by highlighting different types of international conflict and conflict management. Lastly, the Contingency framework allows the researcher to focus on either detailed studies of single cases, or the utilisation of large data sets on conflict management.

The specific theoretical contributions of this chapter to current conflict management research are, first, that it fills some of the conceptual gaps identified in earlier chapters. Specifically, it outlines a general understanding of conflict from which a comparative study of conflict management can logically emerge. Second, it articulates for the first time the specific similarities and differences between negotiation and mediation. Thus, it provides the beginnings of a comparative and integrated theory of negotiation and mediation. In other words, we are seeking to answer the following questions: Are there any real differences between negotiation and mediation, and how important are those differences? What is the nature of their similarities? Is mediation simply another form of negotiation? Are they more likely to be successful under different circumstances? To date, no study has attempted to systematically address these kinds of questions.

We begin the task of identifying and explaining the Contingency framework by asking the same set of questions we posed in chapter two to evaluate the Psychology and Third Party Intervention paradigms:

- 1 What assumptions does this framework make about international conflict, states, the goals of conflict management, and the nature of negotiation and mediation?
- 2 How does the framework define and conceptualise international relations, conflict, and conflict management, and how does it distinguish between negotiation and mediation?
- 3 Which variables does the framework focus on as having the greatest explanatory power?
- 4 What primary methodologies does the framework tend to employ?

Using these four dimensions, section 3.2 will outline and explain the main features of the Contingency framework. The comparative dimensions of this framework in regard to negotiation and mediation will be summarised in section 3.3. In section 3.4 the primary propositions of the study will be presented, followed by a number of secondary, exploratory propositions. These propositions will be drawn from both conflict management literature and the Contingency framework. The final section of the chapter will summarise the argument thus far, and preview the following chapters.

A few caveats are in order at this point. First, the Contingency framework is a heuristic, exploratory theoretical framework. Its primary purpose is to facilitate an empirical investigation, and not necessarily to articulate a full-blown theory. In this sense, it is an investigative device which proposes a set of theoretical propositions, each of which will be supported or unsupported by the empirical study. Thus, it will take the form of broad brush-strokes rather than intricate machinations. Second, the framework draws on a disparate body of literature, incorporating as it does, some aspects of existing paradigms (eg, the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm). It is based on, and extends, the Third Party Intervention paradigm, and thus, logically extends underlying assumptions that, at times, remain unarticulated. Lastly, the propositions drawn from the Contingency framework are based on both logical extensions of the theory, and existing research. The task of

constructing testable propositions which relate to a comparison of negotiation and mediation has been severely hampered by the lack of studies on the topic. In other words, the propositions presented here are largely exploratory, and while they fit the logic of the model generally, they are not meant to be the theoretical underpinnings of a complete theory.

3.2 The Contingency Framework: Filling Conceptual Gaps

The Contingency framework has its origins in two separate, but complementary, areas of research. The first is research on third party intermediary intervention in international politics that fits squarely within the Third Party Intervention paradigm. Bercovitch and his associates developed a contingency framework of mediation (see Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993), which built on comparable but less refined models developed by others (Raymond and Kegley, 1985; Wall, 1981). A few have since utilised a similar approach (see Dixon, 1996). The second area of research comes from the Burton “problem-solving school”, which fits more closely into the Psychology paradigm. Recent work by Fisher and associates has developed an as yet untested contingency model of conflict management, which attempts to coordinate and complement “Track Two Diplomacy”, or, “Third Party Consultation”, with traditional forms of international intermediary assistance (see Fisher, 1995; Fisher and Keashly, 1988, 1991, 1996; Webb et al, 1996).

The main problem with both of these approaches are that they are incomplete. That is, they confine themselves to investigating and matching conflicts to forms of third party intervention only. They do not consider a wider range of conflict management methods that may be applicable, and as a consequence, they do not articulate any comparative theory of negotiation and mediation. The Contingency framework presented here extends these existing models to allow for a wider comparison between bilateral modes of conflict management (negotiation), and third party modes (mediation).

The success of the Contingency framework depends to a large part on constructing typologies of conflict and conflict management. That is, because this

approach is predicated on matching types of conflict management to types of conflict, articulating useful typologies is central. To construct a typology, it is necessary to identify the theoretical characteristics of the phenomenon that will differentiate it from related phenomenon, and which will aid analysts in uncovering its important aspects (Vasquez, 1993: 64). In the following discussion, I will present a number of relevant typologies focusing on conflict, and more specifically, international conflict, and conflict management.

I The Nature of International Conflict

Without completely rejecting neorealism, the Contingency framework takes what has been termed the “complex interdependence” view of international politics (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 31-32). That is, it challenges the prevailing neorealist assumption that states are the most important actors in world politics. Instead, other actors, such as transnational corporations (eg, IBM, BP, United Fruit Company), liberation groups (eg, the PLO, IRA, Tamil Tigers), ethnic groups (eg, the Palestinians, the Kurds, the Serbians, the Croatsians), movements (eg, the Peace Movement, the Environmental Movement), organisations (eg, Greenpeace, the EU, the UN), and even some individuals (eg, the Pope, Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama), are also important actors. This is not only because of the impact of their activities as they pursue their own interests, but also because they act as transmission belts for government policies. International politics then, is the sum of a complex web of interacting parts in a global society.

Furthermore, international conflict, like peace, is a process, rather than an end state. It is active and dynamic, rather than passive and static. In its behavioural manifestation it consists of all the organised and collective efforts by one nation to control, influence, injure, or destroy the persons and property of another. International conflict is also a multi-casual and multi-faceted phenomenon, not easily accounted for in terms of single traits or approaches. Its occurrence should not (unless it is violent) be taken as an interruption of “normal” interactions. It is a very natural and probable consequence of the existence of multifarious actors with different values and interests. Given a system with fairly autonomous and diverse units, linked together in a

relationship that is both competitive and cooperative, the potential for conflict is unbounded. This does not mean that every relationship manifests itself in conflict. Whether or not a relationship will in fact develop in this way will depend upon a set of diffuse structures, attitudes, and behaviours.

However, before we look more closely at international conflict, we need to locate it theoretically. Within the Contingency framework, conflict itself is seen as a complex, dynamic social process consisting of three important and inter-connected dimensions: (1) the conflict situation; (2) behaviour associated with the conflict; and (3) a set of conflict attitudes (Mitchell, 1981: 16-17). These dimensions are usefully illustrated in Galtung's Conflict Triangle (Galtung, 1971: 125), shown in Figure 3.1.

The conflict structure refers to the situation which generates incompatible goals or values among parties, while the conflict attitudes consist of the psychological and cognitive processes which engender, or are consequent to conflict. The conflict behaviour consists of actual, observed activities undertaken by the parties to the conflict designed to injure, thwart, or eliminate the other party (Bercovitch, 1984: 6). Each dimension interacts with the other in a dynamic process. For example, a structural incompatibility may arise, producing hostile attitudes between two parties, which in turn leads to violent behaviour. This may reinforce each party's negative perceptions of the other, while also altering the structural situation. The same or a similar cycle may then repeat itself several times.




Figure 3.1 Galtung's Conflict Triangle

This framework allows the researcher to study all the important elements of the dynamic process of conflict in a systematic and holistic fashion. Furthermore, it can be applied to any level or type of conflict, and aids in the identification of the essential characteristics of any conflict situation. That is, conflict situations are identified as having:

1. at least two parties;
2. mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatible values based on resource or position scarcity;
3. behaviours designed to injure, thwart, or control the other party;
4. mutually opposed actions and counter-actions; and
5. attempts to acquire or exercise power (Mack and Snyder, 1957: 217-219).

However, conflict situations have differences as well as similarities, and the differences are what distinguish types of conflict. Care must be taken in determining definitions and types, because amorphous concepts that include seemingly related but in reality different phenomena, preclude the possibility of establishing clear patterns or correlates (see Vasquez, 1993: 51). For this reason, the following section goes into some detail in the attempt to clarify what we mean by conflict, types of conflict, and international conflict.

The theoretical dimensions along which conflicts can be typologised and the resulting possible types is infinite. A few of the main typologies discussed in the conflict research literature include the following. The first dimension by which conflicts can be distinguished is that of the methods used by the disputants (eg, the conflict behaviours), and the outcomes they produce. For example, parties in conflict can pursue their goals violently or non-violently (Nicholson, 1992: 16; Mack and Snyder, 1957: 220). Wars are a type of violent conflict, for example, while strikes are a type of non-violent conflict. Related to this, Deutsch argues that conflicts are either destructive in that the parties are dissatisfied with the outcomes and feel that they have lost as a result of the conflict, or they are productive, where the parties are satisfied with the outcome and feel that they have gained as a result of the conflict (Deutsch, 1969: 10). In reality, such simple distinctions can rarely be drawn, as conflicts usually have a mixture of violent and non-violent behaviours, and most outcomes have a mix of destructive and productive consequences.

A second dimension focuses on the nature of the parties involved in the conflict, assuming that “each kind of social unit, having its own range of size, structure, and institutions, will also have its own modes of interaction and thus its own patterns of conflict with other social units” (Fink, 1968: 417). At the most basic level, conflicts can be distinguished in terms of whether the parties are individuals, or collective entities (groups). Similarly, Boulding distinguishes between individuals, groups, and organisations, which are well-structured groups with clearly defined roles and constitution (Boulding, 1962: 105). Related to this, Galtung focuses on the size of the parties in conflict and distinguishes between symmetric conflicts between actors of the same rank, and asymmetric conflicts between actors of different rank (Galtung, 1971: 123).

A problem with this approach is that there is no recognised classification of social units (Fink, 1968: 417), and the possible list of different parties may be endless, such as families, tribes, teams, organisations, classes, nations, regions, races, etc (Brickman, 1974: 4). Furthermore, many conflicts occur between individuals and groups, and between vastly different types of groups. The conflict between an individual and a state over human rights is an example of an asymmetric conflict between two disparate types of actors.

Conflicts can also be distinguished in terms of the issues in dispute. At a fundamental level, issues might be classified along the lines of material issues (eg, resources), and non-material issues (eg, ideology), or, resource conflicts where the parties contest limited resources, and survival conflicts where the continual survival of one of the parties at the end of the conflict is at issue (Mitchell, 1981: 43). This might also be described as object-centred conflict, and opponent-centred conflict (Fink, 1968: 448). Another simple classification distinguishes between conflicts of interest, where the parties basically agree about the value of some position, roles, or resources, but diverge over the obtaining of it, and conflicts of value where the parties differ fundamentally about the nature of desirable end-states, or, social and political structures (Mitchell, 1981: 37).¹

¹ Much more detailed classifications of conflict by issue can be found in Mitchell, 1981: 43-44; and Deutsch, 1973: 15-16.

Typologies of conflict have also been made on the level of structure, or, the context in which the conflict occurs. In this classification, conflicts can be divided into institutionalised conflict characterised by explicit rules, predictable behaviour, and continuity, and non-institutionalised conflict which lacks those characteristics and is often disorganised (Mack and Snyder, 1957: 220). Similar to this, Brickman refers to unstructured conflicts not bound by any rules, partially structured conflicts where rules constrain certain behaviours but leave others free, and fully structured conflicts where all behaviours are regulated by rules, such as in some forms of competition (Brickman, 1974: 7).

Despite some of the problems associated with delimiting types of conflict, it is possible to construct a typology which locates and distinguishes international conflict specifically, by combining the internal-external dimension and the nature of the parties dimension. That is, conflicts which originate within one person or group (intra-personal, intra-group), or, conflicts that originate between persons or groups (inter-personal, inter-group) (Deutsch, 1969: 7-8). Dahrendorf refers, in this regard, to exogenous conflicts which are brought upon a social unit from the outside, and endogenous conflicts which are generated from within a social unit (Dahrendorf, 1958: 171).

Combining this aspect with the previously mentioned typology of identifying parties as individuals, collectives (groups), and nations, it is possible to create a significant classification which distinguishes between: (1) intra-personal, intra-group, and intra-national conflict; and (2) inter-personal, inter-group, and inter-national conflict (Galtung, 1965: 348; Fink, 1968: 421; Deutsch, 1969: 8). The utility of this typology is that it locates international conflict theoretically, and importantly, distinguishes it from civil wars (intra-national conflict). In short, it allows for a meaningful study of international conflict as a distinct field from other types of conflict, while allowing for the cross-pollination of findings from other levels.

International conflict itself can be divided into various types. Here I divide all international conflicts into four main types, which help to identify their theoretical characteristics. These are: (1) conflicts between states (inter-state conflicts); (2) internationalised civil conflicts; (3) militarised disputes; and (4) political incidents

(see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997: 5-8). How does one distinguish between these different kinds of conflict?

The first type, inter-state conflicts, are defined by a high level of violence, and by the nature of the parties. Both parties are states. Inter-state conflicts are usually fought over territory by states that share a border or are close to each other. In some cases, states will go to war when they have competing ideologies, or when they feel insecure. Occasionally, inter-state conflicts can escalate and bring in other states, and the result is a regional conflict which affects many countries in a given geographical area. This was the case in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, Southern Africa in the 1980s, and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan) in the 1990s.

Another cause of inter-state conflicts may be termed rivalries (see Geller, 1993; Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Kuenne, 1989; for discussion of rivalries). These are conflicts between states that feel threatened or intimidated by their opponents, and where each engages in a dangerous cat-and-mouse game of provocation and escalation that may often result in an armed conflict. In these cases, over a few decades, a pair of rivals might have four or more wars and many smaller incidents and periods of tension. India and Pakistan have been rivals since their independence in 1948 and have gone to war more than six times since then.

The second type of international conflict occurs when another state becomes involved in a violent civil conflict, either directly by invasion, or indirectly by actively supporting one of the factions (see Bull, 1984; and Regan, 1996 for a discussion on intervention). Internationalised civil conflicts then, are also characterised by a high level of violence, but in this case, the primary parties are not both states. Second or third states are only secondarily involved. Examples of direct intervention in a civil conflict include Saudi Arabia's invasion of Yemen on the side of the Royalists, and Egypt's invasion on the side of the Republicans in Yemen's 1962-70 civil war. Also, in 1965 the US invaded the Dominican Republic on the side of the government, which was then fighting a civil war against the constitutionalists, who wanted to restore Juan Bosch, a former president ousted in a military coup.

Indirect support, on the other hand, can take many forms. In some cases it can involve sending arms and providing training and advisers for one faction in the conflict, such as the US's aid to the Contra rebels fighting the Nicaraguan government

(1980-94), or it can involve allowing rebels to use adjacent territory from which to launch attacks. Zambia's support for the Rhodesian rebels allowed the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), one of the African nationalist factions fighting Rhodesia's white minority government in the war of independence (1967-80), to have bases and training camps on Zambian territory. ZAPU guerrillas would then launch attacks across the Zambezi border into Rhodesia and then return across the border to relative safety.

Some civil conflicts last decades and take the form of guerrilla insurgencies. Often the guerrillas live in dense forest in border areas and move across the borders at will, attacking government targets and then disappearing into the jungle again. The insurgencies in Burma (1949-present) by ethnic Karen guerrillas and in Colombia (1965-present) by Marxist guerrillas have gone on for decades, as neither side has the ability to completely defeat the other. Other civil conflicts result from attempts by particular ethnic groups living in one area to break away, or secede, and try to form their own state. The Biafran War (1967-70), the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975, and the attempt by Western Sahara to secede from Morocco in 1974 are all examples of this. In each case, states from outside the conflict gave their recognition and support to the seceding party, and some even gave them military aid. This represented secondary, but significant, involvement by second and third states in the conflict.

The third type of international conflict is the militarised dispute. This occurs when two states face off militarily, and escalate a crisis or spark an incident, which may not result in an all-out war, but has the potential for being a very serious conflict and is a real threat to international peace and security. The militarised dispute is conceptually distinct from interstate conflicts not because of the nature of the parties involved. After all, they are both conflicts that involve states. Rather, the distinction relates to the level of hostilities reached. Militarised disputes do not reach the level of large-scale hostilities, usually being characterised by small-scale military "incidents". In most cases there is also some loss of life.

The most famous militarised dispute was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the Soviet Union tried to station medium range nuclear missile in Cuba and the US navy threatened to sink any Soviet ships that entered the waters around Cuba.

Although this crisis did not result in any direct military conflict, it was serious enough to take the world to the brink of nuclear war. Militarised disputes are important because they occur in the context of a tense and hostile relationship, and are almost always preceded by a history of violence. Thus, they contain a very real risk of escalation into all-out war. Relations between rival states are usually characterised by a high number of militarised disputes.

The last type of international conflict is the political incident. These are inter-state disputes that escalate beyond the level of normal day to day conflicts between states, such as conflicts over trade, visas, diplomatic etiquette, and such like. Usually, political incidents involve verbal and political demonstrations, such as denunciations, propaganda, name-calling, diplomatic insults, and maybe even threats and ultimatums. In a very few cases, armed incidents may even take place. However, political incidents occur between states that are normally friendly, most often both states are democracies, and there is not a history of violence, or the likelihood that the dispute will escalate into a war.

Examples of what can be considered a political incident include the Anglo-Islandic fishing dispute in 1972-73. This involved several acrimonious verbal and political demonstrations, as well as the use of naval vessels to prevent boats from fishing in disputed waters. While force was used in this case, there was no real threat of war, and it occurred in the context of otherwise friendly relations between two democracies. In recent years, similar fishing disputes between Canada and Spain, and Britain and Spain, have also escalated into political incidents.

In short, the argument being made here is that, in opposition to the Psychology paradigm view of conflict as generic, there are in fact, different types of conflict. Furthermore, in opposition to the Third Party Intervention paradigm, international conflict is not one special type, but can itself be divided into different varieties. The three most important dimensions for distinguishing types of conflict are: (1) the internal-external dimension (eg, whether the conflict is within or between parties); (2) the nature of the party dimension (eg, individuals, groups, nation-states); and (3) the mode of behaviour dimension (eg, violent, non-violent modes). Combining these dimensions, it is possible to classify twelve primary types of conflict. These are summarised in Table 3.1. The most important observation here is that there is a

ACTORS	NON-VIOLENT MODES		VIOLENT MODES	
	Endogenous Conflict	Exogenous Conflict	Endogenous Conflict	Exogenous Conflict
Individual	Intra-personal Conflict (decisional conflict, dilemma, quandaries)	Inter-personal Conflict (debates, games, quarrels, disagreements)	Intra-personal Conflict (suicide, self-mutilation, insanity)	Inter-personal Conflict (fights, murder, vendetta, dueling)
Groups	Intra-group Conflict (factionalism, schism, infighting, inter-departmental conflict)	Inter-group Conflict (strikes, class conflict, litigation, inter-agency competition)	Intra-group Conflict (vendetta, internecine warfare, purges)	Inter-group Conflict (clan warfare, vendetta, riots, gang warfare, pogroms)
Nations/states	Intra-national Conflict (general strike, bloodless coup, elections, political conflict)	Inter-national Conflict (political incidents, trade wars, sanctions, cold war)	Intra-national Conflict (civil wars, coups, insurrections, revolutions, secession)	Inter-national Conflict (wars, rivalries, armed disputes, world wars)

Table 3.1 A Typology of Conflict

distinction between armed international conflicts and non-armed international conflicts. That is, they constitute separate types of conflict. If we assume that different types of conflict respond best to different forms of conflict management (eg, intra-national legal conflicts respond best to legal methods of conflict management), then we may find that the method of conflict management that is most successful in non-violent international conflict is not necessarily equally successful in violent international conflict, and visa-versa.

II The Nature of International Conflict Management

In chapter two the difference between conflict settlement and conflict resolution was discussed. A conflict can be considered **settled** when violent and destructive behaviour has been reduced, and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast, a conflict can be said to be **resolved** when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to the violent and destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the parties in conflict. The goal of conflict management then, can be

conflict settlement, or it can be directed at the more complex, if enduring, outcome of conflict resolution (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997).

While the normative goal of all conflict management efforts is to resolve the roots of conflict and provide the basis for constructive future relationships, in reality this is often an unrealistic goal (see Dixon, 1996: 656). This is especially true of conflicts that have reached the point of physical violence. Violent conflicts are usually perceived in zero-sum conceptions by the parties, and are accompanied by the highest level of hostile attitudes. Furthermore, every act of violence tends to reinforce existing attitudes and create new sources of grievance. Violent conflicts are most often only amenable to conflict settlement; only when the conflict has been transformed into a non-violent mode can conflict resolution be contemplated. In other words, the goal of the conflict management has to be matched to the kind of conflict being managed. A summary of conflict management goals matched to conflict types can be seen in Table 3.2. In the case of violent international conflict, for example, the initial goal is to arrest the expansion and escalation of the conflict and reduce the level of violence. In some intractable cases, this may even be the maximum realistic goal.

	Non-violent Modes	Violent Modes
Endogenous Conflicts (e.g. intra-personal, intra-group, intra-national)	Conflict Resolution	Conflict Settlement initially, then Conflict Resolution
Exogenous Conflict (e.g. inter-personal, inter-group, inter-national)	Conflict Resolution	Conflict Settlement initially, then Conflict Resolution

Table 3.2 A Summary of Conflict Management Goals Matched to Conflict Types

Despite popular perceptions of international politics as anarchical and completely unregulated in terms of conflict, the international system has evolved numerous methods, or types, of conflict management. Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, in a section titled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, says: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to engender the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or

arrangements, or by other peaceful means of their own choice.” States can employ any of these methods in the peaceful management of their conflicts. Negotiation and mediation have already been discussed in some detail to this point, and will be discussed further in the following section.

One of the lesser known types of international conflict management, conciliation, has been described as “an attempt to induce negotiations” (Bailey, 1982: 167). More formally, it may be described as “a method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to which a Commission set up by the parties, either on a permanent basis or an *ad hoc* basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of the settlement...” (Merrills, 1991: 59). That is, two states in conflict nominate officials to sit on a panel. The panel then gathers and examines all relevant information on the dispute and suggests how it should be settled. Another way to conceive of conciliation is to think of it as “institutionalised negotiation” (Merrills, 1991: 67).

Theoretically, the line between conciliation and mediation is sometimes difficult to draw, suffice to say that in many cases, conciliation puts the intervention of a third party into a conflict on a more formal footing and institutionalises it to a greater degree (Merrills, 1991: 39). It is usually instituted by treaty. The role of the conciliator is to propose either the rules for governing the settlement, that is, the means by which the parties shall come to agreement, or, the actual terms of the settlement itself (Suter, 1986: 11). Historically, conciliation emerged out of treaty practice in Europe, and reached its height between 1925 and WWII, when nearly 200 treaties involving conciliation were concluded (Merrills, 1991: 61). Since then, its practice has declined and in fact, in comparison to other forms of conflict management, it has never been a widely used technique. In the past 70 years, less than 20 cases of formal conciliation have been heard out of the thousands of conflicts and disputes (Merrills, 1991: 76). Informal conciliation through international organisations is used only a little more often.

The reasons for this are many. First, many bilateral treaties restrict the categories of disputes open for conciliation to a small area of relatively unimportant issues. Areas of political concern, where conflicts are most likely to occur and most likely to be violent, are not covered by the treaties. Second, the expense and difficulties

involved in convening and operating a conciliation often make other procedures more attractive. Third, conciliation is too elaborate for many minor disputes, and lacks the political authority for major disputes. In short, conciliation has only ever demonstrated some success for disputes which were strictly legal in character and of minor importance (Merrills, 1991: 76-77).

Another method, or type, similar to conciliation is inquiry. Inquiry is "...a specific institutional arrangement which states may select in preference to arbitration or other techniques, because they desire to have some disputed issue independently investigated. In its institutional sense, then, inquiry refers to a particular type of international tribunal, known as the commission of inquiry..." (Merrills, 1991: 43). In other words, inquiry is the attempt by a third party to "establish the relevant facts and to elucidate those aspects of the dispute where incomplete or misleading information has been an unnecessary cause of contention" (Bailey, 1982: 162-163).

Like conciliation, inquiry is a fairly recent addition to the range of conflict management techniques used by states, and has been little used, largely because it is only designed for dealing with conflicts which revolve around disputed facts or information. There were only four inquiries between 1905 and 1922, and then there was one in 1962 and none since (Merrills, 1991: 55). Although international organisations make much more use of it than this, it is still a relatively unimportant conflict management technique in international politics.

Another conflict management method, arbitration, has been defined by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907) as follows: "International arbitration has for its object the settlement of disputes between states by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law. Recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award" (Quoted in Schuman, 1969: 157). In other words, states in conflict agree to turn their dispute over to arbitrators who will decide between them on the basis of international law. For example, when Chile and Argentina began to dispute the ownership of the Beagle Channel after WWII, they both submitted their claims to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ judges investigated the relevant information and treaties, and ruled that on the basis of international law, Chile was the rightful owner. Argentina later repudiated this ruling, leading to armed conflict.

There are four sources of law that may be used by arbitrators to decide a dispute: (1) international conventions establishing rules recognised by the states; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; and (4) judicial decisions and teachings by recognised experts (Bull, 1977: 17). The last source is, of course, only a supplementary source of international law, while the others are primary sources. Furthermore, arbitration may proceed by *ad hoc* tribunals, or individual arbitrators. For example, in some cases, the states may establish a commission. In other cases, they may refer to a foreign head of state or specially qualified individual, or they may use a tribunal or collegiate body (Merrills, 1991: 80-83). Normal practice is to have an uneven number of judges, with each party having at least one of their own representatives on the panel.

Another legal method, adjudication, refers to “the reference of a dispute to the World Court or some standing tribunal, such as the European Court of Human Rights” (Merrills, 1991: 80). The only essential difference between arbitration and adjudication is the manner by which the judges are chosen. They are identical in all other respects. In arbitration, states choose judges themselves, whereas in adjudication, states refer to established courts.

Legal techniques do have some advantages. In a general sense, legal techniques supply a way of settling disputes which is rational, orderly, and authoritative. More specifically, the strong and binding, impartial decisions handed out by arbitrators and adjudicators allow not only for states under domestic pressure to save face, but also legitimise the successful party’s claim in the eyes of the international community. Also, litigation is a good way of disposing of troublesome issues, the choice of judges gives states confidence in the process, and the permanent tribunals relieve states of the need to set up new tribunals for every new dispute. In a general sense, legal techniques discourage unreasonable behaviour by reminding states that there are alternatives to violent behaviour. Surprisingly, arbitral awards are usually observed in international politics (Merrills, 1991).

Two final methods of conflict management include, first, settling conflicts through the UN. This involves states submitting their dispute to the UN Security Council, which then recommends a course of action. Actually, unlike other forms of

conflict management, the Security Council does not need the consent of the disputing parties to consider any conflict. It has the right, under the UN Charter, to consider any conflict if it might pose a threat to international peace and stability.

Other mechanisms the UN Security Council has at its disposal are, that it can appoint mediators or mediating committees, it can instruct the Secretary General to use his good offices, it can refer the dispute to regional organisations or other specialist agencies, or it can itself facilitate quiet negotiation between the disputants (Merrills, 1991: 180-195). Furthermore, unlike other conflict management techniques, the Security Council can, theoretically at least, enforce its decisions “by any means”. Usually, this includes imposing sanctions, or military intervention. The UN has also employed peacekeeping operations in an attempt to keep disputant forces apart while a negotiated settlement is sought.

However, with UN encouragement, states will normally refer their conflicts to regional organisations before they turn to the UN. Regional organisations are agencies created by treaty among states situated within a recognisable geographical area. The most important regional organisations include: the OAU, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Arab League, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, and the Islamic Country Organisation (ICO). Most of these organisations originated in the post-war period, and like the UN, all have built-in mechanisms of conflict management. In fact, for some like the OAU, conflict management among its members was its primary founding purpose. Most regional organisations effectively use mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, arbitration, and good offices in attempting to settle disputes. In other words, this represents conflict management **through** rather than **by** regional organisations (Merrills, 1991: 217).

The important dimensions along which conflict management methods can be compared have already been alluded to. The first dimension is that of principal parties, namely, bilateral versus third party conflict management methods. Second, whether the conflict management is of a voluntary, non-binding nature, or, is involuntary and binding. Conflict management methods can be fitted into one of the four broad types produced by combining these two dimensions (see Table 3.3). Conciliation fits into the involuntary, bilateral type only under specific conditions: (1) when the conciliation panel is made up of officials from each of the disputing parties

(eg, it is institutionalised bilateral negotiation); and (2) it is established by treaty and bound to consider specific disputes (eg, it is legally binding on both parties). When only condition (1) is fulfilled, then it fits into the voluntary bilateral type. If the conciliation commission is permanent and given a degree of relative autonomy, then it may fit into the third party voluntary mode.

	Voluntary, Non-binding	Involuntary, Binding
Bilateral Mode	Negotiation, Conciliation	(Conciliation)
Third Party Mode	Mediation, Conciliation, Inquiry, UN, Regional Organisations	Arbitration, Adjudication

Table 3.3 A Typology of Conflict Management Methods

It has already been discussed how the flexibility, possible roles, and strategies of intermediaries makes mediation a form conflict management ideally suited to international conflict. In practice, mediation is usually applied when: (1) the conflict is complex, long, drawn-out, and costly; (2) the antagonists have reached a deadlock or impasse in their own conflict management efforts, or been unable or unwilling to initiate negotiation; (3) continuation of the conflict is seen as an exacerbating factor by all concerned and there is a desire to limit its costs; and (4) there exists some communication or cooperation between the parties (Mitchell, 1981; see also Bercovitch, 1984: 13). In other words, it would seem that mediation is most usefully applied to violent international conflicts, while non-violent international conflicts can be dealt with by negotiation, conciliation, inquiry, and judicial settlement.

III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation is a method of conflict management in which the principal parties to a conflict communicate directly or indirectly about how they will resolve their differences and manage their future relationship (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1966: 466; Stephenson and Morely, 1977: 26). Negotiation is a bilateral, voluntary, non-binding

method of conflict management aimed primarily at conflict resolution. Mediation, on the other hand, is a means of conflict management where parties in conflict seek the assistance of, or, accept an offer of help from a party not directly involved in the conflict, to settle their differences without invoking the authority of law (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 8). Mediation is a third party assisted, voluntary, non-binding method of conflict management aimed primarily at conflict settlement. Some of the important comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation have already been established (see Table 1.1, Figure 2.1, and Table 3.3).

Within the Contingency approach, the basis for comparing negotiation and mediation empirically rests on the premise that negotiation and mediation belong to the same genus, as it were, but are different types. That is, they have similarities that put them into a single species of conflict management (eg, voluntarism, non-binding outcomes, diplomatic, the use of social influence strategies), but they also have differences which make them distinct types within the context of being part of the same genus (eg, bilateral versus third party modes, expanded relationship possibilities within a mediated negotiation system - see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, as different types of conflict management, albeit of the same genus, it seems logical to assume that they will be successfully applied to different types of conflict. In other words, it is at this point that the Contingency framework makes a major departure from the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm.

The theoretical device which can facilitate a comparison of negotiation and mediation is the Contingency Model, shown in Figure 3.2. This model suggests first, that conflict management takes place in three time dimensions: (1) antecedent, or, past; (2) concurrent, or, present; and (3) consequent, or, future (see Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965; Druckman, 1973; Bercovitch, 1982, 1984). The antecedent dimension refers to all those inputs and variables which exist prior to engaging in conflict management. The concurrent dimension, on the other hand, describes a comprehensive range of factors which characterise the conditions and process of a particular conflict management situation, while the consequent dimension draws attention to the outcome of the conflict management. The importance of the time dimension is that it allows the researcher to move beyond a static analysis of the background or structural factors associated with the conflict management, to a

dynamic analysis of what actually occurs in the process of the negotiation or mediation.




Figure 3.2 A Contingency Model of International Negotiation and Mediation

The Contingency Model stipulates three clusters of variables with specific operational criteria, each of which may have an impact on the process and outcome of the conflict management. The success or failure of the conflict management is logically seen as the result of the interaction between variables in the context and process (see Figure 3.2).

The first cluster of variables, **contextual variables**, refers to aspects of the nature of the dispute, the nature of the parties and their past and ongoing relationship, the international context, and in the case of mediation, the nature of the mediator. Dispute variables include the issues in conflict and the intensity with which the parties pursue their aims. The model assumes that what the parties are fighting over (eg, tangible issues such as control over territory versus intangible issues such as competing ideologies), and the intensity of that fight (eg, whether they are prepared to risk total war) will have some impact on how they interact in a conflict management situation.

I CONTEXTUAL FACTORS	
Nature of Dispute	Issues: sovereignty, ideology, security, self-determination, ethnicity; intensity; duration; fatalities
Nature of Parties and their Relationship	Identity: state, non-state; power; regime type; homogeneity; previous and ongoing relationship: dispute, conflict, friendly
International Context	System period; party alignment; involvement of other states
Nature of Mediator	Rank and identity: partiality, leverage, status, legitimacy, functional identity
II PROCESS FACTORS	
Conflict Management Method	Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication
Conflict Management Characteristics	Timing; environment neutrality; negotiator identity; presence of hostilities; conflict management initiation
Mediator Activities	Timing; strategies: communication-facilitation, procedural, directive
III OUTCOME FACTORS	
Type of Outcome	Settlement; partial settlement; cease-fire; unsuccessful
Outcome Characteristics	Durability

Table 3.4 Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation Within the Contingency Model

Similarly, party variables and the international context are also thought to impinge on the conflict management process. For example, it is logical to assume that the identity of the parties (eg, states versus non-state actors, large states versus small states, democratic states versus non-democratic states), their ongoing relationship (eg, friendly versus conflictual), and the international context (e.g. Cold War versus post-Cold War, alignment of the parties, wider international interest or disinterest), will affect to no small degree the behaviour of the parties, the level of cooperation or hostility between them, their willingness to compromise, and the kinds of agreements

they will accept. In cases of mediation, the identity and relationship of the mediator to the parties will affect the process and outcome in similar ways. The variables thought to be the most important in determining conflict management outcomes are summarised in Table 3.4.

The cluster of **process variables** refers to activities that take place during the conflict management itself, and to the factors immediate to the parties' interaction. In chapter two, we discussed the issue of timing in regard to mediation. This model assumes that when the conflict management occurs (eg, early in the conflict before positions have hardened versus late in the conflict when a "hurting stalemate" has set in) will affect the parties' attitudes and behaviour. Similarly, the conflict management environment (eg, neutral territory versus opposing party's territory), the identity of the principal negotiators (eg, high-level representatives versus low-level representatives), and the strategies employed by the mediators, also impinges on the outcome of the conflict management (see Table 3.4 for summary of process variables).

The final cluster of variables, **outcome variables**, are the dependent variables. The nature of the exercise is to unravel what effect the process and the context have on the success or failure of the conflict management. There are several problems associated with assessing outcomes and devising success indexes (see Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 17-19; Klieboer, 1996: 361-362; Dixon, 1996: 656-657). First, there is the problem of identifying terminal points in what is a dynamic and ever-changing process. Second, conflict management outcomes can be perceived and defined differently, depending upon whether one is a party to the conflict, the mediator, the international community, or simply an interested observer. Third, perceptions can change over time, and what might have been considered successful at one point may be considered a total failure a few years later. Lastly, outcomes can be evaluated in terms of certain normative criteria, such as fairness, efficiency, and legitimacy, which produces its own set of evaluation problems.

To avoid these confusions, the Contingency Model adopts a strictly behavioural approach which focuses on the observed differences the conflict management has on the parties' behaviour. Thus, it is deemed to be successful when it has made a considerable and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the subsequent interaction between the parties, it is partially successful when it has

initiated dialogue between the parties, and of limited success when it has achieved a cease-fire or a break in actual hostilities only. A conflict management episode is considered to be a failure, or unsuccessful, when it has no discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties' behaviour (see Bercovitch et al, 1991). Another dimension which has been added to this classification in order to provide another level of evaluation is the notion of durability. That is, success is considered more than just securing an agreement or a cease-fire. It also refers to the quality of the agreement in terms of its ability to satisfy both parties in the long term (see Table 3.4).

It should be obvious by this stage that the Contingency model is an ideal theoretical device for comparative research into conflict management. Different types of conflict management, whether they be bilateral negotiations, mediations, or interventions by international organisations, can be examined for the way in which contextual and process variables affect their outcomes. In this case, the focus would be on how similar external conditions affect different kinds of conflict management efforts. Alternately, bilateral negotiations, for example, can be examined at different levels of social conflict. Here, different external conditions would be examined for their impact on the same form of conflict management.

IV Studying Negotiation and Mediation

In contrast to both the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm, comparing negotiation and mediation within the confines of the Contingency framework is theoretically possible and practical. This is primarily because negotiation and mediation are considered to be similar forms of conflict management, while having some important differences.

The primary theoretical vehicle for studying negotiation and mediation is the Contingency Model, which specifies which avenues of research will be most fruitful. As has already been mentioned in section 3.1, the Contingency framework allows researchers to focus on detailed studies of single cases (qualitative research), or the utilisation of large data sets (quantitative research). It also facilitates description (eg, illuminating which factors affect the process and outcome of conflict management),

and prescription (eg, suggesting the conditions under which conflict management will succeed). Table 3.5 summarises the main dimensions of the Contingency framework.

THE CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK	
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	
Actors	States unique; individuals, organisations, nations, groups, etc important; interlocking web of contemporary international politics
Nature of Conflict	Different types defined by issues, actors, modes; important differences between armed and non-armed conflict
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	
Goal of Conflict Management	Control violence; conflict regulation or management; conflict resolution of non-armed conflicts
Methods of Conflict Management	Different types: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration, adjudication; problem of matching methods to types of conflict
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Conceptualising Negotiation and Mediation	The same genus; some differences; Contingency Model; advantages of mediation in armed conflicts; negotiation suited to less violent conflicts
Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation	Contextual, interactional, and outcome variables; power, parties, issues, intensity, strategies, international context, environment, etc.
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
Comparing Negotiation and Mediation	Facilitated by using Contingency Model of Negotiation and Mediation
Methodology	Both qualitative and quantitative; descriptive and prescriptive

Table 3.5 The Contingency Framework

3.3 Expanding the Comparative Dimensions of the Contingency Model

Thus far in the thesis I have examined how various paradigms and theoretical approaches seek to compare negotiation and mediation, without explicitly outlining such a comparison. In this section I will directly compare the strengths and weaknesses of each method for their ability to resolve conflict. The purpose of

reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of negotiation and mediation is twofold. First, we are seeking to articulate more carefully the nature of the similarities and differences between negotiation and mediation. That is, we are expanding the Contingency approach into a comparative framework. This will go some way towards providing a theory of negotiation and mediation which can then be tested empirically.

The second aim of this discussion is to expand the theoretical basis from which exploratory propositions may be inferred. In other words, outlining in theory those circumstances in which each type can be effective, will suggest their practical outcomes in international conflict. The comparative advantages and disadvantages of negotiation and mediation are summarised in Table 3.6.

1. The Advantages of Negotiation and Mediation

One of the main advantages of **negotiation** derives from its flexibility. Of all the methods of conflict management, it requires the least formality. By definition, negotiation need not even involve verbalised communications. Instead, it can be tacit, as in a series of moves and counter-moves. Furthermore, depending on the wishes of the disputants, it can be conducted formally or informally, in secret or in the open, by primary decision-makers or by representatives, with closed or open-ended agendas, and using concession-convergence strategies or formula-detail strategies. In other words, the flexibility of negotiation means that it can be adapted to any type of conflict, whether it be simple or complex, between individuals or collectives, or over tangible or intangible issues.

A second set of advantages of negotiation flows from the fact that it is a joint, voluntary, non-binding form of conflict management. This means that outcomes can be construed in win-win terms, as opposed to the normally win-lose outcomes of adversarial, judicial methods, for example. Also, it makes the process more legitimate in the eyes of the disputants because it is not imposed, and the outcomes more binding in the sense that mutual consent to a resolution adds legitimacy to it (Suter, 1986: 10). In other words, negotiation can produce mutually satisfactory and durable outcomes.

Third, the fact that negotiation is a bilateral form of conflict management makes it relatively simple in comparison to other methods. In this sense, it reduces the

complexity of the communication problem (eg, communications do not have to go through a third party), it simplifies relationship possibilities and dynamics (eg, eliminates the possibility of coalition-formation), and eliminates the expense and risks which can be associated with involving third parties (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 2-6; Suter, *ibid*).

In most cases, although not all, negotiation occurs in situations where parties have to manage ongoing relationships. In this case, negotiations, if undertaken often, can have the effect of institutionalising bilateral conflict management norms through building up habits of communication and cooperation. In international politics, diplomacy functions primarily as an institutionalised, relationship-stabilising form of negotiation. Over time, parties can learn how to communicate more effectively and even institute conflict management regimes. This is in contrast to third party forms of conflict management, which are normally temporary arrangements designed to deal with more immediate problems, such as the outbreak of hostilities. For example, many aspects of superpower relations during the cold war were dealt with through institutionalised, on-going arms control negotiations (see Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991).

Similar to negotiation, **mediation** is also an extremely flexible form of conflict management. Mediation can, like negotiation, be formal or informal, secret or open, and involve any kind of party (eg, individuals or collectives, primary decision-makers or representatives). Furthermore, depending on the wishes of the parties and the mediator, it can involve greater or lesser levels of intervention, and mediators can perform a multiplicity of roles. This is not to say however, that mediation has the same degree of flexibility as negotiation. After all, mediators cannot mediate tacitly in the same way that negotiators can. Rather, mediation usually requires a greater degree of structure to the conflict management, with clearly defined representatives who have decision-making authority, and clear issue and interaction structures (eg, definable issues, time limitations). It is unlikely a mediator will step forward to intervene in a conflict where it is unclear who the parties are, what the issues in conflict are, and how long it may take them to reach a conclusion.

The second set of advantages is identical to negotiation. Because it is a joint, voluntary, non-binding form of conflict management, mediation also generates win-

win outcomes and has process and outcome legitimacy. Again however, the degree to which mediation enjoys these advantages is lower than for negotiation, for the simple reason that the presence of third parties provides a ready excuse for non-adherence to any agreement. It can always be claimed that the third party used unfair tactics, was coercive or dishonest, or in some way tainted the process of coming to agreement.

A third set of advantages comes from the transformation of the negotiation dyad into a triad (see Figure 2.1); that is, the notion of mediator as a third bargainer. It has already been discussed how the expanded relationship and communication opportunities of mediation can move the parties towards agreement by the threat of coalitions, the careful manipulation of communication, and the use of bias and impartiality (see sections 2.3, 2.4, and 3.2). These are considerable advantages, and overall, they serve to expand the number of available solutions.

Apart from the advantages inherent in the mere presence of a mediator, other potential advantages flow from the many roles and strategies that mediators can employ to break deadlocks, overcome impasses, and create momentum towards agreement. For example, a few of the role possibilities of mediators include: informal versus formal roles; individual versus representative roles; impartial versus partial roles; face-saving roles; advisory or directive roles; and conflict resolution-oriented versus conflict management-oriented roles (Rubin et al, 1994: 199-202; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 60-61). Similarly, mediators can employ strategies aimed at enhancing the communication process, controlling the conflict management procedures, formulating solutions, or gaining concessions through the manipulation of leverage (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). Applied skillfully, mediator roles and strategies can prove a powerful advantage for securing agreements between parties in conflict.

Lastly, mediators, no matter who they represent, bring with them added resources to the conflict management. Simply by providing a fresh perspective, they can expand the outcome options away from undesirable eventualities. The more resources a mediator brings, the greater the degree of leverage that can be applied, and often, a greater sense of legitimacy can be accorded to the conflict management in general.

2. The Disadvantages of Negotiation and Mediation

The main disadvantage of **negotiation** is that it can become deadlocked or even fail to get under way, if the level of hostility between the parties is too high, there is a serious power imbalance between them, one side fails to recognise the legitimacy of the other, or if the negotiation process is tainted by misperception or miscommunication. Mediation on the other hand, is designed specifically to overcome these problems, and mediators can employ a variety of strategies, or take on a variety of roles, to overcome them.

Related to this, negotiation can be hampered by relationship blockages, such as ongoing rivalries, historical enmity, the lack of effective communication channels, or re-occurring misperceptions. Again, mediation can often be the key to overcoming these obstacles through conciliation, teaching the parties how to relate more effectively, or acting as channels of communication.

Lastly, as has already been mentioned, in international politics war or acute conflict is usually associated with the breaking off of diplomatic relations, making bilateral negotiations difficult (Frankel, 1969: 146). Further, the failure of negotiations in the lead-up to a confrontation can encourage the use of force by seeming to eliminate other alternatives (Merrills, 1991: 22-26). In other words, in acute international conflict, negotiation often breaks down and ceases to be effective. In these cases, mediators acting as a neutral go-between can often provide a useful alternative communication channel.

In contrast to negotiation, the main disadvantage of **mediation** stems from its relationship transforming effect, and is the flip-side to the advantages of mediators as bargainers. That is, mediators not only expand relationship and communication possibilities, they also complicate them and introduce an element of instability. In this sense, mediators can actually interfere with the conflict management process, especially if the parties are already communicating effectively and have no real need of a mediator. Mediators also bring their own interests and constituencies with them to a negotiation, and thus, they expand and complicate the number of interested parties, and the number of issues. As was already discussed in an earlier section, mediators who are too biased or who act too much as a negotiator, can become

parties to the conflict and simply make it worse. Syria's involvement in Lebanon in the 1980s, and Nigeria's intervention in Liberia in the 1990s are clear examples of this.

1. ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
NEGOTIATION	MEDIATION
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Flexibility: tacit, informal, formal, open, secret, agenda-driven, open-ended, requires the least formality, individuals, collectives, different strategies 2. Joint, voluntary, non-binding: win-win outcomes, outcome legitimacy and adherence, process legitimacy 3. Simplicity: direct communication process, bilateral relationships, eliminates expense and risks of third parties 4. Institutionalisation: regime-building, learning, normal diplomacy, stabilising relationships, norm-building 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Flexibility: informal, formal, process-oriented, outcome-oriented, highly interventionist, weak intervention, individuals, collectives, multiple mediator identities 2. Joint, voluntary, non-binding: win-win outcomes, outcome legitimacy and adherence, process legitimacy 3. Mediators as bargainers: expanded relationship possibilities (e.g., coalitions), communication manipulation, bias and impartiality, expanded available solutions 4. Strategies, roles: overcoming impasses through application of strategies and roles 5. Added resources: leverage, expanded outcome options, legitimacy
2. DISADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION	
NEGOTIATION	MEDIATION
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Impasse, deadlock: power imbalance, hostility, miscommunication, misperception, non-recognition 2. Relationship blockages: rivalry, historical enmity, communication blockages 3. Escalation spirals: bargaining failure leading to violence, diplomatic severance in acute conflict, tacit bargaining 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mediators as bargainers: instability, issue expansion, neutrality, bias, communication and relationship complexity, upsetting existing communication, negative legitimacy 2. Mediator acceptance: bias, sovereignty interference, legitimacy 3. Mediator roles, strategies, skills: contingent behaviour, influence versus coercion 4. Outcome adherence: process legitimacy, mediator coercion

Table 3.6 The Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Negotiation/Mediation

In international politics, the injection of a mediator can also complicate the conflict by giving legitimacy to parties otherwise considered illegitimate. This perception of newly acquired legitimacy can then embolden the party to be more demanding than it otherwise might have been. Such criticism was leveled at both Jimmy Carter's mediation in Bosnia in December 1994, which was seen to give legitimacy to the Bosnian Serbs, and Robert Oakley's mediation in Somalia in late 1993, which legitimised Somali warring factions (see Patman, 1997). In both cases, the long-term prospects of peace were harmed by the mediation.

A second disadvantage of mediation is that acceptance of the mediator by the parties is not automatic. Parties may be reluctant to accept a mediator if they fear that such intervention may infringe on their sovereignty (see Kriesberg, 1982: 267-270), if the mediator is seen to be overly biased, or if their legitimacy is questioned. In other words, mediation is contingent on disputant acceptance, both initially and throughout the mediation.

Related to this is the obvious point that all mediation success is contingent on the mediator's skillful application of their strategies and roles to the conflict situation. Success is not automatic. This means that often, the greatest disadvantage a mediator faces is their own inadequacies, lack of experience, or inabilities. Especially in international politics, mediators require high levels of intelligence, insight, tact, and sensitivity in the application of their strategies.

Lastly, as has already been mentioned, mediation can suffer from outcome adherence problems. This is especially true if one or both of the parties question the tactics of the mediator during the process of reaching agreement. The ongoing border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, although supposedly settled in the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, continues partly because Ecuador claims that it was coerced into signing by the original mediating states. The application of strategies of influence can often appear as strategies of coercion in international politics, leading to dissatisfaction by the parties and hence, undermining any agreement reached.

Evaluation

To summarise this section, apart from the obvious fact that negotiation and mediation are conceptually different and cannot simply be considered as aspects of the same process, several important points emerge. First, theoretically at least, negotiation has advantages over mediation when conflicts can be dealt with through channels of normal diplomacy in institutionalised ways. That is, where the conflict is less than acute and occurs between states that are friendly (or at least, not antagonistic), negotiation is probably the best alternative. In fact, in these cases, mediation may actually harm the conflict management process. Related to this, in theory, negotiation outcomes would seem to enjoy greater adherence and legitimacy, adding to their greater durability. In short, negotiation is the primary, simplest, and most straightforward form of conflict management in international politics. The vast majority of conflicts between states are minor and non-violent, and are usually dealt with successfully by negotiation through diplomatic channels.

Second, in theory, mediation has advantages over negotiation in acute conflict characterised by hostility, communication breakdowns, power disparities between the parties, and the like. In other words, in situations where negotiation is impossible or difficult, mediators have the tools to restart and advance the conflict management process. However, the strengths of mediation in acute conflicts are also its primary weaknesses. In the first instance, it can be argued that the very factors which make mediation necessary (eg, hostility, power imbalances, communication breakdown, etc), also make mediation that much more difficult and less likely to succeed. If mediation is eschewed in favour of negotiation, then the likelihood is that the conditions are more conducive to a settlement. Added to this is the fact that mediation is further contingent on mediator resources, the skillful application of strategies, and ongoing acceptability and legitimacy. This means that in mediation there is always greater room for error. In short, from a theoretical viewpoint, mediation tends to operate in the most difficult circumstances, and is rarely used, except in acute conflicts.

3.4 Initial Propositions Generated by the Contingency Model

Research on the effect of contextual and process variables, together with the logic of the Contingency Model and the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation, suggests a number of initial propositions for an empirical comparison of the two methods. However, some caveats are in order first. As has already been discussed in chapter one, there are few studies which attempt to compare these two forms of conflict management. Most research is conducted within either the Psychology paradigm, which has no logical reason to compare them, or the Third Party Intervention paradigm, which tends to concentrate solely on intermediary conflict management. The lack of research which could suggest the type and direction of research propositions to pursue poses some considerable, though not insurmountable, problems for this study. This is especially relevant for the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation, where there are virtually no studies which might suggest areas of difference between them.

Two strategies have been employed to overcome this difficulty. The first involves creatively and logically extending existing research findings on either negotiation or mediation. The second involves applying the comparative theoretical dimensions outlined in section 3.3 in particular, so that where propositions are not directly taken from existing research, they are theoretically derived nonetheless. Lastly, it should be kept in mind that the propositions are primarily exploratory and meant to illuminate avenues of further investigation, rather than provide iron-cast support for any full-blown theory. The findings from the propositions presented here will form the basis of a more in-depth investigation in chapter five. For this reason, most of the propositions will not be stated in comparative terms. It will be left to the initial run of results to highlight the differences between them and suggest further comparative aspects. In other words, while this research starts from the premise that negotiation and mediation outcomes are the result of different explanatory factors, the dearth of both theoretical and empirical studies from which to derive comparatively-based research propositions means that we have to look primarily to the data itself for clues about their differences.

I Primary Propositions

A review of the conflict management literature reveals few suggestions as to which conflict management will be most successful overall. Studies by Holsti found that negotiation was more successful than all the other methods of conflict management examined, including mediation (see Holsti, 1966, 1968, 1988). From the theoretical discussion in section 3.3, it can be argued that negotiation will be more successful overall, simply because mediation occurs largely in the most difficult conflicts, and because mediation is contingent on a variety of unpredictable and difficult factors. Negotiation by diplomacy is the normal form of conflict management in international politics, and mediators are usually only called in when the conflict is complex, long, drawn-out, and costly, and the parties have reached a deadlock in their own conflict management efforts (Bercovitch, 1984: 13). In this sense, the Contingency Model coincides with the Psychology Paradigm discussed in chapter two, although for different reasons. This proposition is stated more formally in Table 3.7.

PRIMARY PROPOSITIONS:

1. Negotiation will be more successful overall than mediation in international conflict. (OUTCOME)
2. Successful negotiation-produced outcomes will be more durable than successful mediation-produced outcomes. (OUTCOME DURABILITY)

Table 3.7 Summary of Primary Propositions

In regards to outcomes, there is some suggestion in the literature that outcomes produced by negotiation will be more durable than outcomes produced by mediation (see Pruitt 1981: 220-221). This is because the parties to a negotiation come to the agreement wholly on their own, while in mediation they do not. This fits with the theoretical discussion in section 3.3, and thus, the Contingency Model predicts that successful negotiation outcomes will be more durable than successful mediation outcomes (see Table 3.7).

II Contextual Variables

A first set of contextual variables relates to the nature of the dispute. At the heart of any conflict are the issues in dispute. The effect of the issues relates to both their substance, and their number and complexity. It is an often articulated proposition in mediation research that tangible issues (eg, concrete, measurable issues such as money, resources, territory, etc) are more amenable to successful mediation than intangible issues involving beliefs, principles, ideologies, legitimacy, and image (see Bercovitch, 1984; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Ott, 1972; Lall, 1966; Northedge and Donelan, 1971; Klieboer, 1996; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). In fact, numerous studies have confirmed that intangible issues are the most difficult to mediate and depress success rates (Bingham, 1986; Hiltrop, 1989; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Pruitt et al, 1989). Similarly, it is also argued that the greater the number and complexity of the issues, the less likely that mediation will be successful (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Kolb, 1983; Moore, 1986). There is no theoretical reason why negotiation should be any different, so it is suggested that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the type of issues are tangible rather than intangible, and when issue complexity is low rather than high.

An important caveat needs to be retained for this proposition however. It has also been suggested that greater complexity creates greater opportunities for trade-offs, sequencing, and packaging, thus enhancing the chances of successful conflict management (see Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993). Only the empirical results themselves will suggest the direction and nature of this particular relationship.

In terms of the primary issues in dispute, it is predicted that conflicts over sovereignty, security, self-determination, and resources will be more successfully resolved by both negotiation and mediation than conflicts over ideology and ethnicity. See Table 3.8 for more formal statements of these propositions.

In their behavioural dimension, conflicts are focused on the actions of the parties. Conflicts may be pursued with varying degrees of intensity. There are two contradictory points of view in the literature. On the one hand, it is argued that the greater the intensity of the conflict, the better the chances of successful conflict

management (as a way of cutting losses, for example). On the other hand, some argue that greater intensity leads to entrenchment and polarisation, making conflict management more difficult (see Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996). The Contingency Model would concur with the latter view, and suggest that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less intense the conflict is. Thus, if we use fatalities, fatalities per month of fighting (intensity), and duration of the fighting as measures of overall intensity of the conflict, then we would predict that the lower the fatalities, the lower the fighting intensity, and the shorter the duration (eg, assuming that the longer the conflict, the more fatalities, the greater the hostility between the parties, issue proliferation, etc), the more successful negotiation and mediation will be. See Table 3.8 for more formal statements of these propositions.

However, while this appears relatively straightforward, the question of how intensity affects negotiation and mediation in a comparative sense is slightly more complex. There is some suggestion in the literature that the less intense the conflict, the more likely the parties will want to resolve it themselves and will resist mediation (Rubin et al, 1994: 214). Furthermore, it has been argued that mediation is likely to be more successful than negotiation in international conflict for a number of reasons. First, it is argued that mediation will be more successful than negotiation because hostility is generally higher in international politics, especially when force has been used (Rubin et al, 1994: 203-204; see also Keashly and Fisher, 1996: 244-245). Greater levels of hostility impedes negotiation by causing deadlocks, entrenchment, broken communication, etc. Second, at the level of international politics, negotiation functions best under conditions of “normal diplomacy”, and not the “one-off” situation of armed conflict (Princen, 1992: 7-8). In this sense, mediation serves as a regime surrogate, because in one-off disputes institutionalisation is impractical. Lastly, mediation is more likely to be successful in international politics because it retains the flexibility and control over the conflict management process, while adding extra resources and creativity (Princen, 1992: 44; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 60; Rubin et al, 1994: 203-204). That is, mediation can break negotiation deadlocks, re-open channels of communication, provide face-saving for concessions, propose creative solutions, etc.

It could be inferred from this that negotiation is unsuited to international conflict, especially those with high levels of hostility or actual military hostilities; further, that mediation is better able to deal with these factors. Following this logic, while negotiation and mediation will both be more successful the lower the levels of intensity and hostility, it could be expected that mediation will be more successful in conflicts with high levels of fatalities and intensity. However, in light of the theoretical comparison in section 3.3, where we noted that mediation tends to occur in situations which make conflict management difficult to begin with, and where success is contingent on mediator behaviour, it would be, on the balance, imprudent to make any firm predictions. The results themselves will determine the validity of these contrasting viewpoints.

A second set of contextual variables relates to the nature of the parties and their ongoing relationship. It is generally agreed that when the parties to a conflict are very different in terms of their identity and their power (capabilities), this impedes conflict management (see Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1993). Specifically, when parties to a conflict do not share the same political system or have a basic adherence to the same set of cultural norms and values (eg, asymmetric conflict), conflict management becomes more difficult. This is because “shared norms and sociopolitical similarity minimise misperception and facilitate a successful conclusion to the conflict” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 21). Similarly, many analysts argue that successful conflict management requires a (rough) power parity between the parties, because disparity will dispose the stronger party to reject mediation in the first place (see Young, 1967; Zartman, 1981; Kriesberg, 1982; Touval, 1982; Klieboer, 1996). Others argue that power parity endangers successful conflict management because it stimulates competition and attempts to upset the power balance (see Organski, 1960; Wright, 1965; Klieboer, 1996). In other words, we can expect that both negotiation and mediation will be more effective when the parties to the conflict share cultural norms and values, and have sociopolitical similarities. Specifically, they will be more successful when both parties share similar political systems, are relatively equal in power, and are aligned in the same bloc or regional collective organization.

Related to the cultural norms and values of a party is the degree of cultural fragmentation, or, homogeneity. It has been claimed that the greater the degree of fractionation within a state, the greater the chances of conflict management failure (see Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996). This is because representatives (eg, negotiators), find it difficult to make concessions without losing face vis-à-vis different constituencies, and greater levels of intra-party bargaining are required first. Thus, it also seems logical to suggest that the greater the degree of homogeneity within parties, the more successful both negotiation and mediation will be.

Turning to the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation, once again the waters are far from clear. It could be argued that conflicts characterised by divergent cultural norms and values, sociopolitical dissimilarities, and high fractionation are more likely to result in negotiation impasse and require mediation, which is ideally suited to such situations. Specifically, it has been suggested that high power differences between the parties makes negotiation more difficult (see Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992: 550). As mediators can counter-act the affect of power discrepancies by forming alliances, or favouring the weaker party's suggestions, mediation should be more successful than negotiation under these conditions.

Conversely, conflicts characterised by cultural similarity, sociopolitical similarity, and high levels of homogeneity, it is argued, will not need mediation, as negotiation will most likely proceed smoothly. These arguments suggest that mediation will be more successful than negotiation when dissimilarity is high, while negotiation would be more successful than mediation when similarity is high. However, in the light of our earlier theoretical observations (see section 3.3), this would be stretching the logic of the framework too far. Again, it will suffice to let the first run of results determine which view is correct.

The ongoing relationship between the parties would intuitively, also seem to be important. The literature supports the notion that parties in an ongoing relationship are more willing to preserve it than those in a short-term relationship, and that parties with a history of friendship will approach conflicts more cooperatively (see Bercovitch, 1989; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Rubin, 1981; Deutsch, 1973; Klieboer, 1996). This suggests that parties with a friendly, ongoing relationship will be more willing to negotiate cooperatively, and will have less need of a mediator. In

fact, as was discussed in section 3.3, the intervention of a mediator in such a situation may actually harm the conflict management process. In short, the Contingency Model suggests that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less hostility, or, the better the previous relationship between the parties. Comparatively, we would expect negotiation to be more successful than mediation when the previous relationship between the parties was friendly (see Table 3.8).

CONTEXTUAL FACTOR PROPOSITIONS:

- 1 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in tangible issue conflicts than in intangible issue conflicts. (ISSUE TYPE)
- 2 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in single issue conflicts (eg, simple conflicts) than in multiple issue conflicts (eg, complex conflicts) (ISSUE COMPLEXITY)
- 3 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in conflicts over sovereignty, security, self-determination, and resources, than conflicts over ideology and ethnicity. (PRIMARY ISSUE)
- 4 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the lower the fatalities in the conflict. (FATALITIES)
- 5 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the lower the conflict intensity. (INTENSITY)
- 6 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the shorter the conflict duration. (DURATION)
- 7 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful if they share similar political systems. (PARTY IDENTITY)
- 8 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the power differential between the parties is low. (POWER)
- 9 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the parties share alignment in the same bloc or security organization. (ALIGNMENT)
10. Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the parties are relatively homogenous. (HOMOGENEITY)
11. (a) Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the parties have had a previously friendly relationship than when they have had a history of conflict. (PREVIOUS RELATIONS)
(b) Negotiation will be more successful than mediation when the parties have had a friendly previous relationship.
12. Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less additional parties intervene in the conflict. (ADDITIONAL PARTIES)

Table 3.8 Summary of Contextual Factor Propositions

However, it is also possible to view this factor from the perspective of “learning” in conflict management (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Haas, 1991; Lebow, 1985). Here, it could be argued that states with a history of conflict may have, in fact, learned to deal with their conflicts through institutionalised forms of bargaining, or a tacit agreement to invite in a mediator whenever conflicts get out of hand. In this case, the path to agreement may be easier than in cases where conflict is unexpected and unanticipated.

A final contextual variable relates to the number of extra parties who intervene in the conflict on one side or the other. Such intervention clearly complicates the conflict management process by increasing the number of parties that have to be consulted, the number of interests and issues, and the complexity of the relationship structure. It is suggested then, that the less the conflict is complicated by intervening parties, the more successful both negotiation and mediation will be.

III Process Variables

Process variables relate to the conflict management itself - the way it is initiated and conducted, and the behaviour of the participants. One of the most important process variables is the timing of the conflict management; that is, the stage of the conflict. As with some of the contextual variables, there are two contradictory hypotheses on timing in the literature. Some analysts have suggested that conflict management is more successful early on in the conflict before the adversaries have crossed the threshold of violence, inflicted losses on each other, and become entrenched in their positions (see Edmead, 1971; Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t’Hart, 1995).

Others argue that later stages of a conflict provide the “ripe” moment for conflict management because the parties have reached a “hurting stalemate”, and may be willing to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations (see Northedge and Donelan, 1971; Ott, 1972; Pruitt, 1981; Zartman, 1983, 1985; Klieboer, 1996). Evidence from Bercovitch and associates suggests that the former position is more indicative of what occurs in international conflict. Thus, the Contingency Model suggests that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in the early

stages of the conflict before positions have hardened. Comparatively, mediation will be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of a conflict. This is because once the parties become entrenched, negotiation is more difficult. However, due to the declining alternatives facing the parties later in the conflict, mediators will possess more bargaining power (Princen, 1992: 54). See Table 3.9 for a more formal statement of this hypothesis.

A second important process variable relates to the site, or the environment in which the conflict management takes place. A neutral environment, free from external pressures and influences of constituencies and media, can create a level playing field and allow the parties to concentrate on the more substantive issues (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 29). A non-neutral environment however, can appear to favour the party whose territory it is in and in turn, make the opposing party harden their position in order to compensate. This suggests that both negotiation and mediation will benefit from a neutral environment. Turning to the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation, it is argued that because a mediator can counter-act the negative impact of a non-neutral environment by guaranteeing each party free and equal access to information and resources, can act as a neutral communication conduit, and can balance perceived power differences, then mediation will be more successful than negotiation in non-neutral environments. However, given our earlier observations that mediation usually occurs in the most difficult circumstances, and is contingent on the skills and resources of the mediator, it would be stretching the credibility of the model to predict this.

When both parties to a conflict are willing to deal with it constructively and take the step of initiating conflict management, this represents a propitious condition for success (see Hiltrop, 1985; Rubin, 1981; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993). Initiation of conflict management indicates a willingness to commit to the conflict management process. In other words, both negotiation and mediation are likely to be more successful when they are initiated willingly by both parties. It can be argued that mediators can overcome indifference and intransigence of parties by offering incentives, persuasion, coercion, and threats. Furthermore, when both sides are willing to settle, they may not need a mediator at all. Although this suggests that negotiation may be more successful than mediation when both sides initiate the conflict

management, while mediation would be more successful when only one side is willing, it would be imprudent to predict that this will be the case, given our earlier discussion.

PROCESS FACTOR PROPOSITIONS:

- 1 (a) Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in the earlier stages of the conflict compared to the later stages. (TIMING)
(b) Mediation will be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of the conflict.
- 2 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the conflict management occurs in a neutral setting. (ENVIRONMENT)
- 3 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when both parties initiate the conflict management attempt. (INITIATOR)
- 4 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the higher the rank of the principal negotiators. (NEGOTIATOR RANK)
- 5 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the conflict management is not complicated by ongoing hostilities. (PRESENCE OF HOSTILITIES)

Table 3.9 Summary of Process Factor Propositions

There is some suggestion in the literature that the rank and identity of the negotiators in the conflict management also affects its success or failure. In a study on the Spanish-US military bases negotiations, Druckman found general support for the hypothesis that senior level officials can overcome an impasse and facilitate agreements (Druckman, 1986: 358). Similarly, it is widely held that mediators of high rank, with great resources, legitimacy, and standing have a greater chance of success (see Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Frei, 1976; Pruitt and Johnson, 1970; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Ippolito and Pruitt, 1990). The Contingency Model predicts that both negotiation and mediation will benefit from having higher-level principal negotiators.

The last process variable discussed here is the presence or absence of hostilities during the conflict management. Conflict management which takes place while hostilities continue on the ground will be complicated by battlefield events, while conflict management which takes place in the window of peace brought about by a cessation of hostilities will be able to focus more directly on the underlying issues. In

short, both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the conflict management is not complicated by ongoing hostilities (see Table 3.9).

3.5 Contingent Conflict Management: Comparing Negotiation and Mediation

At the beginning of this chapter we posed the question: Is there an approach which will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and mediation? This chapter has outlined the dimensions of such an approach, and proposed the Contingency Model as a theoretical vehicle which can be used as the basis for an empirical comparison of negotiation and mediation. Developing an alternative framework to existing paradigms and proposing a useful comparative model have been the primary achievements of this chapter. An empirical study comparing negotiation and mediation would not be possible without a theoretical framework which specified what dimensions and factors are most important. Similarly, without a theoretical understanding of the nature of the similarities and differences between them, it would be difficult to evaluate any empirical results.

Using the model and existing research which generally fits with the Contingency framework, a number of initial propositions have been suggested here. Although it has not been possible to predict precisely how negotiation and mediation will behave under different conditions, the results of the initial set of propositions will highlight those areas where they appear to contrast and those where they are generally the same. A summary of the variables under investigation is presented in Table 3.10.

In the next chapter, I will outline the process of data collection and analysis used in the empirical study. This will be followed by the initial results and how they can be interpreted. Chapter five will focus more specifically on the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation in the attempt to shed some light on explanations of success and failure.

A PRIMARY (DEPENDENT) VARIABLES	
1	Conflict Management Outcome (Success or Failure)
2	Outcome Durability
B SECONDARY (INDEPENDENT) VARIABLES	
I Contextual Variables:	
1	Issue Type (Tangible versus Intangible)
2	Issue Complexity
3	Primary Issue
4	Fatalities
5	Conflict Intensity
6	Duration
7	Party Identity
8	Power
9	Alignment
10	Homogeneity
11	Previous Relationship
12	Additional Parties
II Process Variables:	
1	Timing of Conflict Management
2	Conflict Management Environment
3	Conflict Management Initiator
4	Negotiator Rank
5	Presence of Hostilities

Table 3.10 Summary of Variables for Empirical Investigation

Chapter 4

COMPARING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION EMPIRICALLY: INITIAL RESULTS

4.1 Introduction: Negotiation and Mediation in Empirical Analysis

In chapter three, a theoretical framework was outlined which could provide an exploratory foundation for a comparative study of negotiation and mediation in international politics. It was argued that the Contingency framework has a number of advantages over other approaches: it permits meaningful comparative research between types of conflict management, it encourages systematic empirical research, it identifies variables associated with successful conflict management, it offers an integrative framework for current conflict management research, and it facilitates theory development.

In this chapter, the Contingency framework is applied to the real world of international politics, and utilised in a large-scale empirical research project. In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to try and answer the third key question that was posed in chapter one: can a comparative approach to negotiation and mediation be applied to the real world of international conflict management? The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate the utility of using the Contingency approach in comparing negotiation and mediation, and answer the question firmly in the affirmative.

However, the empirical study undertaken for this chapter is important for other reasons than confirming the Contingency approach as a useful comparative framework, or testing a number of theoretical notions. As has already been mentioned in chapter one, no researcher has followed the lead of Holsti (1966, 1968), and there exists no systematic, large-scale comparative data set on international conflict management. The data set developed for this study then, represents an important innovation in the field. Furthermore, no attempt has yet been made to study

international negotiation using quantitative data and methods, and the construction of such a body of data here is unique in the field of negotiation studies.

Specifically, section 4.2 explains the methodology of the study, outlining how the variables under examination were operationalised, the data sources scanned, the research design, and the statistical tools utilised in the data analysis. Section 4.3 briefly outlines the major findings of the study in terms of the propositions generated by the Contingency model. The purpose here is to discover whether the propositions have been confirmed or contradicted by the data. Section 4.4 undertakes the more difficult task of attempting to explain what the results mean for negotiation and mediation comparatively, while the final section summarises the findings of the chapter and outlines the next step in the empirical investigation.

A small caveat is in order before we begin, however. In chapter 1 (section 1.5) we briefly discussed the sequential problem facing the empirical study. That is, there are inherent difficulties involved in treating negotiation and mediation as independent of each other, and assuming that outcomes are not the result of cumulative effects. This limitation needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the results of the study. This issue will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 6 (see section 6.2).

4.2 Comparing Negotiation and Mediation Empirically: Methodology

The overall aim and context of this empirical study was first, an attempt to extend an existing research project and create the first comparative data set of its kind. That is, I took Bercovitch's Correlates of Mediation data set (Bercovitch, 1997), and following its specified data collection procedures exactly, I coded a comparable number of negotiation cases. Second, it was aimed at developing the first large scale data set on international negotiation.

The description of the methodological procedures used by Bercovitch and his associates therefore, is also an exact description of the procedures I utilised. Although Bercovitch's methodology has already been described in a number of publications (see Bercovitch, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993; Bercovitch et al, 1991), a slightly more detailed explanation seems expedient here. Portions of the codebook for the Correlates

of Mediation data set (Med97.Codebook) are reproduced in Appendixes 1-4, and will be referred to in the following discussion.

The methodological approach taken by Bercovitch was predicated on a dissatisfaction with prevailing attempts to study conflict management. On the one hand, descriptive ideographic approaches assumed that all cases of mediation (or negotiation) were unique, and nothing meaningful could be said about types of mediation and dispute outcomes in general. On the other hand, normative-based, experimental studies did little to advance our understanding of the relative importance of different variables on mediation outcomes, and furthermore, could not be easily extrapolated to the international arena (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 8-9; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 299). Neither approach, it was argued, stimulated much-needed empirical research.

The weaknesses of these approaches prompted the adoption of the Contingency approach, which regards the outcomes of mediation (or negotiation) as being contingent upon a number of contextual and process variables (see Figure 3.2). The Contingency approach stimulates systematic empirical research because it stipulates variables and attributes with explicit operational criteria, as well as aiding in the identification of propositions about determinants of effective mediation.

Empirical Research

Empirical research should be verifiable (e.g., replicable), cumulative (e.g., build on existing research), self-correcting, value-free, and directed toward statistical generalisability (Jones, 1984; Ellis, 1994). Furthermore, it should be systematic and aimed at enumeration (Miller, 1995: 156). The Contingency approach is designed to fulfil these criteria. It is an inductive, descriptive-analytic approach which relies on quantitative methods which stipulate variables, attributes, and relationships in the search for factors which correlate with successful outcomes.

Along with other analytical approaches, the Contingency approach proceeds along a series of well-established steps. The first step involves conceptualising the problem through theoretical investigation and reflection (see chapters one to three). Second, a comprehensive data set must be developed. This involves specifying, observing, and

measuring relevant data, after operationalising the central concepts (Jones, 1984: 4). Third, relationships between aspects of the data need to be tested. A variety of appropriate statistical tools are available for this (see Miller, 1995). Lastly, the initial conceptualisation needs to be confirmed or modified. This is the point where the “on-going dialogue between theory and data” takes place (Ibid: 157). Even in an exploratory study such as this, these steps will guide the research design and data interpretations.

Research Design

Designing and conducting an empirical study can be conceived of as the process of surmounting a series of related problems. The first problem involves the definition and operationalisation of the variables under investigation. In order to gather data on negotiation and mediation in international conflict, the first task was to identify international disputes and the methods used to manage them. Although a large number of studies have addressed themselves to the problem of identifying and classifying international disputes¹, none have specifically addressed themselves to the question of how disputes are managed or terminated. Furthermore, given that these studies exhibited marked differences with respect to the periods covered, their definition of what constitutes an international dispute, the number of disputes found, and the absence of a list of peacefully resolved disputes, it was felt expedient to develop a separate data set of international disputes, and to examine how many were mediated (Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 292-293).

Initially, Bercovitch relied on the prior compilation of Singer and Small (1982), in which international disputes were defined as organised and continuous armed conflict involving one or more states which resulted in at least 1,000 fatalities. This threshold of fatalities was later lowered to 100, and initially, 97 international disputes from 1945-1990 were identified (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 673). The study concentrated on the post-war period for a number of theoretical and practical reasons (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997).

¹ Some of the best efforts are summarised in Singer and Small, 1982; Moaz, 1982; Cioffi-Revilla, 1990; Miall, 1992; and Vasquez, 1993.

A growing realisation that the data set did not include important disputes such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the 1988 Spratly Islands take-over by China, simply because they did not reach the required threshold of fatalities, caused a further re-think. Consequently, in its current form, the data set includes conflicts if they conform to the following criteria: (1) the involvement of at least two states, although one of these states may be involved indirectly through significant intervention in a civil conflict; and (2) the significant use of force (eg, open warfare, unopposed invasion of territory, large-scale and threatening military build-ups, etc), regardless of the number of fatalities (see section 3.2). In other words, the data set includes interstate conflicts, internationalised civil wars, and militarised disputes, but not political incidents (see section 3.2; Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). This widening of the operational definition has yielded a total of 295 conflicts for the period 1945-1995. A list of these conflicts can be seen in Appendix 2, and a description of each can be seen in Bercovitch and Jackson (1997).

In the original project, each of these conflicts was then examined in detail to ascertain whether or not mediation had taken place. The initial examination yielded 1,666 discrete cases of mediation, and in the process, a number of negotiation cases. For this thesis, I examined each conflict a second time to ascertain whether or not negotiation had taken place, which yielded a total of 1,154 cases of negotiation. My own investigations contributed more than 600 cases of negotiation. Each was coded in terms of the 68 variables described in Appendix 1 and 2, creating a sizable data set. Although negotiation and mediation have already been defined theoretically (see sections 1.3, 3.2), for operational purposes mediation was taken to mean “the actual reporting of formal or institutionalised, non-coercive intervention by an outsider (a person, a state or organization) in order to help the parties settle their dispute” (Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 293). Similarly, negotiation was operationally defined as the reported formal, or sometimes relatively informal, attempts by the disputing parties to communicate with each other about substantive issues related to the cause and/or consequences of their conflict. Of the 295 conflicts, 225 involved either, or both, negotiation and mediation.

Data Collection

The second main problem in conducting an empirical study involves data collection. The primary events data sources used to locate and collect information on negotiation and mediation were the *New York Times*, *Keesings Archives* (latterly *Keesings Record of World Events*), *The Times* (London), *Reuters Online News Service*, and a wide range of books and articles describing specific cases (see the bibliography in Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). I consulted these same sources for information on instances of negotiation. Data on conflicts and state characteristics was taken from a wide range of authoritative sources², such the *Statesman's Year-book* (various editions), *Freedom in the World*, *World Military and Social Expenditures* (various years), various UN publications, and numerous other sources summarising state and world-level quantitative data (see also Cook and Paxton, 1979; Sherman, 1989).

Compiling a list of all negotiation and mediation events in international conflict is a demanding task, especially considering that routine informal, institutional negotiations and mediations are carried out behind closed doors daily. The data collected here represents “non-routine” conflict management attempts that were described in public sources³. Initially, Bercovitch scanned the above mentioned sources in search of mediation, although a few negotiations, referrals to international organisations, multilateral conferences, and arbitrations were also coded. However, because the project was primarily concerned with mediation, the vast majority of negotiation cases present in the record were missed. Consequently, I re-scanned all the same sources looking specifically for instances of negotiation. All the information regarding the negotiation and mediation cases was recorded on codesheets, an example of which can be seen in Appendix 1.

² Conflict data was taken primarily from Singer and Small (1982); Tillema (1991); Day (1987); Butterworth (1976); Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988, 1989); Brogan (1992); as well as the above-mentioned journalistic sources. The conflicts themselves are described in Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997.

³ It is recognised that by looking only at public sources, some covert attempts at negotiation or mediation may be missed. Obviously, as evidence of such negotiations or mediations come to light, they will be included in the data set.

Operationalising the Variables

A third problem to overcome was operationalising the variables specified by the Contingency approach. As was mentioned, the dependent variable, negotiation and mediation outcomes (eg, success or failure), was coded in strictly behavioural terms which focused on the observed differences the conflict management had on the parties' behaviour (see Bar-Tal et al, 1989; Clarke, 1993; Coser, 1968, for further discussion on outcomes). Modifying Haas's success index (1986), the negotiation or mediation event was considered unsuccessful when no agreements were acknowledged, and there was no discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties' behaviour. It was considered to be of limited success when it achieved a cease-fire agreement, and/or an actual cessation of hostilities. It was considered to be partially successful when it resulted in an agreement to initiate or continue dialogue between the parties, and/or resulted in agreement on side-issues or portions of the major issues. Lastly, the negotiation or mediation was considered fully successful when agreement was reached on the majority of the major issues in conflict.

There are a number of important reasons for adopting this approach, not least because it helps to avoid many of the conceptual confusions and disagreements involved in evaluating conflict management outcomes (see discussion in chapter 1, section 1.3). Second, it is the only realistic alternative for a large-scale empirical study such as this. That is, it would be impractical to effectively operationalise and evaluate notions of fairness, justice, efficiency, legitimacy, satisfaction, or long-term success for such a large body of cases. Such approaches are more suited to qualitative research; strict behavioural criteria are the only realistic alternative here.

Third, the behaviourally-based scale adopted here "explicitly recognises partial settlements as diplomatic achievements in which some issues, often the most contentious ones, may be deliberately and skillfully omitted from consideration in order to secure agreements" (Dixon, 1996: 657). Lastly, my approach has the advantage of effectively disentangling the act of successfully reaching an agreement from the conceptually distinct task of implementing its terms (Ibid).

A further measure related to outcomes concerned the durability of the success of the conflict management. In other words, parties could fully settle all the primary

issues in conflict, as happened in 1992 in Angola, but then the agreement could break down and the parties return to violent struggle, as occurred in 1994 in Angola. Similarly, mediators were successful in obtaining agreement on more than 40 ceasefires during the Yugoslavian conflict, but most of these were actually observed for less than one week, and some were broken within hours. Conflict outcomes then, were coded as being more or less durable.

The 68 variables used to code each discrete case of negotiation and mediation, the format they are set up in, and descriptions of each variable can be found in Appendix 3. Calculation criteria and codes for the more complex variables, such as the power indexes, homogeneity measures, political rights scales, and civil liberties scales, can be found in Appendix 4. Although many of the variables are relatively straightforward and self-explanatory, such as dispute dates, conflict duration (in months), the number of fatalities, system period, geographic region, type of conflict, UN involvement, conflict management environment, and so on, others require more explanation.

An initial variable requiring explanation is the start and end dates of a negotiation or mediation. This is potentially problematic because at times, a conflict management episode may take place in a single two hour meeting. Alternately, it may take weeks, or even months of shuttling between capitals by a mediator before the mediation effort is considered to be ended. For the most part, start and end dates were determined in terms of two primary guiding descriptions in the data sources. In the first instance, negotiations or mediations are often conceived of as “rounds” of talks, which end when the negotiators return to their home governments for consultation, leave the talks for a number of days or weeks, or there is a major change in negotiator personnel. Second, mediations especially, are often described in terms of “initiatives”, whereby a mediator may circulate a proposal between the parties until it becomes clear that it is not acceptable. A new initiative may be the circulation of a new proposal, or a new attempt by another mediator. Using these considerations, it soon becomes clear where one negotiation or mediation ends, and another begins.

The duration variable refers to the actual number of months the fighting continued, rather than the time the issues remained in dispute. This means that negotiation and mediation may continue long after the conflict (in terms of its violent physical manifestations) is over, because the underlying issues remain unresolved. For

example, although the fighting between North and South Korea largely ended in 1953 (apart from intermittent incidents along the DMZ), negotiations over security and reunification continue to the present day.

Another variable requiring some explanation is the issues in conflict. Issues refer to what the conflict is all about, and in this sense, are the underlying cause of the dispute. Often determining exactly what the issues are is confusing, because there may be more than one, different parties may not agree on what constitutes a disputed issue, and there may be disagreement on the relative importance of the issues. To make sense of this somewhat confused picture, Bercovitch coded the possible issues into six categories to describe and reflect the tangible and intangible types of issues that may characterise international disputes: sovereignty, ideology, security, independence, resources, and a residual “other” category which included ethnicity. The coding also allows for each dispute to have a primary, secondary, and peripheral issue, thus indicating simple or complex issue structures. Also, it allows for the primary issue to be coded as being tangible (e.g., resources, sovereignty, independence), or intangible (e.g., ideology, security, ethnicity).

Sovereignty disputes refer to incompatible claims to a specific piece of territory by the adversaries (e.g., Britain-Argentinian claims to the Falklands/Malvinas, China-Vietnamese claims to the Spratly Islands, Eritrea-Yemenese claims to the Hunaysh islands). Ideological disputes are based on strong disagreements over the nature of a political system, basic values, or beliefs (e.g., Iran-Iraq, Korean, China-USSR, USA-Panama conflicts). Security disputes refer to perceptions of threat or feelings of insecurity over borders, frontiers, or territories (e.g., Arab-Israeli conflicts, India-China border incidents). Independence disputes are based on the desire by a territory to liberate itself from another state and determine its own national selfhood (e.g., African Territories-Portugal, Biafra-Nigeria, Lithuania-USSR disputes). Resource disputes refer to conflicts over the control of a particular resource, such as a water supply (e.g., Syria-Iraq Euphrates dispute, India-Bangladesh Ganges dispute). Lastly, ethnic disputes refer to conflicts involving high levels of inter-ethnic antipathy (e.g., Rwanda and Burundi conflicts, Yugoslavian civil war, Tuareg-Niger conflict).

A few other variables requiring explanation include the final dispute outcome (v14 - see Appendix 3). Here conflicts are described as being ongoing, if at the data

set end-date (e.g., December 31, 1995), violent struggle continues. They are considered lapsed if each side, or one side, unilaterally withdraws its claims and does not engage in any more conflict behaviour. In contrast, disputes are considered abated if the violent conflict behaviour ends, but each side continues to press its claims diplomatically and retains the option to use force. In this case, the dispute is seen to be in a state of continued tension (e.g., Ecuador-Peru, Arab-Israeli, India-Pakistan disputes). The other categories for this variable are self-explanatory.

The alignment variable (v20 - see Appendix 3) refers to the political alignment of states during the cold war period (1945-1989), and to the post-cold war alignment structure (e.g., 1990-1995). The number of parties variables (v28, v29 - see Appendix 3) refers to the number of intervening parties on each side, such as the Korean war, which also included the involvement of China, the USA, and several other Western-aligned states. Other conflicts which involved multiple intervention include the Vietnam war, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Yemen conflicts, the Angolan and Mozambique conflicts, the Cambodian conflict, and a number of Latin American conflicts, such as the Nicaraguan conflict.

The last variable requiring some discussion is mediator strategies (v50 - see Appendix 3). Conceptualising mediator behaviour is quite difficult, as there are more than 100 techniques mediators may apply in their relationship with the parties (Wall and Lynn, 1993). To facilitate operationalising this aspect requires first of all, a definition of mediator behaviour. Kolb divides mediator behaviour into strategy and tactics. Strategy refers to "an overall plan, approach, or method a mediator has for resolving a dispute...It is the way the mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, and the issues (Kolb, 1983: 249). In contrast, tactics are "the behavioural manifestations for various strategies; the operational, and observable behaviours that characterise each strategy" (Ibid).

There have been various attempts at categorising mediator behaviour into different types of strategies⁴. Bercovitch adopts the approach taken by Touval and Zartman (1985), who classify mediator behaviour along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention. They identify three primary types of strategies that

⁴ See Bercovitch and Wells, 1993 for a discussion of the main typologies of mediator strategies.

encompass the spectrum of mediator behaviour, namely, communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive strategies.

Communication-facilitation strategies describe mediator behaviour at the low end of the intervention spectrum, where a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role. For example, they may channel information to the parties, facilitate cooperation, and shuttle between the parties, but exhibit little control over the process or substance of mediation. Procedural strategies entail a higher level of intervention, and enable a mediator to exert more formal control over the environment in which the conflict management takes place. For example, they may determine the number, type, place, and agenda of the meetings, as well as control constituency influences, media publicity, information distribution, resources, and communication channels. Directive strategies are the most active strategy, and entail the highest level of intervention. Here mediators attempt to deal with the issues in dispute and the behaviour of the parties by providing incentives to the parties, issuing ultimatums, suggesting solutions, and/or warnings about the consequences of non-agreement.

Data Analysis

The methodological approach used to analyse the data can be characterised as a descriptive-analytical approach (Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 292). It relies on quantitative methods which stipulate variables, attributes, and relationships in the search for factors which correlate with successful outcomes. Although statistical analysis of third party intermediary activity in international relations is not unknown (see Bercovitch and associates; Frei, 1976; Hosti, 1966; Levine, 1971; Raymond and Kegley, 1985; Dixon, 1996), few have attempted more than the most rudimentary bivariate analysis, and none have attempted to compare different methods of conflict management.

In this chapter, I begin by assessing the impact of a number of factors or variables on the success or failure of the conflict management by using simple bivariate models, where the relationship between each variable and the conflict management outcome is examined singularly. In using the usual two-dimensional contingency tables, the objective is to determine if one or both variables have an effect on the distribution of

values in the other, or, to establish that there is no such effect at all. Here I rely primarily on the Pearson chi-square statistic as a test of independence in two-dimensional contingency table analysis, where a significant X^2 ($p < .05$) indicates disagreement between the data and the null hypothesis. The X^2 is the traditional test for analysis of a two-way table, and is a function of the discrepancy between the observed frequencies in the table cells, and the estimated expected frequencies under independence (Demaris, 1992: 3-4). It is also employed here for reasons of continuity with the format of the data, and a desire to extend the findings of previous studies which have employed both this data set and the methodological procedures being utilised here (see Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993).

At this stage then, the aim is simply to establish that a relationship exists. The results of this bivariate relationship analysis will then be used as a guide for hypothesising and testing multivariate models. That is, significant bivariate associations uncovered here will form the basis of the multivariate models tested in chapter five. In chapter five, I will employ multidimensional table analysis, where the main objective is to identify both the impact of multiple independent variables on the success or failure of negotiation and mediation, and the nature of the impact of the independent variables on each other. Loglinear and logit methods will be employed as the mode of analysis there.

4.3 The Specific Propositions and Initial Results

I Primary Propositions

The primary proposition, namely, that negotiation will be more successful overall than mediation in international conflict, was supported by the data. As can be seen in Table 4.1, negotiation was successful in 47% of its cases, while mediation was successful in only 39.4% of its cases⁵. With a X^2 of 16.24 with one degree of freedom, this is highly significant (at the $p < .001$ level), and suggests that the hypothesis of independence can be rejected. These results can also be expressed in terms of the

⁵ This success/failure dichomised variable was created by collapsing the Full Settlement, Partial Settlement, and Ceasefire categories into a single Successful category. The effects of collapsing variables will be addressed in chapter five.

likelihood of success. Thus, all things being equal, the average likelihood of successful negotiation would be 47%, while the average likelihood of successful mediation would be 39.4%. This should be kept in mind when the impact of different variables on negotiation and mediation outcomes is assessed in the following discussion. It should also be noted that this relationship is being examined here in isolation from all other variables, and we cannot, at this stage, determine whether there are other forces at work that impact on this correlation. This caveat applies to all the bivariate analyses in this chapter.

Interestingly, these results closely mirror results obtained by Holsti (1966, 1968). Holsti examined 77 conflicts for the period 1919-1965, and found that bilateral negotiations were successful in 47% of the 47 negotiation attempts examined. Mediation, both by international organisations and other international actors, was successful in 35% of the 57 mediation attempts. Along with the results discussed below, Holsti's results lend weight to the suggestion that negotiation is indeed more successful than mediation in international conflict, and for the reasons that have been proposed (see Section 3.4). Primarily, negotiation is more successful than mediation because mediation tends to be employed primarily in those conflicts which are the most difficult to resolve (see section 4.4 below).

	Negotiation	Mediation
Success	542 (47.0%)	656 (39.4%)
Failure	611 (53.0%)	1010 (60.6%)
Total	1153 (100%)	1666 (100%)

Table 4.1 Negotiation and Mediation Success and Failure (n=2819)

Furthermore, the success rate of 39.4% for mediation found here, fits with other research. Kressel and Pruitt (1989) have estimated that the median settlement rate across all mediation domains is about 60%, with a range between 20% and 80% (see also Wall and Lynn, 1993). The fact that mediation success in violent international

conflicts is well below the median rate is understandable, given the intensity, hostility, and complexity of such conflicts.

If the conflict management outcomes are broken down into their specific categories, Table 4.2 shows that negotiation successes are comprised largely of partial settlements (37%). This is also true of mediation successes (22.2%). Interestingly, a larger proportion of mediation successes are comprised of ceasefires (13.2%) than for negotiation (6.7%).

	Negotiation	Mediation
Full Settlement	38 (3.3%)	66 (4.0%)
Partial Settlement	427 (37.0%)	370 (22.2%)
Ceasefire	77 (6.7%)	220 (13.2%)
Unsuccessful	611 (53.0%)	1010 (60.6%)

Table 4.2 Negotiation and Mediation Outcomes

This is suggestive of the types of situations that mediators most often find themselves in. Namely, mediation often occurs in highly volatile situations where fighting continues, while negotiation often takes place after the fighting has stopped (see section 4.4 below).

A second proposition relating to outcomes concerned the durability of successful outcomes. Here it was predicted that successful negotiation-produced outcomes would be more durable than successful mediation-produced outcomes. The data clearly supported this proposition (see Table 4.3). Negotiation successes, in the vast majority of cases (82%) lasted eight weeks or more, whereas only slightly more than half (51.7%) of mediation successes were in this category. In fact, nearly a third of all mediation successes (29.8%) lasted less than one week, compared with only 9.5% of negotiation successes. If the first two categories are combined, we see that nearly half of all mediation successes (44.3%) lasted less than four weeks. With a X^2 of 113.882 with 3 degrees of freedom, these results are significant at the $p < .001$ level.

In other words, the data seems to support the notion that successful negotiation outcomes will be more durable than mediation successful outcomes. The literature suggests that the theoretical explanation for this is because they are arrived at completely bilaterally (see Section 3.4). Another suggestion is that mediation is often too brief to alter the climate between the parties. The problems needed to be solved are too severe, and “mediation is a weak elixir for improving a dispute hostile enough to merit intervention by a third party” (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). One further explanation is that mediation tends to occur, in most cases, in the most intense, intractable, and hostile conflicts where ingrained patterns of violence are extremely difficult to break. This notion is explored further in later sections.

	OUTCOME DURABILITY			
	less than 1 week	2-4 weeks	5-7 weeks	8+ weeks
Negotiation success	49 (9.5%)	34 (6.5%)	10 (2.0%)	420 (82.0%)
Mediation success	180 (29.8%)	88 (14.5%)	24 (4.0%)	312 (51.7%)

Table 4.3 Negotiation and Mediation Outcome Durability

II Secondary Propositions: Contextual Factors

The first set of contextual factors investigated was the number and type of issues in conflict. In terms of issue type, there was little support for the proposition that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the issues were tangible rather than intangible. In fact, there was almost no difference for mediation success when the issues were intangible (40.2%), than when they were tangible (37.3%). Furthermore, the X^2 value of 1.2 with one degree of freedom means that the null hypothesis, or the mutual independence of these variables cannot be rejected. The results were similar for negotiation, where success varied not at all between tangible issues (47.0%) and intangible issues (46.9%). A partial explanation for these results could relate to the inherent difficulties involved in coding issues as tangible or intangible in international politics. For example, while it seems reasonable to view a

dispute over the control of territory as a tangible issue, the tremendous symbolic significance of territory to states (see Vasquez, 1993) often can only be explained in intangible terms.

It was also predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the less complex the conflict, in terms of the number of issues. There was some support for this prediction (see Table 4.4), in that both negotiation and mediation were more successful the fewer the number of issues. Mediation was

	ISSUE COMPLEXITY					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	One Issue	Two Issues	Three Issues	One Issue	Two Issues	Three Issues
Success	82 (50.6%)	244 (42.4%)	216 (52.0%)	67 (47.9%)	285 (39.0%)	304 (38.2%)
Failure	80 (49.4%)	332 (57.6%)	199 (48.0%)	73 (52.1%)	446 (61.0%)	491 (61.8%)

Table 4.4 Negotiation and Mediation Issue Complexity and Outcomes⁶

clearly more successful in simple, single issue conflicts (47.9%), than in complex multiple issue conflicts (38.2%). With a X^2 of 4.69 with 2 degrees of freedom, this distribution did not reach statistical significance ($p=.096$). The picture for negotiation is even less clear. Negotiation is most successful in multiple issue conflicts (52.0%), where it was well above the average expected success rate, but least successful in dual issue conflicts (42.4%). With a X^2 of 10.07 with 2 degrees of freedom, this distribution is highly significant ($p=.006$).

⁶ Tables are presented here in a comparative format whenever possible for two simple reasons. First, the study is primarily comparative, and single tables are easier to interpret comparatively than separate tables. Second, the large number of tables that would result from separating negotiation and mediation would be impractical.

Comparatively, negotiation and mediation experience similar success rates for one and two issue conflicts, but exhibit contrasting effects in complex conflicts, where there is a 13.8% difference in success rates. This suggests that while greater complexity seems to decrease the success rates of mediation, as was suggested in Section 3.4, the competing notion regarding complexity applies to negotiation. Namely, the possibility that greater complexity creates opportunities for trade-offs, sequencing, and packaging may actually apply, but only in cases of negotiation. Interestingly, a large proportion of mediation cases (795, or 47.7%) occurred in the multiple (three) issues category, highlighting the fact that mediation tends to operate under the most difficult circumstances.

	NEGOTIATION					
	Sovereignty	Security	Self-Determination	Resources	Ideology	Ethnicity
Success	303 (46.7%)	46 (35.7%)	107 (47.6%)	10 (62.5%)	51 (50.5%)	25 (75.8%)
Failure	346 (53.3%)	83 (64.3%)	118 (52.4%)	6 (37.5%)	50 (49.5%)	8 (24.2%)

Table 4.5 Negotiation Primary Issue and Outcomes

Looking more specifically at the content of the issues in dispute, it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful in conflicts over sovereignty, security, self-determination, and resources, than in conflicts over ideology and ethnicity. This proposition was not supported by the data, which revealed an unclear and somewhat skewed distribution (see Tables 4.5, 4.6). The explanation for this must lie partly in the fact that there are inherent problems involved in delineating issues operationally (see Klieboer, 1996; Diehl, 1992). The findings were also skewed somewhat by the predominance of cases clustering in sovereignty, self-determination, and ideology categories. In fact, both negotiation and mediation had greater success in issues involving ideology than in issues involving sovereignty, security, or self-determination. This contradicted the direction of the

original proposition. The only point of interest comparatively was that negotiation was significantly more successful than mediation in conflicts over both sovereignty and self-determination. Both negotiation and mediation were significant at the $p < .05$ level.

	MEDIATION					
	Sovereignty	Security	Self-Determination	Resources	Ideology	Ethnicity
Success	165 (36.2%)	110 (38.7%)	205 (38.6%)	11 (68.8%)	147 (45.2%)	18 (33.3%)
Failure	291 (63.8%)	174 (61.3%)	326 (61.4%)	5 (31.3%)	178 (54.8%)	36 (66.7%)

Table 4.6 Mediation Primary Issue and Outcomes

As a related measure of issue complexity, negotiation and mediation were also tested against whether the conflict could be characterised as being primarily a civil conflict (intra-state), or an inter-state conflict. Although there was virtually no difference between success rates, and neither type reached statistical significance, there was one interesting finding. The table revealed that 1123 (67.4%) of the mediation cases occurred in conflicts that were primarily civil, while 735 (63.7%) of the negotiation cases occurred in interstate conflicts. This could go some way to explaining the higher success rates of negotiation, as mediation occurs primarily in conflicts characterised by less clear-cut issues, high fragmentation, multiple issues, and intensity of feeling - that is, civil conflicts. Negotiation, on the other hand, occurs largely in relatively clear-cut conflicts between well-defined actors who have established channels of communication.

Behaviourally, it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the lower the level of fatalities. This prediction was generally upheld (see Table 4.7), as both negotiation and mediation showed tendencies towards higher rates of success at lower rates of fatalities. Furthermore, the results were statistically significant. The X^2 was 19.74 with 4 degrees of freedom for negotiation ($p = .001$), and

χ^2 was 37.16 with 4 degrees of freedom for mediation ($p=.000$). Recoding the categories in this table revealed results consistent with the original findings.

Comparatively, negotiation was more successful at all levels of fatalities, except for the 0-500 level where the difference in success rates was marginal. However, the degree of success narrowed the higher the level of fatalities. Interestingly, a glance at the distribution of cases reveals that 1151 (69%) of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where there were more than 10,000 fatalities, while 612 (53%) of negotiation cases occurred in conflicts with less than 10,000 fatalities. This is further evidence of the fact that mediation occurs predominantly in the most difficult of circumstances.

	FATALITIES									
	Negotiation					Mediation				
	0-500	501-1000	1001-5000	5001-10000	10000+	0-500	501-1000	1001-5000	5001-10000	10000+
Success	158 (52.0%)	44 (64.7%)	90 (50.0%)	28 (46.7%)	222 (41.1%)	120 (56.1%)	22 (44.0%)	45 (28.0%)	37 (44.0%)	429 (37.3%)
Failure	146 (48.0%)	24 (35.3%)	90 (50.0%)	32 (53.3%)	318 (58.9%)	94 (43.9%)	28 (56.0%)	116 (72.0%)	47 (56.0%)	722 (62.7%)

Table 4.7 Negotiation and Mediation Fatalities and Outcomes

Related to fatalities is intensity. Here the Contingency Model predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the lower the level of conflict intensity. This prediction was largely upheld in the data (see Table 4.8), with a general tendency towards greater success the lower the level of intensity. Furthermore, recoding the categories of intensity⁷, and re-testing this variable, confirmed strongly the original findings that both negotiation and mediation are more successful the lower the level of intensity. This suggests that the notion that greater intensity enhances the chances of successful conflict management as a way of cutting costs, for example, is most likely fallacious. In fact, it would seem that greater intensity makes conflict management more difficult, by leading to entrenchment and polarisation.

⁷ Intensity was recoded into the following categories: 0-2500, 2501-10000, 10001-100000, 100000+.

Comparatively, the results do not support the argument that mediation will be more successful than negotiation at higher levels of intensity (see Section 3.4). In fact, negotiation can be seen to be more successful than mediation at all levels of intensity. There is again, some support for the notion that mediation tends to occur in the most difficult cases, as only 697 (41.9%) mediation cases occurred in the 0-500 intensity-level category. Negotiation, on the other hand, was concentrated in the lower levels of intensity, with 621 (55.0%) cases in the 0-500 category. The results for Table 4.8 were statistically significant. Negotiation had a X^2 of 19.37 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p=.000$), while mediation had a X^2 of 18.94 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p=.000$).

	INTENSITY (fatalities per month)							
	Negotiation				Mediation			
	0-500	501- 1000	1001- 10000	10000 +	0-500	501- 1000	1001- 10000	10000 +
Success	315 (50.7%)	37 (53.6%)	126 (45.5%)	52 (32.1%)	294 (42.2%)	146 (45.2%)	167 (35.5%)	48 (28.1%)
Failure	306 (49.3%)	32 (46.4%)	151 (54.5%)	110 (67.9%)	403 (57.8%)	177 (54.8%)	303 (64.5%)	123 (71.9%)

Table 4.8 Negotiation and Mediation Intensity and Outcomes

The prediction that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the shorter the conflict duration was unsupported in the data. Neither negotiation nor mediation reached statistical significance, and no clear pattern emerged from the data. Recoding the duration variable confirmed these original results. Again, the only point of interest was that the majority of mediation cases tended to be concentrated in the conflicts which were longest running, with 1173 (70.4%) occurring in conflicts of a duration longer than 36 months.

A second set of contextual variables examined related to the nature of the parties and their ongoing relationship. The first prediction here was that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful if the parties shared political systems. A dichotomous variable of cases where the parties shared the same type of political

system, versus cases where they had different political systems, was used to test this proposition. The data was unresponsive of this proposition, and neither negotiation nor mediation reached statistical significance. Comparatively, negotiation was consistently more successful than mediation in both categories, and mediation cases were concentrated in conflicts where the parties had dissimilar political systems (1012, or 60.7%).

Another measure of party similarity, time in the international system as a recognised state, was also investigated here, but produced mixed and unclear results. It made no difference for mediation success rates, and did not reach statistical significance. In the case of negotiation however, it was found that when the parties in conflict had been in the international system different lengths of time, negotiation was more successful (50.1%) than in cases where the parties had been in the international system the same amount of time (42.4%). With a χ^2 of 6.74 with one degree of freedom, this distribution was significant at the $p < .01$ level. Comparatively, the data revealed that the vast majority of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where the parties had been in the international system for differing amounts of time.

A second prediction related to party characteristics variables stated that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the power differential between the parties was low. The findings were again mixed (see Table 4.9). The prediction was supported in the case of mediation, with a clear pattern of higher success rates the lower the power differential. With a χ^2 of 8.57 with 2 degrees of freedom ($p = .014$), the association between the two variables was statistically significant. In the case of negotiation however, the results were somewhat more confusing. Negotiation was most successful in the middle-range category of power disparity (52.6%), and less successful in the low power differential category (43.1%) and the high power differential category (44.3%). With a χ^2 of 7.86 with 2 degrees of freedom, these results were also significant at the $p < .05$ level.

A possible explanation for these findings is that when two states have equal capabilities, neither is willing to make concessions in case it compromises their position relative to their opponent. When the power differential is high, on the other hand, the stronger party may feel unwilling to compromise because it feels confident that its superior position will allow it to 'win' over their opponent. Therefore, a

certain median level of power difference actually provides an incentive for both parties to negotiate in good faith.

Comparatively, negotiation appeared to demonstrate a different effect to mediation in regards to this variable. When both negotiation and mediation occur in conflicts with low power disparity, they are equally successful. However, at high levels of power disparity, negotiation is far more successful (44.3%) than mediation (34.3%), even though it is below the expected average success rate (eg, 47%). This contradicts the viewpoint that mediation is better able to counter-act the effect of power discrepancies between the parties (see Section 3.4). Also, Table 4.9 reveals that the majority of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where power discrepancy was moderate to high (1071, or 66.6%). As will be demonstrated in later sections, these conflicts also tend to be primarily civil conflicts.

	POWER DIFFERENTIAL					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	Low (0-4)	Middle (5-10)	High (11+)	Low (0-4)	Middle (5-10)	High (11+)
Success	190 (43.1%)	180 (52.6%)	149 (44.3%)	232 (43.4%)	238 (39.5%)	161 (34.3%)
Failure	251 (56.9%)	162 (47.4%)	187 (55.7%)	303 (56.6%)	364 (60.5%)	308 (65.7%)

Table 4.9 Negotiation and Mediation Power Differential and Outcomes

A third prediction related to party identities and capabilities stated that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when they shared alignment in the same bloc or security organization. The results for this variable were also mixed (see Table 4.10), with negotiation and mediation appearing to be affected in different ways. In general, negotiation conformed to the prediction and was more successful when alignment was similar. With a X^2 of 25.28 with 2 degrees of freedom, this association was highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. Mediation, on the other hand,

demonstrated an opposite effect, and was most successful when the parties belonged to opposing blocs or security organisations. However, with a X^2 of 3.18 with 2 degrees of freedom ($p=.203$), the mutual independence of these variables is more likely.

Comparatively, the table highlights the much greater level of success of negotiation (52.6%) over mediation (39.6%) when the parties share alignment. Similarly, it also highlights that mediation is more successful (42.3%) than negotiation (34.4%) when the parties belong to opposing blocs or regional organisations. This suggests that negotiation and mediation may be affected in different ways by the alignment of the disputing parties. Mediation is better able to deal with the complication of opposing loyalties, while negotiation is significantly enhanced when the parties share such loyalties. Membership in the same security organisations not only provides regular points of contact, but also indicates that the parties share an underlying bed of interests and views.

	ALIGNMENT					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	Same Alignment	Mixed Alignment	Opposing Alignment	Same Alignment	Mixed Alignment	Opposing Alignment
Success	326 (52.6%)	121 (47.1%)	95 (34.4%)	464 (39.6%)	77 (34.5%)	115 (42.3%)
Failure	294 (47.4%)	136 (52.9%)	181 (47.1%)	707 (60.4%)	146 (65.5%)	157 (57.7%)

Table 4.10 Negotiation and Mediation Party Alignment⁸ and Outcomes

Related to the aforementioned aspects of party similarities is the notion of cultural fragmentation, or homogeneity. Here it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the parties were relatively homogenous. Again, the results were mixed and somewhat confusing (see Table 4.11). Predictably, negotiation was most successful (51.5%) when both parties were homogenous. However, negotiation was also marginally more successful when both

parties were fragmented (44.2%), compared to when one was homogenous and one was fragmented (41.6%). With a χ^2 of 9.72 with 2 degrees of freedom, these results were significant at the $p < .01$ level. Mediation, on the other hand, demonstrated a general trend towards greater success the less homogenous one or both parties were. When both parties were highly fragmented, mediation success was 42.1%, compared to 37.1% when they were both homogenous. This variation in the data did not reach statistical significance, however ($\chi^2 = 2.73$, $df=2$, $p=.254$).

	HOMOGENEITY					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	Both Strong	Weak/ Strong	Both Weak	Both Strong	Weak/ Strong	Both Weak
Success	300 (51.1%)	155 (41.6%)	87 (44.2%)	232 (37.1%)	233 (39.7%)	191 (42.1%)
Failure	283 (48.5%)	218 (58.4%)	110 (55.8%)	393 (62.9%)	354 (60.3%)	263 (57.9%)

Table 4.11 Negotiation and Mediation Party Homogeneity and Outcomes

Comparatively, the only note of interest here was that negotiation was significantly more successful (51.5%) than mediation (37.1%) when both parties were homogenous. Similar to previous findings, it is also noted that the majority of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where one or both of the parties were fragmented (1041, or 62.5%), whereas only 49.4% (570) of the negotiation cases occurred in similar circumstances. In this sense then, the majority of mediation cases occurred under much more difficult conditions than negotiation.

There were two primary predictions regarding the previous relations of the parties. First, it was predicted that when the parties had had a previously friendly relationship,

⁸ This variable was created by collapsing the categories of the original Alignment variable into the three categories seen in this table - "same alignment" included same bloc, same regional organization, etc.

this would be more conducive to success than when they had had a history of conflict. This was generally supported in the data, although as can be seen in Table 4.12, very few negotiations or mediations occurred in conflicts where the parties had had a previous relationship free from conflict. In the vast majority of cases, negotiation and mediation was preceded by antagonism or actual conflicts. With a X^2 of 8.50 with 2 degrees of freedom ($p=.014$), the association between previous relations and mediation outcomes was statistically significant. Negotiation, on the other hand, failed to reach statistical significance for this variable ($X^2=.222$, $df=2$, $p=.895$).

The second prediction regarding the previous relations of the parties was that negotiation would be more successful than mediation when the parties had a previous friendly relationship. This notion was completely unsupported by the data, which in fact, found that mediation was more successful than negotiation in such cases. However, the fact that this finding did not reach statistical significance for negotiation, and involved such low numbers of cases, trivialises this finding somewhat. Interestingly, negotiation was significantly more successful (47.0%) than mediation (38.9%) when the relationship was characterised by previous episodes of conflict. This is suggestive of the notion that experiencing a number of disputes allows states to “learn” how to manage conflict (see section 4.4 for a more detailed discussion of this finding).

	PREVIOUS RELATIONS					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	No Conflict	Antagonism	Previous Conflicts	No Conflict	Antagonism	Previous Conflicts
Success	21 50.0%	143 (46.3%)	378 (47.0%)	33 (57.9%)	334 (38.5%)	289 (38.9%)
Failure	21 (50.0%)	166 (53.7%)	424 (52.9%)	24 (42.1%)	533 (61.5%)	453 (61.1%)

Table 4.12 Negotiation and Mediation Party Previous Relations and Outcomes

A final party characteristics factor investigated here was the involvement of additional intervening parties in the conflict. Specifically, it was predicted that negotiation and mediation would be more successful the less additional parties intervened and thereby, complicated the conflict. The results differed for negotiation and mediation somewhat (see Table 4.13).

In the first place, mediation contradicted the hypothesised relationship and appeared to be more successful the greater the number of intervening parties. This association was not statistically significant, however ($X^2=5.18$, $df=3$, $p=.159$). On the other hand, the prediction did hold for negotiation, which showed a clear decline in success rates the greater the number of intervening parties. Furthermore, this distribution in the data was statistically significant, with a X^2 of 18.78 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p=.000$). Comparatively, it seems important that the vast majority of negotiation cases involved conflicts with few intervening parties, whereas mediation cases tended, in most instances, to involve outside interventions. This finding reinforces the notion that mediation occurs under the most difficult circumstances.

	ADDITIONAL PARTIES (ONE/BOTH PARTIES)							
	Negotiation				Mediation			
	None	1-2	3-5	5+	None	1-2	3-5	5+
Success	208 (49.9%)	222 (51.6%)	31 (39.7%)	81 (35.5%)	88 (34.4%)	318 (39.8%)	166 (39.1%)	84 (44.9%)
Failure	209 (50.1%)	208 (48.4%)	47 (60.3%)	147 (64.5%)	168 (65.6%)	480 (60.2%)	259 (60.9%)	103 (55.1%)

Table 4.13 Negotiation and Mediation Additional Parties and Outcomes

II Secondary Propositions: Process Factors

Process variables relate to the way the conflict management is initiated and conducted, and the behaviour of the participants. The first set of propositions here related to the timing of the intervention. Specifically, it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful in the earlier stages of the

conflict than in the later stages when positions had hardened. The data did not support this notion, except in the most general sense. Negotiation success only varied marginally across each category, except for the period of 13-36 months, when success rates were above average (53.4%). For mediation, success declined with an increase in months up to 12 months since the outbreak of the conflict (see Table 4.14). However, after 13 months, success rates rose significantly, but then fell again after 36 months. While this distribution reached statistical significance for mediation with a χ^2 of 12.50 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p=.006$), it was insignificant for negotiation ($\chi^2=4.93$, $df=3$, $p=.175$). Furthermore, the pattern was maintained when the variable was recoded. In other words, the data does not support the notion that there is any single “ripe” moment for conflict management. Rather, it appears that success rates are highest after an intermediate time period has elapsed, perhaps at a time when high costs have been experienced, but before positions have completely polarised.

	TIMING OF INTERVENTION (Months)							
	Negotiation				Mediation			
	1-2	3-12	13-36	36+	1-2	3-12	13-36	36+
Success	27 (43.5%)	67 (42.1%)	102 (53.4%)	346 (46.8%)	72 (46.5%)	86 (37.7%)	136 (46.3%)	361 (36.6%)
Failure	35 (56.5%)	92 (57.9%)	89 (46.6%)	393 (53.2%)	83 (53.5%)	142 (62.3%)	158 (53.7%)	625 (63.4%)

Table 4.14 Negotiation and Mediation Timing and Outcomes

A second proposition relating to the timing of the intervention predicted that mediation would be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of the conflict. The data, in fact, demonstrated the opposite principle. Mediation success (46.5%) and negotiation success (43.5%) varied little in the early stages of the conflict, but negotiation was more successful (46.8%) than mediation (36.6%) after 36 months. In terms of the distribution of cases, the majority of mediation cases (986, or 59.3%) occurred after 36 months, indicating that mediators are often only brought in after positions have hardened and all other avenues exhausted.

Another important factor in the process of conflict management is the environment in which it takes place. Here it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the conflict management occurred in a neutral setting. This was supported in the case of mediation, but not for negotiation (see Table 4.15), which was most successful when the negotiation took place in the territory of either protagonist. What the data did reveal was that shuttling between the parties' territories was not a successful strategy for either negotiation or mediation (negotiation 38.7%, mediation 27.7%). In other words, when neither party is prepared to meet face to face and messages have to be relayed between them, this increases the chances of misperception and miscommunication. It is also indicative of a high level of hostility between the parties, or antipathy to the conflict management process, neither of which is conducive to success. The distribution across the data was statistically significant for both negotiation ($X^2=8.93$, $df=2$, $p=.01$), and mediation ($X^2=58.19$, $df=2$, $p=.000$).

	ENVIRONMENT					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	One Party's Territory	Neutral Site	Composite (Shuttling)	One Party's Territory	Neutral Site	Composite (Shuttling)
Success	332 (50.6%)	137 (42.5%)	41 (38.7%)	149 (41.4%)	336 (48.8%)	156 (27.7%)
Failure	324 (49.4%)	185 (57.5%)	65 (61.3%)	211 (58.6%)	352 (51.2%)	407 (72.3%)

Table 4.15 Negotiation and Mediation Environment and Outcomes

Comparatively, negotiation was far more successful (50.6%) than mediation (41.4%) when the conflict management took place in one or other of the party's territory. This seems to cast initial doubt on the notion that mediators can counter-act the negative impact of a non-neutral environment. Also of interest here is the finding that mediation was moderately more successful (48.8%) than negotiation (42.5%)

when the conflict management occurs on a neutral site. In other words, a neutral site does not necessarily increase the success of negotiation, as would intuitively seem to be the case.

One of the most important conditions for success is thought to be the willingness of the parties to settle their conflict peacefully. The Contingency Model predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when both parties initiated the conflict management. This prediction was supported by the data (see Table 4.16), especially for mediation, which was most successful (60.7%) when both parties initiated the mediation, compared to when one party initiated it (39.1%), or the mediator initiated it (34.5%). Furthermore, with a X^2 of 51.94 with 2 degrees of freedom ($p=.000$) indicated a strong association between these two variables. Similarly, negotiation was most successful (50.6%) when both parties initiated it, compared to when only one party initiated it (41.4%). With a X^2 of 9.29 with 2 degrees of freedom, this relationship was also statistically significant ($p=.01$).

	CONFLICT MANAGEMENT INITIATOR					
	Negotiation			Mediation		
	One Party	Both Parties	Third Parties (Neither)	One Party	Both Parties	Third Parties (Neither)
Success	201 (41.1%)	224 (50.6%)	2 (25.0%)	52 (39.1%)	128 (60.7%)	415 (34.5%)
Failure	285 (58.6%)	219 (49.4%)	6 (75.0%)	81 (60.9%)	83 (39.3%)	788 (65.5%)

Table 4.16 Negotiation and Mediation Initiator and Outcomes

Comparatively, what is interesting here is that mediation is significantly more successful (60.7%) than negotiation (50.6%) when both parties initiate the conflict management. This suggests that conflict management initiation is not significant in itself, and parties may still require a mediator to facilitate a successful conclusion to their talks. Another point of interest here is that the vast majority of mediation cases

(1203, 77.8%) were initiated by the mediator and not the parties themselves, indicating that mediators, more often than not, have to work with some level of indifference and intransigence by the parties.

A fourth prediction concerning process variables stated that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the higher the rank of the principal negotiators. The results for this were also mixed (see Table 4.17). The prediction was upheld for negotiation, which was significantly more successful (60.5%) when the principal negotiators were both primary decision-makers, such as heads of state or rebel organisation leaders, than in any other category. With a X^2 of 21.38 with 2 degrees of freedom, this variability in the data was highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. The prediction was not upheld for mediation, which was most successful (48.1%) in the both senior decision-maker category, and also experienced above-average success (45.1%) in the both low-level decision-maker category. With a X^2 of 14.47 with 2 degrees of freedom, this distribution was also significant ($p = .002$).

	NEGOTIATOR RANK							
	Negotiation				Mediation			
	Both Primary Decision Makers	Both Senior Decision Makers	Both Lowest Decision Makers	Mixed Level Decision Makers	Both Primary Decision Makers	Both Senior Decision Makers	Both Lowest Decision Makers	Mixed Level Decision Makers
Success	118 (60.5%)	194 (43.4%)	76 (39.2%)	132 (47.5%)	195 (38.2%)	175 (48.1%)	92 (45.1%)	122 (35.8%)
Failure	77 (39.5%)	253 (56.6%)	118 (60.8%)	146 (52.5%)	316 (61.8%)	189 (51.9%)	112 (54.9%)	219 (64.2%)

Table 4.17 Negotiation and Mediation Negotiator Rank and Outcomes

Comparatively, the most interesting finding was that negotiation was significantly more successful (60.5%) than mediation (38.2%) when both negotiators were primary decision-makers. This suggests that when primary decision-makers meet in the presence of a mediator, they tend to be uncompromising in order to appear strong to their constituents. This tendency is probably even stronger when the conflict is intractable, primarily civil, and characterised by high levels of hostility between the

protagonists - the characteristics of most mediation cases (see section 4.4). On the other hand, mediation was slightly more successful (48.1%) than negotiation (43.4%) when both decision-makers were senior, and when the decision-makers were low-level (mediation 45.1%, negotiation 39.2%).

The final variable examined here was the presence or absence of hostilities during the conflict management episode. It was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the conflict management was not complicated by ongoing hostilities. The data did not confirm this prediction however, and the findings never reached statistical significance for either negotiation or mediation, suggesting that the mutual independence hypothesis cannot be rejected here. There was a less than 2% increase in success rates for both negotiation and mediation from the presence to the absence of hostilities, indicating that this variable had no impact on conflict management outcomes.

4.4 Evaluating the Empirical Results

At first glance, the results discussed in Section 4.3 appear to be somewhat confusing, random, and perhaps even contradictory. However, upon reflection a number of important initial conclusions can be drawn, general overall patterns discerned, and observations made. More specific conclusions will be given in chapter five after subjecting the data to far more stringent multivariate testing. However, one of the most important findings of the study is that negotiation and mediation tend to occur under different conditions. Specifically, mediation tends to occur in conflicts that are the most complicated, the most intense, and the most intractable. That is, it occurs in the type of conflicts that are by definition, the most difficult to resolve. From this perspective, it is not surprising that mediation has significantly lower success rates than negotiation, and produces less durable outcomes. This seems to be an important finding, as it has often been suggested (see Bercovitch and associates), but never demonstrated empirically.

Table 4.18 summarises the difficult conditions under which mediation tends to occur⁹. First, it occurs primarily in long-running civil conflicts, between parties that are fragmented, have disparate political systems and capabilities, and have a history of antagonism and conflict. Second, it occurs in the most complicated and complex conflicts, with multiple issues, and multiple intervening outside parties. Third, it occurs in the most intense, the most costly (in terms of lives), and the longest-running conflicts. Lastly, it occurs in conflicts where the parties' own conflict management efforts have failed, or there has been, and continues to be, little motivation or political will to settle on the part of the protagonists.

THE CONDITIONS OF MEDIATION	
1.	795 mediations occurred in multiple issue conflicts
2.	1123 mediations occurred in primarily civil conflicts
3.	1151 mediations occurred in high fatality (10,000+) conflicts
4.	964 mediations occurred in high intensity (501+ fatalities per month) conflicts
5.	1173 mediations occurred in high duration (36+ months) conflicts
6.	1012 mediations occurred in conflicts where the parties did not share similar political systems
7.	1071 mediations occurred in conflicts where there was moderate-high power disparity between the parties
8.	1041 mediations occurred in conflicts where one or both parties had fragmented states
9.	742 mediations occurred in conflicts characterised by previous conflict
10.	1410 mediations occurred in conflicts involving multiple additional intervening parties
11.	986 mediations occurred more than three years after the conflict broke out
12.	1203 mediations were initiated by the mediator
Total Mediations: 1666	

Table 4.18 The Conditions of Mediation

Negotiation, by contrast, seems to occur in far more favourable conditions compared to mediation (see Table 4.19). First, negotiation generally takes place in relatively less intense and less costly conflicts. Second, it occurs in less complex conflicts, with comparatively simple issue structures and few intervening additional parties. Third, it usually involves homogenous parties who share political alignments. That is, the parties share a set of common values. Lastly, negotiation tends to be given

⁹ Most of the tables in this section are simply summaries of general observations. No attempt is made here to imply any statistical associations or absolute tendencies in the data. More stringent testing is carried out in chapter five.

a high priority (in terms of the types of decision-makers involved), and is often characterised by a mutual willingness to negotiate.

THE CONDITIONS OF NEGOTIATION	
1.	738 negotiations occurred in conflicts involving two or less issues
2.	665 negotiations occurred in conflicts involving sovereignty or resource issues
3.	612 negotiations occurred in conflicts involving less than 10,000 fatalities
4.	621 negotiations occurred in low intensity (0-500 fatalities per month) conflicts
5.	620 negotiations occurred in conflicts where the parties shared the same alignment
6.	583 negotiations occurred in conflicts where both the parties were homogenous states
7.	417 negotiations occurred in conflicts uncomplicated by intervening additional parties
8.	443 negotiations were initiated by both parties
9.	642 negotiations involved senior or primary decision-makers on both sides as the principal negotiators
Total Negotiations: 1154	

Table 4.19 The Conditions of Negotiation

These findings make intuitive sense, as the very fact that mediation is required at all, implies difficulties in the conflict management process. Furthermore, it provides a general explanatory reason why negotiation is more successful than mediation under most conditions, and suggests why some variables affect negotiation positively (in terms of greater outcome success), but do not affect mediation in the same way (see below). In short, the data supports the general thrust of the Contingency approach that negotiation will be more successful than mediation overall in international conflict.

A second important finding which also confirms an underlying principle of the Contingency Model, is that negotiation and mediation not only occur under a different set of conditions, but they appear to be affected in different ways by different variables. First, as can be seen in Tables 4.20 and 4.21, there is a significant degree of difference in the conditions that are associated with negotiation success, and the conditions associated with mediation success¹⁰.

¹⁰ Of course, the statistical strength of these associations will be closely examined in the multivariate analysis of the next chapter. At this stage, it will suffice to make a number of general observations.

CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHEST NEGOTIATION SUCCESS

1. Three issues (52.0%) and one issue (50.6%) - Table 4.4
2. Ideological issues (50.5%) and self-determination issues (47.6%) - Table 4.5
3. 0-500 fatalities (52.0%) and 501-1000 fatalities (64.7%) - Table 4.7
4. 0-500 intensity (50.7%) and 501-1000 intensity (53.6%) - Table 4.8
5. Medium power differential (52.6%) - Table 4.9
6. Same alignment (52.6%) and mixed alignment (47.1%) - Table 4.10
7. Both strong homogeneity (51.5%) - Table 4.11
8. No previous conflict (50.0%) - Table 4.12
9. No additional parties (49.9%) and 1-2 additional parties (51.6%) - Table 4.13
10. 13-36 months intervention since conflict start (53.4%) - Table 4.14
11. One party's territory as negotiation site (50.6%) - Table 4.15
12. Both party initiation of negotiation (50.6%) - Table 4.16
13. Both primary decision-makers as principal negotiators (60.5%) - Table 4.17

Table 4.20 Conditions Associated With Highest Negotiation Success

Negotiation for example, does not appear to require a simple issue structure, low power disparity, or a neutral site to produce high success rates, while mediation clearly does. Also, while negotiation success is associated with similar party alignment, strong homogeneity, few intervening additional parties, and primary decision-makers, mediation success is associated with almost opposite values. That is, mediation success is associated with opposing alignment, weak homogeneity, multiple intervening parties, and low-level decision-makers.

In some cases, variables appear to have a negative impact on one type of conflict management, while having a positive impact on the other. For example, while having primary decision-makers as the principal negotiators seems to enhance the degree of success for negotiation, it seems to depress the degree of success for mediation. In short, the profile of variables associated with negotiation success is different to the profile of variables associated with mediation success. This suggests that negotiation and mediation are different conflict management methods with different determining factors. Specifically how these variables interact with each other and with the dependent variable (negotiation and mediation outcomes), will be examined in the following chapter.

CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHEST MEDIATION SUCCESS	
1.	Single issues (47.9%) - Table 4.4
2.	Ideological issues (45.2%) - Table 4.6
3.	0-500 fatalities (56.1%) and 501-1000 fatalities (44.0%) - Table 4.7
4.	0-500 intensity (42.2%) and 501-1000 intensity (45.2%) - Table 4.8
5.	Low power differential (43.4%) - Table 4.9
6.	Opposing alignment (42.3%) - Table 4.10
7.	Both weak homogeneity (42.1%) - Table 4.11
8.	No previous conflict (57.9%) - Table 4.12
9.	Multiple additional intervening parties (44.9%) - Table 4.13
10.	1-2 months (46.5%) and 13-36 months (46.3%) from conflict start - Table 4.14
11.	Neutral site for mediation (48.8%) - Table 4.15
12.	Both party initiation of mediation (60.7%) - Table 4.16
13.	Both senior (48.1%) and both low-level (45.1%) decision-makers as principal negotiators - Table 4.17

Table 4.21 Conditions Associated With Highest Mediation Success

However, having said this, it is interesting to note that negotiation and mediation are not totally dissimilar, and there are some variables that seem to be important for both negotiation and mediation success. The fact that negotiation and mediation share similarities is also part of the assumptions of our theoretical framework (the Contingency Model - see chapter three). For example, both negotiation and mediation experience higher rates of success the lower the level of fatalities and intensity, in conflicts where there has been no previous conflict, and when the conflict management is initiated by both parties. In other words, these conditions seem to affect negotiation and mediation in similar ways. As such, they are relatively simple to explain. When both parties are eager to resolve their conflict, and they have no history of antagonism, and the costs and intensity are limited, any form of conflict management is likely to be more successful.

A corollary to the conditions of highest negotiation and mediation success, is that they imply the conditions under which negotiation (see Table 4.22) and mediation (see Table 4.23) is *least* successful. Again, there are some conditions which depress success rates for both forms of conflict management, such as high fatalities, high intensity, high power differential, and lack of both party initiation (eg, lack of political will to settle).

CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH LOWEST NEGOTIATION SUCCESS	
1.	Two issues (42.4%) - Table 4.4
2.	Security issues (35.7%) - Table 4.5
3.	10,000+ fatalities (41.1%) - Table 4.7
4.	10,000+ Intensity (32.1%) - Table 4.8
5.	Low power differential (43.1%) and high power differential (44.3%) - Table 4.9
6.	Opposing alignment (34.4%) - Table 4.10
7.	Mixed weak/strong homogeneity (41.6%) - Table 4.11
8.	3-5 (39.7%) and 5+ additional parties (35.5%) - Table 4.13
9.	3-12 months intervention since conflict start (42.1%) - Table 4.14
10.	Composite (shuttling) negotiation site (38.7%) - Table 4.15
11.	One party initiation of negotiation (41.1%) - Table 4.16
12.	Both low-level decision-makers as principal negotiators (39.2%) - Table 4.17

Table 4.22 Conditions Associated With lowest Negotiation Success

On the other hand, there are also factors which are unique to negotiation, such as opposing alignment, dissimilar homogeneity, high numbers of additional intervening parties, and both parties sending low-level officials to the talks. These factors appear to depress the success rates of negotiation, but not mediation. The unique factors which lower mediation success rates include conflicts over sovereignty or ethnicity issues, mixed alignment, and mediator initiation of the talks. In other words, negotiation and mediation again demonstrate contrasting, but also comparable profiles of the conditions under which they are least successful.

CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH LOWEST MEDIATION SUCCESS	
1.	Sovereignty issues (36.2%) and ethnicity issues (33.3%) - Table 4.6
2.	1001-5,000 fatalities (28.0%) and 10,000+ (37.3%) - Table 4.7
3.	1001-5,000 intensity (35.5%) and 10,000+ intensity (28.1%) - Table 4.8
4.	High power differential (34.3%) - Table 4.9
5.	Mixed alignment (34.5%) - Table 4.10
6.	No additional intervening parties (34.4%) - Table 4.13
7.	Composite (shuttling) environment (27.7%) - Table 4.15
8.	Mediator initiation (34.5%) - Table 4.16

Table 4.23 Conditions Associated With Lowest Mediation Success

A third interesting finding related to the points discussed so far in this section, is that some variables are statistically significant for negotiation, but not for mediation,

and visa-versa. Table 4.24 indicates that while previous relations and timing are significant indicators for mediation, they are not significant for negotiation. In other words, these variables would seem to be independent of negotiation outcomes. Similarly, while issue complexity, alignment, homogeneity, and additional parties are statistically significant indicators for negotiation, they are not for mediation. Again this is simply another indication that, in some important respects, negotiation and mediation are affected by different variables, and in different ways (while at the same time sharing important similarities).

A final important observation from the initial run of results described here, is that negotiation is significantly more successful than mediation under a relatively surprising set of conditions (see Table 4.25). For example, negotiation is significantly more successful than mediation when the conflict is characterised by complex issue structures, high power differentials between the parties, a history of antagonism and conflict, a massive time lapse between the conflict initiation and the conflict management (eg, indicating hardened positions), and when it takes place in one party's territory (eg, a hostile environment for the other party). These were all conditions where it was expected that mediation would outperform negotiation. In

Variable:	Negotiation (p)	Mediation (p)
Issue Complexity	0.006	0.096*
Primary Issue	0.001	0.020
Fatalities	0.001	0.000
Intensity	0.000	0.000
Power Differential	0.020	0.014
Alignment	0.000	0.203*
Homogeneity	0.008	0.254*
Previous Relations	0.895*	0.014
Additional Parties	0.000	0.159*
Timing	0.175*	0.006
Environment	0.011	0.000
Initiator	0.010	0.000
Negotiator Rank	0.000	0.002

* Did not reach required level of statistical significance ($p > 0.05$). Variables which did not reach statistical significance for either negotiation or mediation include: Issue Type, Duration, Party Identity, and Presence of Hostilities.

Table 4.24 Statistically Significant Variables of Negotiation and Mediation Outcomes

other words, a simple bivariate analysis of these variables does not reveal the whole picture, and the interactive effects of these and other variables needs to be uncovered before a clearer picture can emerge. Also, the Contingency model may need to be extended and adjusted to accommodate these findings.

For example, it may be that a history of conflict actually improves the chances of negotiation success because the parties have had time to “learn” effective conflict management. That is, over time the parties learn how to handle their conflicts in ways which minimise the costs they experience (see Breslauer, 1991; Tetlock, 1991; Vasquez et al, 1995). Also, it may be that negotiation is unaffected by power differentials or the negotiation site, if the parties are willing to negotiate, or the issues are simple, or some other intervening variable is present. However, the other conditions shown in Table 4.25 were not so unexpected. For example, it was expected that negotiation would outperform mediation in cases of low intensity, similarity of alignment and homogeneity, the presence of few additional parties, and when primary-decision-makers were involved in the actual negotiations.

Turning to mediation, some of the conditions under which mediation was more successful than negotiation were also surprising (see Table 4.26). First, it was unexpected that mediation would be more successful than negotiation when the primary issue was security (eg, a tangible issue), there were low fatalities, and there was a low power differential between the parties. Intuitively, negotiation should have been more successful in each of these conditions. However, for these three conditions, the degree of difference between negotiation and mediation was extremely slight, and could be considered simply anomalous or insignificant.

What is more surprising, is that mediation is more successful than negotiation when the parties have no previous history of conflict, the conflict management takes place on a neutral site, it is initiated by both parties, and the principal negotiators are senior or low-level decision-makers. In the first place, it is possible that parties with no history of conflict have not yet “learned” how to manage their disputes, and in this case, the presence of a mediator significantly enhances the chances of mediator success. In the case of site neutrality and both party initiation, these factors were expected to enhance conflict management efforts in general. Why exactly they should enhance mediation success significantly more than negotiation, remains unclear.

1. Complex Issue Conflicts - Table 4.4
2. Sovereignty and Self-determination Issue Conflicts - Table 4.5, 4.6
3. Low to Medium-level Intensity Conflicts - Table 4.8
4. Medium to High Party Power Differential - Table 4.9
5. Same Alignment for both Parties - Table 4.10
6. Both Parties Strongly Homogenous - Table 4.11
7. Antagonism and Previous Conflict Between the Parties - Table 4.12
8. Low to Medium Additional Intervening Parties - Table 4.13
9. Long Timing of Intervention (36+ months) since Start Date - Table 4.14
10. Conflict management in One Party's Territory - Table 4.15
11. Primary and Mixed-level Decision-makers as Principal Negotiators - Table 4.17

Table 4.25 Conditions Under Which Negotiation is Significantly More Successful Than Mediation¹¹

Lastly, it was unexpected that low-level negotiators would prove so successful. Perhaps low-level decision-makers in negotiation lack authority and feel compelled to be seen as firm under the gaze of their superiors. In mediation, on the other hand, they have a clear mandate to negotiate and are willing to be flexible in order to secure the best possible solution for their constituencies.

1. Security Issues (slightly more successful) - Table 4.5, 4.6
2. Low Fatalities (slightly more successful) - Table 4.7
3. Low Power Differential (slightly more successful) - Table 4.9
4. Opposing Alignment - Table 4.10*
5. No Previous Conflict - Table 4.12
6. High Additional Parties - Table 4.13*
7. Short Intervention Time (1-2 months) from Conflict Start - Table 4.14
8. Neutral Site - Table 4.15*
9. Both Party Initiation - Table 4.16*
10. Both Senior or Low-level Decision-makers as Principal Negotiators - Table 4.17

Table 4.26 Conditions Under Which Mediation is More Successful Than Negotiation¹²

What was not surprising, on the other hand, was that mediation should cope better with opposing alignment, and the complication of multiple intervening additional parties. Also, the fact that mediation has greater success early on in the

¹¹ All these conditions are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

¹² Unlike negotiation, most of these conditions did not reach statistical significance. Only those marked with a * were significant at the $p < .05$ level. A more rigorous multivariate analysis will be undertaken in chapter five.

conflict is not surprising, as parties often break off all diplomatic ties when fighting breaks out, or they negotiate strategically in case their military gambit fails to pay off. In this situation, mediators can play a vital role in acting as a channel of communication, and warning the parties about the consequences of pursuing their present actions.

4.5 A first Glance at the Real World of Negotiation and Mediation

A first glance at the real world of international negotiation and mediation suggests a number of important conclusions. First, the Contingency approach is correct in its primary assumption that negotiation and mediation are different forms of conflict management that operate in different ways, and are affected by different sets of factors. This is clearly shown in the data, even at the relatively simple bivariate level. In other words, we are right to persist in attempting to explain conflict management from this theoretical perspective. Second, the results themselves suggest partially why this might be the case. It is the case because mediation tends to occur, in part by necessity, in those conflicts which are the most difficult to resolve. Any variable that would normally result in higher success rates for other forms of conflict management, is negated in its impact by a myriad of other factors which make the chances of success very low anyway.

Thirdly, and most importantly for this study, the results indicate that the real world of international negotiation and mediation is not as straightforward or simple as our theoretical model suggests. This is not surprising, as the real world is almost never as simple as a model. A number of differences between negotiation and mediation that were expected did not materialise, while differences we did not expect did occur. Also, negotiation was successful in conditions where we thought it would be less successful, and more successful than mediation where we thought it would be less successful. The picture was equally as complex for mediation¹³.

¹³ Of course, given the complexity of the phenomena we are investigating, and the relative bluntness of the empirical instruments at our disposal, it is possible that these results could be due to imperfections in the data collection and analysis process.

The most basic explanation for these results is that complex social phenomena such as negotiation and mediation can never be satisfactorily analysed using simple bivariate models. They are multi-causal phenomena, with a large number of possible explanatory variables which need to be considered simultaneously in order to explain any significant degree of their variance. Second, the explanation for the seemingly anomalous bivariate results is the simple fact that the explanatory variables do not just interact uni-directionally with the dependent variable (negotiation and mediation outcomes), but they also interact with each other. For example, logically, the antecedent variables in the Contingency model (eg, issues, fatalities, power, homogeneity) will affect and interact with both concurrent (process) variables (eg, timing, environment, initiator, rank), and consequent (dependent) variables. In other words, until multivariate analysis uncovers the complex interrelationships between these variables, we cannot be sure whether or not they really are anomalous.

In short, the results suggest that while the Contingency Model is a useful starting point, it needs to be re-worked in a number of crucial areas, and refined in its predictive orientations. However, this cannot be achieved until we have further examined the data, and begun to unravel in more detail **how** the different variables interact with negotiation and mediation outcomes. Then we can begin to suggest **why** negotiation and mediation have different success rates under different sets of conditions. This is the task of the next chapter.

Chapter 5

A MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

5.1 Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Negotiation and Mediation

In chapter four, the initial results of the empirical comparison of negotiation and mediation were presented. It was found that the profile of variables associated with negotiation success was different to the profile of variables associated with mediation success. For example, negotiation success was significantly associated with: issue complexity, primary issue, fatalities, intensity, power differential, alignment, homogeneity, additional parties, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank (see Table 4.22). Mediation success, on the other hand, was significantly associated with: primary issue, fatalities, intensity, power differential, previous relations, timing, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank. In other words, negotiation success seems to be associated more closely, at this stage of the analysis, with party characteristic variables, or aspects of the parties most likely to affect their ongoing relationship. Mediation success, on the other hand, seems more closely associated with variables relating to the nature of the conflict and the actual process of conflict management.

The primary methodological problem posed by the results of chapter four is that simple bivariate contingency table analysis reveals little surety about the direction or strength of relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Furthermore, it cannot reveal whether the relationships are spurious (eg, mediated through a third variable), or how much variance they account for in tandem. For example, it is possible that the strong association between alignment and negotiation outcomes will weaken when combined with a third variable, such as the power differential between the parties. Similarly, it is also possible that although there appears to be no direct association between issue complexity and mediation outcomes, when a third variable such as intensity is also taken into account, issue complexity could become quite important in determining the variability of mediation outcomes.

Logically, we could expect that antecedent variables such as the issues, fatalities and intensity, and the nature of the parties, would affect both the outcomes (dependent variable), and the concurrent variables such as the timing of the conflict management, the initiator, environment, and negotiator rank. For example, it seems logical that the previous relationship of the parties might affect the choice of environment in which to hold the negotiation or mediation. The extreme hostility between the parties in the Bosnian war, for example, precluded negotiations or mediations in each other's territory, and most talks were held in neutral settings such as Switzerland, or the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport. Also, it seems fairly clear that the duration, intensity, and number of fatalities in the conflict will affect the timing and initiator of the conflict management. In many cases, the parties may not be willing to initiate talks until they have experienced a certain level of costs or realised that they cannot achieve their goals through unilateral military action.

However, the conceptual problem goes deeper than this, in that antecedent variables may also affect each other. For example, it seems reasonable that the number of additional intervening parties will be determined to some large degree by the issues in conflict, the nature of the parties (eg, large versus small parties), and the intensity of the conflict. Certainly, the intensity with which the parties pursue the conflict will be, in part, determined by the issues and the nature of their previous relationship. In other words, the problem is in determining both how the independent variables affect each other, and how they affect the negotiation and mediation outcomes. Clearly, simple bivariate analysis is incapable of determining these complex relationships, and more powerful multivariate testing is required. This then, is the task of this chapter, to test a number of multivariate models which will suggest a little more specifically the types of relationships between the variables.

In other words, the purpose of employing multivariate statistical tests to the data is three-fold. In the first place, the aim of multivariate testing is to confirm or deny the findings of the bivariate analysis. For the reasons outlined above, we cannot be sure of the bivariate findings until they have thoroughly investigated using more rigorous (multivariate) tests. The multivariate tests then, will allow us to be more confident about the findings in chapter four.

Secondly, the multivariate analysis will enable us to isolate the most important variables from among the large cluster of potential explanatory factors we have so far identified. By examining how much variance in the dependent variable (negotiation and mediation outcomes) is explained by each independent variable, we will be able to determine those few variables which have the most powerful effect on negotiation and mediation outcomes.

Lastly, multivariate testing is aimed at uncovering more specifically those conditions which enhance the chances of successful conflict management. For example, while the bivariate analysis allows us to suggest generally that the initiator of the negotiation or mediation is an important determining factor for explaining outcomes, the multivariate analysis allows us to say specifically that there is a strong relationship between both party initiation and negotiation and mediation success. Furthermore, it also allows us to say that there is a strong relationship between both party initiation, a neutral environment, and negotiation and mediation success. That is, it reveals relationships that are more complex than simple bivariate-level associations. In general, the multivariate analysis allows us to be far more specific, and somewhat more certain in our findings.

In section 5.2, I will explain the reasons why loglinear and logit analysis is the most appropriate statistical method for the analysis of this data, and then give a brief, non-technical explanation of the approach. In section 5.3 I will present the main findings of the loglinear analysis for negotiation outcomes, while section 5.4 will the main findings related to mediation outcomes. Lastly, in section 5.5 I will discuss the main findings of the chapter, and draw some brief conclusions.

A brief caveat is in order at this point. In spite of the importance of this study for conflict management theory and practice (see next chapter), the fact that it is the first large-scale comparative study of its kind, means that, by definition, it must be considered primarily exploratory and aimed at suggesting further areas of research. It cannot possibly be exhaustive. Given the number of variables used in this study (see section 4.2), there are a multitude of possible model combinations for both negotiation and mediation. Also, it would be feasible to examine negotiation and mediation outcomes under numerous conditions, such as by region (eg, African conflicts versus Middle East conflicts), by issue-types (eg, territorial conflicts versus self-

determination conflicts), or by the time-period (eg, pre-1990 versus post-1990). Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine all the potential ramifications, and others have already begun the task in mediation studies (see Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993).

Rather this study will confine itself to the relatively simple task of testing a few explanatory models which identify some important variable combinations which help to explain negotiation and mediation outcomes. In the context of the overall thesis, therefore, the goal is twofold. First, this chapter seeks to uncover that main factors which might go some way towards accounting for negotiation and mediation success. Second, it will seek to determine simply whether negotiation and mediation success can be attributed to the same set of conditions, or variables.

5.2 Analysing Relationships: A Multivariate Approach

Qualitative Data and Multivariate Analysis

Having identified those factors, or variables, with a significant impact on the success or failure of negotiation and mediation, it is now necessary to examine them simultaneously, to examine the interactions among them, and to assess their direct and indirect impact on negotiation and mediation outcomes. The dependent variable in this analysis, the success or failure of negotiation and mediation (outcomes), is inherently qualitative (or, categorical) as conceptualised here. Similarly, several of the independent variables, such as issue type (tangible versus intangible), conflict type (civil versus interstate), and previous relations (friendly versus conflictual), cannot, and should not, be measured in quantitative terms¹.

In other words, in order to examine this data, we need a multivariate method that is appropriate for data of this type. While the analysis of qualitative data has traditionally been limited to the use of two-dimensional contingency tables, the

¹ Although some might argue that this type of data can be 'redefined' as continuous and subjected to multivariate techniques such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Regression (MR), I reject this practice on the grounds that it has been shown to result in measurement error, bias, and the

development of loglinear techniques in the past two decades means that this limitation is no longer applicable. Although little used in the field of political science, loglinear methodology has attained a much higher profile in psychology, sociology, and psychometrics, largely because of the advantages it offers in both theory and application over traditional multivariate techniques.

For example, while it can be acknowledged that regression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) are established parametric procedures, they both require interval or continuous level data where categories of variables have meaningful numerically assigned values (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 308; Kennedy, 1983: 2-5). While in practice it is common to arbitrarily “redefine” qualitative variables as continuous, the resulting “measurement error, bias, and the loss of a significant amount of information” (King, 1989: 4) is sufficiently prohibitive to preclude such manipulations here (see also King, 1986; Langley, 1993).

Furthermore, although both regression and ANOVA techniques can deal with dichotomous qualitative data by employing linear models, they can only do so if the values of cell proportions remain in the range of .25 to .75. Beyond this range, the models diverge as multiplicative linear models and are based on asymptotic distributions instead of normal distributions (Bercovitch and Houston, *ibid*; see also King, 1986: 681-683; Knoke, 1975). Also, using alternative methods of multivariate analysis would require transforming the values for each variable into “dummy variable” format (Bercovitch and Houston, *ibid*; Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Reynolds, 1977). As mentioned, this practice has been shown to be prohibitively disadvantageous.

Specifically then, loglinear methodology enables the researcher to examine multidimensional contingency tables containing qualitative (or categorical) data, such as in the data being examined here. Loglinear methods and logit techniques are adopted here because first, loglinear model estimation (which indicates the variance across all the variables in the model), tends to fit observed qualitative data. Also, it is based on the interaction parameters rather than only the main effects in the model, and it uses maximum likelihood procedures of estimation based on the geometric means of

loss of important information (see King, 1989: 4; Langley, 1993: 36-37; King, 1986; O’Grady and Medhoff, 1988).

the contingency table cells, rather than the traditional least squares measures (Bercovitch and Houston, *ibid*; Agresti, 1990; King, 1986; Knoke, 1975).

Second, logit analysis, a special form of loglinear model (also called asymmetrical models), allows for the testing of multiple hypotheses, the construction of causal models, and the ability to test theoretical assumptions (Marascuilo and Busk, 1987: 452).

Third, logit procedures also provide the researcher with a number of useful supplementary measures that can be utilised to test models and hypotheses systematically, and to formulate alternative ones where necessary. For example, the strength of specific interactions in the model can be measured and tested for statistical significance using parameter estimates, or Lambda effects (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 308; Marascuilo and Busk, 1987: 452). This is especially useful for the research being conducted here, where numerous possible alternative explanations exist (Harris, 1990: 302-3).

In short, the strength and utility of the results, and the model-building and hypothesis-testing orientation of loglinear analysis, have considerable intuitive appeal (Zinnes, 1991). That is, although loglinear techniques are in many respects analogous to ANOVA, because they are more specifically designed to deal with qualitative (or, categorical) data, they tend to produce models that are more powerful, and results that are more robust in terms of both statistical theory, and the substantive hypotheses under investigation (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 678-9; Kennedy 1983: 229-234; Langley, 1993).

Lastly, loglinear methods have been chosen here for reasons of relevance, continuity with the format of the data, and a desire to extend the findings of previous studies which have employed both this data set and the loglinear methodology (see Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993).

Loglinear Methodology

The loglinear methodology utilised in this study owes much to the pioneering work of Goodman (1970, 1971, 1973). This work was later refined by Kennedy (1983) in his introductory text on loglinear analysis for behavioural research. It is also

influenced by Agresti (1990), Christensen (1990), Gilbert (1981), Haberman (1978a, 1978b), Knoke (1975), Knoke and Burke (1980), King (1986), Marascuilo and Busk (1987), and Reynolds (1977). The explanation of the method given here will be brief and non-technical for two simple reasons. First, more detailed and more technical explanations have been described elsewhere (see authors listed above; also, Demaris, 1992; Langley, 1993). Second, the lack of a technical understanding of these methods is no longer a barrier to their use, given that all of the arithmetic procedures have been programmed into easy-to-use computer software packages (see Knoke, 1975: 433; Marascuilo and Busk, 1987: 454). What is more important is the ability to think conceptually, to understand the limitations and interpretations of the data using these particular statistical tools (see Zinnes, 1991).

In the two-dimensional contingency table analysis undertaken in chapter four, the objective was to determine if one or both variables had an effect on the distribution of values in the other, or to establish that there was no effect at all. In multidimensional table analysis, on the other hand, the objectives are far more ambitious. Here the researcher is attempting to identify which variables are independent, which variables influence other variables, and which pairs or groups of variables have an interactive effect on others. In other words, multidimensional table analysis requires identifying which variables will make up the multidimensional table, and then identifying the interactive effects that have the strongest influence on the data. That is, we need to determine which relationships between variables are responsible for the observed distribution of the data within the cells of the table. More specifically, in terms of this chapter, we want to know which relationships and interactions will influence whether a negotiation case, or a mediation case will fall into the success or failure category.

In general, the loglinear method involves positing causal models of those variables and relationships between variables thought to be influential, and then testing these models on the data to see how well they fit the actual cell frequencies in the table. This is the “goodness-of-fit” test (see below). A hypothetical example will help to illuminate the loglinear method². Assuming a table consisting of three dichotomous variables, A,B, and C, there are four different possible interactions

² Adapted from Langley, 1993: 39-42.

between the variables which may influence the spread of cases across the cells in the table: AB, AC, BC, and ABC (this also assumes that the variables are not mutually independent). These interactions can be thought of as sub-tables of the main ABC table, and in order to understand how the cases in the ABC table are distributed, we need to have all the pieces of information contained in the sub-tables. In loglinear analysis, the information contained in a sub-table like (AB) is referred to as a “term”, an “effect”, or an “interaction”.

If, in analysing the data, we came to believe that the link between A and B was so strong that it determined the distribution of cases across C, then we could posit a loglinear model that contained only one piece of information, or, one effect: (AB). If this effect was sufficient, then the (AB) model would produce estimated cell frequencies for the whole table that fitted the observed cell frequencies fairly well. In other words, to predict the values across the ABC table in this case, we would only need to know the value of (AB).

It should be obvious at this stage, that the process just described would become far more complicated with the introduction of more variables. Thus, in complex tables where there may be forty or fifty possible interactions, it is necessary to identify a few important interactions that accurately reproduce cell frequencies across the whole table³. In terms of the study here, this means that we need to identify those few pieces of information that are necessary for predicting how cases will be distributed across all the combinations of antecedent, concurrent, and consequent variables in the Contingency model. More importantly, we need to identify which pieces of information are required to accurately predict whether a negotiation or mediation event will be a success.

One of the central tasks in loglinear methodology then, is to estimate cell frequencies. In loglinear models, the marginal odds provide the basis for estimation, rather than the proportion of cases in the table margins. The likelihood of a case falling into a given category combination in multidimensional tables like we have been describing, is determined by calculating the conditional odds. Due to the nature

³ An often used solution to the problem of complex tables is the practice of dichotomising, or simplifying variables (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993, for a practical example). While there are diverging opinions on whether this practice aids interpretation (see Reynolds, 1977 versus Gillespie,

of the estimation procedure, the natural logarithm (log to base e) of the odds is preferred to the odds proper. For larger and more complex tables, an iterative proportional fitting algorithm is employed to obtain the expected frequencies. That is, “the procedure uses the marginal tables fitted by the model to ensure that expected cell frequencies sum across the other variables to equal the corresponding observed marginal totals” (Knoke and Burke, 1980: 22). In other words, each hypothesised interaction in a model, or effect (eg, AB in our example), gives the loglinear procedure a set of conditional odds with which to generate expected cell frequencies. It follows then, that a model which produces expected frequencies similar to the actual observed frequencies, but which contains only a few of the possible effects, or terms, must contain the effects which have an important impact across all the variables.

Another important concept at this stage is the “saturated” model, which is a model which includes all the important possible interactive effects between the variables being investigated, including the null hypothesis (or, mutual independence). The saturated model will reproduce all the observed cell frequencies exactly, but is useless for research purposes because it does not identify the variables and interactive effects that are the most important. The problem is that in complex tables, models that contain many interactive effects between several variables can start to produce results that are similar to the saturated model. Such models are eschewed in favour of simple models.

On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is now possible to describe more specifically the methodology employed here. Basically, we will be employing two related types of models to test the variance in the data between the expected frequencies and the actual observed frequencies. First, we will use general loglinear models, which are employed to uncover how much of the total variance in the data is explained by the model. General loglinear models do not distinguish between dependent and independent variables. That is, they are used to explore the dynamics between all the variables in a cluster non-specifically. Second, we will employ logit models, a form of loglinear model (sometimes called asymmetric models), that are used to explore the relationships of a dichotomous dependent variable to one or more

1978), in this study I take the more cautious approach and try to avoid arbitrarily dichotomising variables wherever possible.

independent variables. That is, logit models designate one variable as the dependent, or response variable, and then indicate how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. In the sub-sections below I will first, briefly summarise the statistics used in loglinear analysis. Second, I will outline the main methodological procedures involved in each model-type.

Loglinear Test Statistics

There are four test statistics used in loglinear analysis. The first is the Likelihood Ratio Chi Square statistic, or L^2 (sometimes written G^2), which is used to test the goodness of fit of both logit and general loglinear models. Goodness of fit is the overall agreement between the expected cell frequencies generated by a model, and the actual cell frequencies observed in the data⁴ (Kennedy, 1983: 89-91, 222). A model with a good fit will have a relatively small L^2 , and a p-value greater than .05 (Gilbert, 1981: 68; Agresti, 1990: 176). Under normal circumstances, chi-square statistics (X^2) are used as a test of independence in two dimensional contingency table analysis, where a significant X^2 has a p-value smaller than .05, indicating disagreement between the data and the null hypothesis. However, the opposite is the case in testing loglinear models, because here a non-significant statistic ($p > .05$) implies that the expected frequencies under the model of independence are reasonably close to those observed in the table (Demaris, 1992: 5). That is, X^2 becomes a “goodness-of-fit” test that indicates agreement between the given model and the data. Finally, as the L^2 and the degrees of freedom of the model converge, the fit of the model can be said to improve. Thus, an ideal model would be one in which L^2 equals the degrees of freedom, and the significance threshold has been reached (Kennedy, 1983: 222).

The second test statistic used in loglinear analysis is the Component L^2 , which is used in follow-up analysis to aid model selection. That is, if the fit of the model is poor, then we can revise the model by analysing the strength of individual interactive

⁴ A full explanation of the calculation of this statistic, and a discussion of its relationship to the more common Pearson Chi Square can be found in Agresti, 1990; Kennedy, 1983; and Marascuilo and Busk, 1987.

effects in our hypothesis, verifying or rejecting each effect until a better fitting model emerges. The statistic used in this process is the Component L^2 . In other words, the L^2 statistic, because of its additive properties in terms of the residual L^2 , can be divided into component parts, and as a result, the strength of an individual interactive effect can be found by calculating its component L^2 . Essentially, the Component L^2 of an effect is the difference in general goodness of fit that results from adding that effect to a particular model. An important effect will considerably improve the fit of the model and have a large Component L^2 (Langley, 1993: 43-44), while unimportant effects will contribute little to the reduction of the residual L^2 (Kennedy, 1983: 91-94).

In order to calculate the Component L^2 of each effect in the model, we calculate the change in residual L^2 (goodness of fit) by comparing a model containing the term in question, with the identical model not containing that term. To ensure that we are only testing the contribution of that specific term, we must also control for all the other terms (Goodman, 1971). Further, in order to test the individual contribution of each effect, we move through the model in a stepwise fashion, testing the various explanation-response relationships in series (see Kennedy, 1983: 211-223). Using the Component L^2 in this manner⁵ offers considerable insights into the relative strength of individual interactive effects, but it should be remembered that this process is only a guide to revising the hypothesised model.

The third statistic employed here is the parameter estimate (or λ), which is another test for analysing the strength of individual interactive effects within a given model. Parameter estimates discern the relative strength of influence of interactive effects, and their statistical significance, with important effects having relatively large parameter estimates and being significant at the $p > .05$ level. Via a simple formula, λ is transformed into the odds of a case falling into a given combination of categories⁶. Parameter estimates are not multiplicative, as in traditional path analysis, because as has been mentioned, the data is qualitative and does not lend itself to such equations. In other words, we cannot multiply paths between variables to estimate the size of

⁵ A full example of the calculation of a Component L^2 can be seen in Langley, 1983: 63-66.

⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of the interpretation of loglinear λ parameter estimates, see Alba, 1987. Here we only compare the relative size and direction of λ s and perform standard Z-tests of significance, where a significant λ will have a Z-value greater than ± 1.96 (Langley, 1993: 45).

indirect casual effects (Knoke and Burke, 1980: 45). Within the given model however, lambdas are excellent indicators of the relative strength of interactive effects and thus, aid in overall model selection.

The final statistic used in this loglinear analysis is the loglinear R^2 measure. Basically, this statistic measures the amount of variance explained beyond that which can be accounted for in the null hypothesis. That is, it measures the success of the model in predicting the probability of the distribution of the data, as compared with the mutual independence of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is usually written as M_O in loglinear analysis. It is analogous to the R^2 in multiple regression, but not directly equivalent⁷. In terms of general loglinear models, the calculation of R^2 indicates how much of the total variance in the data has been explained by the model. When using a logit model however, which stipulates outcome as the dependent variable, the R^2 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. The R^2 for model n (M_n) for example, is calculated as:

$$R^2 M_n = \frac{L^2(M_O) - L^2(M_n)}{L^2(M_O)}$$

(i) Procedural Steps for General Loglinear Models

Having outlined the main statistics used in loglinear analysis, it is now possible to outline briefly the main procedural steps involved in the analysis of the general loglinear model. Here we are attempting to uncover how much of the total variance in the data is explained by the model, and we are considering the whole cluster of variables without distinguishing between dependent or independent variables.

While previous studies have employed what may be termed a confirmatory approach to model building (see Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993), this thesis will take a more exploratory, or, hypothesis-testing approach. In other words, rather than posit a single model on theoretical and/or empirical grounds and then try to confirm it through goodness-of-fit, Component L^2 ,

⁷ For an explanation of its calculation, and a fuller discussion, see Langley, 1993: 45-46; Christensen, 1990: 150; Haberman, 1978a: 17; and Kennedy, 1983: 228.

and lambda tests, this thesis will posit a wide variety of models. Each model will be subjected to rigorous testing, and, if necessary, elimination, until a smaller number of the most robust models are found. The justification for taking this approach lies in the exploratory nature of the study, the dearth of previous research (especially for international negotiation) which could suggest a single model to test, and the multitude of possible interaction models (given the number of explanatory variables).

The specific steps followed in this procedure are, first, a test of the null hypothesis of mutual independence for the cluster of variables being investigated. In other words, we will begin by testing the hypothesis that the variables in the cluster are not related and do not interact significantly with each other.

Second, we will conduct a hiloglinear backward elimination model selection search, or, a hierarchical loglinear analysis procedure. This procedure fits hierarchical loglinear models to multidimensional contingency tables using an iterative proportional-fitting algorithm. The backward selection process starts with a saturated model containing all the possible interactions between the variables, and then removes those that do not satisfy the criterion for remaining in the model until the best-fitting and most parsimonious model is obtained. At the first step, for example, the effect whose removal results in the least significant change in the overall model's L^2 is eliminated, provided that the observed significance level is larger than the criterion for remaining in the model. A wide variety of variable combinations are tested in this manner.

The third step involves testing the individual terms, or, interactions between the variables, through an analysis of the Component L^2 statistic, which tests the significance of the hypothesised terms and the non-significance of the null-hypothesised terms. On the basis of this analysis, a number of hypothesised models containing the most significant terms are proposed, tested for their goodness of fit, revised, and re-tested.

Fourth, every model generated by the hiloglinear procedure and the Component L^2 process is rigorously assessed on the basis of its theoretical validity (eg, many models reach statistical acceptability but make little sense theoretically), its goodness of fit, its Component L^2 s, table analysis (eg, many models have large numbers of missing cells or skewed cell count distributions, plus abnormal residuals), and its lambda parameter

estimates. Only those that pass the tests of theoretical validity, parsimony, and statistical rigour are retained.

1. Test of the null hypothesis (mutual independence of the variables).
2. Hiloglinear search for best models among variables.
3. Component L^2 test of individual interactions in variable cluster. Hypothesising models and testing for goodness of fit.
4. Model selection on the basis of theoretical considerations, goodness of fit L^2 , Component L^2 , table analysis, and lambda parameter estimates (λ).
5. Calculation of R^2 for final models.

Table 5.1 Summary of Procedural Steps for General Loglinear Models

The last step in general loglinear model testing involves calculating the R^2 for each of the final models. This statistic indicates the amount of variability in the data that is explained by the model. That is, the R^2 will measure the success of the model in predicting the probability of the distribution of the data, as compared with the mutual independence of the null hypothesis. A summary of these procedural steps is given in Table 5.1.

(ii) Procedural Steps for Logit Models

The preceding steps identify a small number of models which best explain the important interactions in the cluster as a whole. The next stage of the analysis involves evaluating the terms or interactions which relate specifically to outcomes. Specifically, this involves performing a logit analysis in which negotiation and mediation outcomes are specified as the dependent variable.

The first procedural step in this process is testing the null hypothesis. This is achieved by testing the null logit model, where outcome is hypothesised to be independent of the other variables in the cluster.

The second step is positing a multivariate logit hypothesis, or logit model, for each final loglinear model arrived at through the steps described above. In other words, we will posit a model with negotiation and mediation outcomes as the dependent variable. These logit models are then tested for their ability to reproduce the observed distribution of cases in the dependent variable, that is, their goodness of fit using the L^2 statistic.

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Test of the null logit model (eg, outcome is independent of the other variables). 2. Construct logit models for the best general loglinear models. Test each for goodness of fit using L^2. 3. Calculation of R^2 for final logit models. |
|--|

Table 5.2 Summary of Procedural Steps for Logit Models

Third, the R^2 for each logit model is calculated to indicate the amount of variability in outcome, in relation to the independent variables, that is explained by the model. A summary of these steps is given in Table 5.2.

The techniques described above allow us to compare and narrow down the range of potentially acceptable models. The final models we select must conform to a number of important criteria. First, they should be parsimonious. That is, each model should contain the smallest number of terms, or interactions, avoiding complex individual terms (higher-order interactions) where possible, to aid in interpretation. The principle of parsimony then, is based on “fitting the model containing the fewest terms which does not yield a statistically significant lack of fit” (Kotze, 1982: 196). Second, the final models should have acceptable goodness of fit. In other words, they should be models which produce expected cell frequencies that fit the observed data reasonably well. Lastly, the models should be plausible, able to stand up to substantive evaluation, and must not distort or sacrifice theoretical meaning.

Caveat

A problem that emerges from the analysis of the data utilised here, is that due to the size of the data set, the nature of most of the variables being examined, and the complex interactions hypothesised in the models, large numbers of empty cells (observed and expected cases equal zero) were sometimes encountered. The implications of this are that the accuracy of some of the measures employed here may be impaired. The degrees of freedom and parameter estimates, for example, may be over or under-estimated in some cases, and the best indication for determining good models may in fact, be a comparison of the observed and expected frequencies and residuals. These are carefully considered in the table analysis of each model. As such, the final models suggested by the multivariate analysis can only ever be suggestive of the relative strength of interactions.

Furthermore, due to the large number of models and variable clusters being tested here, the specific details of the independent measures, such as parameter effects, will only be given where they highlight an essential observation. However, it can be assumed that all these measures were evaluated in the analysis, and in the cluster models presented.

The size of the data set, and the number and complexity of explanatory variables, also meant that the memory of the computer being used was put under strain⁸. In other words, both the number of variables being tested and the complexity of the inter-variable interactions were, by necessity, restricted in the models tested. An often employed tactic for overcoming this problem is dichotomising the independent variables (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993), but this would have meant running the risk of compromising their meaning and value as explanatory variables. In any case, many variables have already been collapsed (on the basis of logic determined by theoretical indicators and numbers of cases present) to facilitate a clear analysis.

Finally, the loglinear analysis was rendered more manageable by dividing the variables into cluster sets, and considering each separately. The most significant

⁸ For this reason, and because larger tables would have been overly cumbersome in any case, the maximum number of variables tested in any single model was five.

variables from each cluster were then combined in an overall model⁹. Specifically, the variables were considered in terms of the Contingency Model (see section 3.2), which clustered them as: (i) dispute characteristics variables; (ii) party characteristics variables; and (iii) process characteristics variables. Methodologically then, there is an inherent trade-off in empirical analysis where the analyst has to be conscious not to randomly manipulate variables simply to achieve a statistically stronger model (see Houston, forthcoming).

5.3 Model Building and Testing: Negotiation

In this section, I present the results of the multivariate analysis of negotiation outcomes. Each cluster of variables is considered in turn, as specified in the Contingency Model (see section 3.2), before a combined cluster analysis is described. Although the multivariate analysis is guided by the results of the bivariate analysis in chapter four, initially all the variables in the original cluster will be examined, for the reasons outlined in section 5.1. Namely, bivariate contingency tables may obscure effects which are only obvious in multidimensional contingency table analysis. If some variables were to be excluded, for example, important three-way interactions might remain undiscovered, and important models weakened.

I Dispute Variables Cluster

The dispute variables under investigation here and their notation are summarised in Table 5.3. The bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed that fatalities (F), intensity (I), and issue complexity (C) were particularly important predictors in explaining negotiation outcomes (O). As explained in section 5.2, I begin the analysis by conducting a test of the null hypothesis, or model of mutual independence. In other words, we are examining the hypothesis that the variables in Table 5.3 are not related. The null hypothesis will be named DM_O (for Dispute Model O), and is expressed using the loglinear notation:

⁹ As a check against any possible bias, numerous models involving variables across cluster sets were also tested. Furthermore, numerous combined cluster models involving non-significant variables were

$$DM_O = (D, F, I, Y, C, O)$$

There are no interactive terms in the null hypothesis model, and if the estimated cell frequencies produced by DM_O fit the observed data well, we would have to accept the conclusion that these variables are completely independent of each other.

Variable: *	Notation:
Duration	(D)
Fatalities	(F)
Intensity	(I)
Issue Type	(Y)
Issue Complexity	(C)

*Primary issue was excluded from the multivariate analysis because of doubts over its statistical utility - see chapter four, section 4.3.

Table 5.3 Dispute Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis

It is useful to reiterate exactly what a loglinear test of model DM_O entails. The procedure first constructs a multidimensional contingency table by cross-tabulating the variables in the cluster (see Table 5.3). The first model tested against this table, model DM_O , contains only the following pieces of information: (D, F, I, Y, C, O). At this stage it contains no interactive terms, such as (DO), for example. The loglinear procedure uses these pieces of information, essentially the marginal distribution of the individual variables, to estimate frequencies for all the cells in the table. The degree to which model DM_O accurately reproduces the actual observed cell frequencies is called the goodness of fit of that model, and loglinear goodness of fit is measured by the L^2 statistic.

A loglinear test of the hypothesised model DM_O gives a goodness of fit of:

$$L^2 DM_O = 1625.5720 \quad DF = 11 \quad p = .0000$$

Remembering that the criteria for acceptable goodness of fit are a relatively small L^2 approaching the degrees of freedom (df), and a p-value greater than .05, it is obvious that the null hypothesis does not fit the data well. In other words, we can reject the hypothesis that these variables are unrelated.

also tested as a check. None of the results gave any reason to alter the established procedure.

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
DO	2.8928	2	.2354
FO	5.1076	2	.0778
IO	3.4821	2	.1753
YO	.3155	1	.5743
CO	16.3962	2	.0003
CDO	20.6696	8	.0081
CFO	22.5758	8	.0040
CIO	27.2436	8	.0006
DFO	13.7192	8	.0894
DIO	17.0051	8	.0301
DYO	3.9243	5	.5604
FIO	15.7725	8	.0458
FYO	6.6816	5	.2454
IYO	8.2374	5	.1436

Table 5.4 Component L^2 s for Dispute Variables Cluster (Negotiation)

The next step involves testing a series of interactive models which hypothesise relationships between the variables. First, we conduct a hiloglinear search of the numerous possible variable combinations¹⁰, producing dozens of potential explanatory models. Each model is then examined for its theoretical rigor, its goodness of fit, the strength of its individual interactions, and its lambda coefficients. The tables produced by each model are also examined for missing cells, heavily skewed cell distributions, and large standardised residuals.

In an adjunct process, the Component L^2 s of terms between the variables are also examined¹¹ (see Table 5.4), and models including the most significant terms are hypothesised and then tested for their goodness of fit. These models are in turn, carefully examined for their theoretical acceptability, lambda coefficients, cell distributions, and their residuals. Models which make it through this rigorous examination process are then tested for their R^2 , before being subjected to a logit analysis. The best models from the dispute variables cluster are shown in Table 5.5. All the models presented here are useful for explaining the amount of variance in the

¹⁰ All variable combinations included the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes (O). Furthermore, for reasons of parsimony and computer memory, the number of variables considered in any one combination did not exceed five. Also, variable combinations which did not make intuitive theoretical sense were not tested.

¹¹ Calculating Component L^2 s entails performing a sequence of logit analyses. A logit analysis is a specialised loglinear analysis in which one variable is designated as the dependent variable.

data, as can be seen in the high R^2 scores. For example, the (FO), (CFI), and (CIO) terms in M2 explain 99% of the variance across the model compared to the null hypothesis.

An examination of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 confirms the importance of issue complexity, and to a lesser extent, the number of fatalities, as explanatory variables in predicting negotiation outcomes. Issue complexity in particular, has a high Component L^2 combined with a p-value smaller than .05. It also appears in numerous terms in the best models shown in Table 5.5. This is interesting, but not necessarily surprising, as the bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed that most negotiations occur in low intensity conflicts between relatively similar and friendly states. It is logical then, that one of the most important determinants of the negotiation outcome is not just intensity, fatalities, or duration, but rather the level of complication of the issues being discussed. As the level of intensity rises to extreme levels, negotiation usually breaks down and third parties have to intervene in any case. In short, dispute complexity, which in any event is associated with lengthy, protracted conflicts and high fatalities, appears to be incompatible with negotiation success.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2
DMO O, D, F, I, Y, C	1625.5720	313	.0000	----
M1 DI, IF, DF, IO, DO	21.41299	30	.875	98%
M2 FO, CFI, CIO	10.22524	16	.855	99%
M3 DI, DO, CIO	25.39845	28	.606	87%
M4 CO, FO, CDF	26.10540	22	.247	87%
M5 CO, CIO, DIO	24.2158	24	.4493	87%

Table 5.5 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Dispute Variables Models in Explaining Negotiation Outcomes

Table 5.5 also reveals that there are a number of interactions which do not include the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes (O). That is, there are a number of important terms among the independent variables. For example, there is a clearly demonstrated, and theoretically understandable, relationship between duration and intensity (DI), duration and fatalities (DF), and intensity and fatalities (IF). As a conflict drags on, there likely to be a mounting fatality count, and the intensity of the fighting may increase as positions harden and the likelihood of an early settlement recedes. There is also an important association between issue complexity, fatalities, and intensity (CFI). It is logical that conflicts characterised by numerous grievances by the parties will be the most intensely fought.

Interestingly, although intensity is not a significant term on its own (see the IO term in Table 5.4), it emerges as an important term in conjunction with issue complexity. The (CIO) interaction has a strong Component L^2 and is present in M2, M3, and M5. When both issue complexity and intensity are low, the chances for successful negotiation rise. Conversely, as both issue complexity and intensity rise, the chances of successful negotiation decreases. What emerges from this analysis is that as the conflict intensity rises, this encourages further hostility and contentious behaviour, which diminishes the likelihood of negotiation agreement (see Pruitt, 1981). The model M5 contains both the (CO) and (CIO) terms. It is relatively parsimonious, and the interactions contained in it explain 87% of the variance compared to the null hypothesis for this cluster. In other words, M5 is a good explanatory model of the dynamics of the dispute variables with negotiation outcomes. Unfortunately, the computer was unable to calculate logit models for these loglinear models, because some combinations of the independent variables produced cell counts that amounted to zero.

II Party Characteristics Variable Cluster

The party characteristics variables being investigated here are summarised in Table 5.6. It will be remembered that the bivariate analysis highlighted the power differential (P) between the parties, alignment (L), homogeneity (M), and the intervention of additional parties (A), as being the most important predictors of

negotiation outcomes. As before, we begin by testing the hypothesis that all these variables are unrelated. The null hypothesis model (PM_O - Parties Model) for this cluster gives a goodness of fit of:

$$L^2PM_O = 2846.7298 \quad DF = 636 \quad p = .0000$$

The ability of the null hypothesis to reproduce the observed cell frequencies shows a particularly poor fit. Thus, we can proceed with a hiloglinear search for appropriate models, and the model building and testing procedure based on Component L^2 s.

Variable:	Notation:
Power Differential	(P)
Political System Similarity	(S)
Homogeneity	(M)
Additional Parties	(A)
Alignment	(L)
Previous Relations	(R)

Table 5.6 Party Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis

The breakdown of Component L^2 s for party characteristics variables can be seen in Table 5.7. The most important interactions to emerge are the power differential (PO) between the parties, and alignment (LO). Both of these terms have relatively high L^2 values, and are significant at the $p < .05$ level. Similarly, nearly all of the three-way interactions are significant, and are included in hypothesised models for testing.

The final loglinear models which survived the examination process can be seen in Table 5.8. All of the models show excellent goodness of fit, are parsimonious, and the high R^2 s indicate how useful they are for explaining the variance in each model. While logit models could not be computed for M1 and M4 for statistical reasons, M3 and M4 show excellent goodness of fit. For M2, the logit R^2 of .05 indicates that the (LO) and (ASO) terms explain 50% of the variance within this model. For M3, the (PO) and (PRO) terms explain 33% of the variance compared to the null hypothesis.

As in the dispute characteristics cluster, this cluster reveals a number of important interactions between the independent variables. The (LPA) term in M1, the (LSA) term in M2, the (PRA) term in M3, and the (PRS) term in M4 suggest that the number of intervening additional parties does depend on the alignment, power differential, and

previous relations of the disputing parties. Also, they suggest that political system similarity is often related to shared alignment and friendly previous relations.

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
PO	8.3841	2	.0151
SO	.1186	1	.7306
MO	4.7859	2	.0914
AO	.9824	1	.3214
LO	27.7514	2	.0000
RO	.1718	2	.9177
RPO	13.9113	8	.0841
LSO	28.5084	5	.0000
LAO	31.3911	5	.0000
RSO	5.3992	5	.3691
RAO	9.8529	5	.0795
PAO	14.9181	5	.0107
MAO	28.3847	8	.0004

Table 5.7 Component L^2 s for Party Variables Cluster (Negotiation)

An examination of both Table 5.7 and 5.8, and the lambda parameter estimates for the terms in the models, reveals how important the power disparity between the parties is for explaining negotiation outcomes. In particular, negotiation success and low power disparity are closely associated. This makes intuitive and theoretical sense, because in situations of high power disparity, the stronger party will be disinclined to give in to demands from the weaker party. Either that, or the stronger party will be unwilling to enter into talks at all, preferring to pursue its claims unilaterally.

Another important variable in this cluster is alignment (L). The Component L^2 for alignment is very high, and it shows up strongly in the (LSO) and (LAO) terms. An analysis of the (LO) lambda parameter coefficients reveals that there is a strong association between negotiation success and the parties sharing alignment ($\lambda=.24484$, $Z=2.72640$). Parties that share alignment obviously share a number of interests and orientations towards international affairs. Furthermore, participation in shared intergovernmental organisation, such as collective defence organisations, provides important contacts. Conflicts between Greece and Turkey have often been mediated through NATO offices, an organisation that both states participate in. An underlying

bed of common interests, plus regular contacts for communication, are vital for effective conflict management.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
PM _O P, S, M, A, L, R, O	2846.7298	636	.0000	----	----
M1 LPO, LPA, PAO	9.18725	6	.163	98%	----
M2 LO, ASO, LSA	8.15168	6	.227	98%	50%
M3 PO, PRO, PRA	14.28861	10	.160	88%	33%
M4 PO, PRS	12.71066	15	.625	92%	----

Table 5.8 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Party Variables Models in Explaining Negotiation Outcomes

III Process Variables Cluster

The process variables being examined in this section are summarised in Table 5.9. The bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed a significant association between environment (E), initiator (N), and negotiator rank (K), and negotiation outcomes (O). We begin in the usual fashion with a test of the null hypothesis, or model of independence. The null model (RM_O - pRocess Model) for this cluster shows a goodness of fit of:

$$L^2\text{RM}_O = 614.8549 \quad \text{DF} = 277 \quad p = .0000$$

This is a particularly poor fit, and indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the variables are unrelated. Thus, we continue in the usual fashion with a hiloglinear search for suitable explanatory models, and a model-building and testing procedure based on an analysis of Component L^2 s.

Variable:	Notation:
Timing	(T)
Initiator	(N)
Environment	(E)
Hostilities	(H)
Negotiator Rank	(K)

Table 5.9 Process Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis

The breakdown of Component L^2 s for process variables can be seen in Table 5.10. In keeping with the previous bivariate analysis, the table reveals that both timing and the presence of hostilities remain as insignificant explanatory factors. Both have very low Component L^2 scores, and neither comes close to a statistically significant p-value. Initiator, environment, and negotiator rank remain important explanatory variables, and there are numerous three-way interactions which show significant Component L^2 scores.

The most important models to emerge from the analysis of process variables are shown in Table 5.11. Each model shows excellent goodness of fit and has a high R^2 , indicating that the interactions within each model explain a great deal of the variance. Furthermore, the strong logit R^2 s for models M2-4, indicate that the terms which specify the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes, explain most of the variance in the model. For example, the (NEO) term in model M4 explains 67% of the variance in the model over and beyond that explained by the null hypothesis.

Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show that nearly all the variables and their terms in this cluster are significant for negotiation outcomes. As already noted, both timing and the presence of hostilities remain largely insignificant in terms of their Component L^2 scores, although timing is significant in the (TKO) term, and hostilities is marginally significant in the (EHO) term. Initiator, environment, and negotiator rank, on the other hand, are consistently significant variables. This reinforces the findings of the bivariate analysis. The presence of the terms (EO), (TKO), and (NEO) in the models in Table 5.11 reinforce how important these variables are for explaining negotiation outcomes. Interestingly, while timing (T) is not significant in terms of its individual

Component L^2 , it emerges as an important variable in tandem with other factors in the models (see Table 5.11 - M1, M2, and M4).

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
TO	.4819	2	.7859
NO	7.2260	1	.0072
EO	9.8143	2	.0074
HO	.5379	1	.4633
KO	21.6646	3	.0000
TNO	9.2048	5	.1012
NEO	30.9860	5	.0000
TEO	12.8535	8	.1170
THO	2.5303	5	.7719
TKO	36.6703	11	.0001
NKO	41.6088	7	.0000
NHO	6.9560	3	.0733
EKO	41.2085	11	.0000
EHO	12.7496	5	.0258
HKO	29.4591	7	.0001

Table 5.10 Component L^2 s for Process Variables Cluster (Negotiation)

The strength of process variables comes as no surprise, as it is what occurs during the negotiation that has the most direct impact on the outcome. While background factors such as the nature of the dispute, or the characteristics of the parties, can predispose the attitudes of the negotiators before they arrive, what occurs during the actual talks will have the most direct effect on their outcome. Clearly, the initiator of the talks (eg, as an indication of the overall willingness to bargain peacefully), the environment in which it takes place (eg, a secure and neutral setting versus a potentially dangerous one), and the comparative rank of the actual negotiators (eg, similar versus dissimilar officials) will be vital. The models indicate that a neutral environment and shared high-ranking negotiators are conducive to successful negotiations. Perhaps the most important variable however, is conflict management initiation. When both parties are eager to settle their differences through talks, there is a strong association with negotiation success and one party's territory as the negotiation environment ($\lambda=.16326$, $Z=2.22194$). It seems the political will to settle conflicts peacefully can overcome a multitude of obstacles.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
RM _O T, N, E, H, K, O	614.8549	277	.0000	----	----
M1 EO, TEK, TKO	23.24393	22	.388	88%	----
M2 TKO, HKO	16.38056	16	.427	81%	93%
M3 NEO, NKO, NEK	13.37843	12	.342	95%	82%
M4 TN, TE, NEO	10.14685	16	.859	89%	67%

Table 5.11 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Process Variables Models in Explaining Negotiation Outcomes

IV Combined Variables Cluster

In this section, the variables with the strongest effects from each individual cluster are combined in a final overall cluster, and then examined for their effects on negotiation outcomes. Variables are chosen primarily on the basis of their significant Component L^2 scores, but are also evaluated on the basis of their contribution to significant three-way Component L^2 s and explanatory models. From the first cluster, dispute characteristics, only issue complexity (C) emerged as a consistently strong variable¹². The second cluster, party characteristics, revealed that the power difference (P) between the parties and their alignment (L) were the most significant variables. The third cluster, process factors, produced three significant variables which will be used in the combined cluster analysis: conflict management initiator (N), environment (E), and negotiator rank (K). The combined variables cluster is summarised in Table 5.12.

¹² In keeping with the necessity of checking that this variable was indeed the most important variable from the dispute characteristics cluster, the fatalities (F) variable was also tested in the initial combined cluster because it had a marginally significant Component L^2 score ($p=.0778$). It was found to be unimportant. A similar procedure was followed for each cluster of variables.

Because all these variables were statistically robust in their association with negotiation outcomes, an analysis of the Component L^2 s for all the two-way and three-way interactions revealed that they were all highly significant at the $p < .05$ level. For this reason, there was no value in presenting a Component L^2 table. Furthermore, a large number of useful models were found which explained the dynamics of the variables in this cluster. Some of the most satisfactory models are summarised in Table 5.13. They all show excellent goodness of fit, high explanatory R^2 s, and most have significant logit R^2 s. In other words, all these variables and their interactions are extremely useful in explaining negotiation outcomes.

Variable:	Notation:
Issue Complexity	(C)
Power Differential	(P)
Alignment	(L)
Initiator	(N)
Environment	(E)
Negotiator Rank	(K)

Table 5.12 Combined Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis

An analysis of Table 5.13 confirms how important process variables, such as initiator and environment, are for explaining negotiation outcomes. The (NEO) term in particular, is consistently strong. An analysis of the lambda parameter estimates for this interaction reveals a significant association between negotiation success, a neutral environment, and one party initiation ($\lambda = .16772$, $Z = 2.12740$). There is also a strong association between negotiation success, both party initiation, and one party's territory as the negotiation environment ($\lambda = .16326$, $Z = 2.22194$). Finally, negotiation success is strongly associated with both parties having primary decision-makers at the talks ($\lambda = .23749$, $Z = 2.96062$). In other words, these findings confirm what was learnt in the process cluster analysis, namely, that the actual face-to-face phase of the negotiation is the most significant, and factors at this stage have the most direct influence on the overall outcome on the talks.

However, the combined cluster analysis also demonstrates the importance of non-process, or contextual variables. There is a strong association between successful

negotiation, shared alignment, and a low power differential ($\lambda=.35431$, $Z=2.51406$). Shared alignment, as already discussed in the party cluster analysis, can mean shared views and opportunities for discussions. This provides an underlying bed of common interests which can form the basis for initiating talks, as well as multiple forums in which to hold them. In terms of the capabilities of the primary disputants, low or medium power disparity has two distinct advantages. First, it means that neither side can dominate the other, thus removing one potential obstacle to the talks. Second, states with similar power or capabilities normally share interests and outlooks on a variety of issues.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
M1 LO, KO, EO, LEK	23.63005	28	.701	94%	----
M2 CO, NEO, CNE	11.38739	10	.328	90%	46%
M3 LNO, LPO, LNP	4.78759	6	.571	98%	84%
M4 NKO, NEO, NEK	13.37845	12	.342	95%	65%
M5 NEO, NEP	19.70977	12	.073	85%	16%

Table 5.13 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Combined Variables Models in Explaining Negotiation Outcomes

The other contextual variable which is important for negotiation is issue complexity. The data indicates that negotiation success is strongly associated with low-medium issue complexity ($\lambda=-.22693$, $Z=-2.92176$). Obviously, the simpler the overall issue package, the easier an overall agreement can be reached. This is especially true in situations where some of the other success-enhancing factors are present, such as low power differential, similar alignment, and willingness to negotiate peacefully.

As a whole, the combined variables cluster analysis allows us to describe the most ideal conditions under which negotiation is likely to be successful. Negotiation will most likely be successful in conflicts where the issues are fairly straightforward and clear-cut, and where the parties share alignment and there is no great power disparity between them. If this is combined with talks that are entered into willingly by both sides, and which are held in a neutral environment between high-ranking officials, they constitute the greatest chance of success between the variables investigated in this thesis.

5.4 Model Building and Testing: Mediation

In this section, I describe the results of the multivariate analysis of mediation outcomes. As before, each cluster of variables is considered in turn, as specified in the Contingency Model, before a combined cluster analysis of the most significant variables is presented. Again, while the multivariate analysis is guided by the results of the bivariate analysis in chapter four, all variables are initially included.

I Dispute Variables Cluster

The dispute variables being investigated here, and their notation, are summarised in Table 5.14. In the bivariate analysis, fatalities (F) and intensity (I) were found to be significantly associated with mediation outcomes. In this section, we will test whether that association remains strong in the presence of other dispute variables. Following established procedure, we begin by testing the hypothesis that none of the variables in this cluster are related. The independence model, DM_O , gives a goodness of fit of:

$$L^2 DM_O = 247.3337 \quad DF = 46 \quad p = .0000$$

As the L^2 does not nearly approach the degrees of freedom, and the p-value is smaller than .05, it is clear that the null hypothesis does not fit the data well and we can proceed with our analysis of various hypothesised models.

Variable: *	Notation:
Duration	(D)
Fatalities	(F)
Intensity	(I)
Issue Type	(Y)
Issue Complexity	(C)

*Primary issue was excluded from the multivariate analysis because of doubts over its statistical utility - see chapter four, section 4.3.

Table 5.14 Dispute Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis

The next step involves a hiloglinear search of numerous variable combinations, plus a simultaneous analysis of Component L^2 s and some resulting models. Each model and its tables are examined for their theoretical consistency, goodness of fit, lambda coefficients, cell distributions, and standardised residuals. The Component L^2 s of the most important interactions within the dispute variables cluster can be seen in Table 5.15. The final models which best describe and explain the variance within the dispute characteristics cluster can be seen in Table 5.16. These models have excellent goodness of fit, and the interactions within each model explain a great deal of the variance. For example, in M3 and M4 the (CYO) and (IYO) terms respectively, explain 88% and 90% of the variance.

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
DO	1.7273	2	.4216
FO	31.2354	2	.0000
IO	16.5459	2	.0003
YO	.4297	1	.5121
CO	4.3439	2	.1140
CDO	8.9389	8	.3475
CFO	50.3420	8	.0000
CIO	29.6084	8	.0002
DFO	32.6424	8	.0000
DIO	17.7256	8	.0234
DYO	3.3290	5	.6494
FYO	45.9540	5	.0000
IYO	40.5046	5	.0000

Table 5.15 Component L^2 s for Dispute Variables Cluster (Mediation)

A careful examination of Tables 5.15 and 5.16 confirms what was learned in the bivariate analysis in chapter four, namely, that fatalities and intensity are the most important variables for explaining mediation success within this cluster. This is not surprising, as the number of fatalities and the intensity of a conflict usually reflects the level of hostility between the parties (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 688). Often there is a direct relationship between hostility and intensity, whereby a rise in one (eg, hostility) will result in a rise in the other (eg, fatalities and intensity). We have already discussed how hostility can lead to a breakdown in talks, or the inability to reach agreement (see chapter four). Where hostility is low, mediation is often unnecessary. Where hostility is high, on the other hand, mediators have to work extremely hard to facilitate communication and engender agreement.

Another important observation from these tables is that while issue complexity is not a significant variable on its own, it gains in significance in tandem with other variables. For example, the (CIO) term is significant in terms of its Component L^2 (see Table 5.15), and emerges as a strong explanatory interaction in M1 and M2. This again, is not surprising, as the level of issue complication will be highly relevant to the outcome, especially if the conflict is also characterised by high intensity.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
DM _O D, F, I, Y, C, O	247.3337	46	.0000	----	----
M1 IO, DO, ID, CIO, DIO	16.7329	20	.670	93%	----
M2 IO, CIO, DIO	19.6592	24	.716	92%	----
M3 CD, CYO	13.21503	18	.779	88%	59%
M4 ID, IYO	19.02629	18	.390	90%	63%

Table 5.16 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Dispute Variables Models in Explaining Mediation Outcomes

II Party Characteristics Variables Cluster

The party characteristics variables examined in this section are summarised in Table 5.17. It will be remembered that only power differential (P) and previous relations (R) were significantly associated with mediation outcomes in the bivariate analysis. We begin with a test of the null hypothesis, which gives a goodness of fit of:

$$L^2PM_O = 3552.6746 \quad DF = 636 \quad p = .0000$$

This is a particularly poor fit, indicating the inability of the null hypothesis to reproduce the observed cell frequencies. Thus, we can reject the notion that these variables are unrelated, and confidently proceed with a hiloglinear search for appropriate models, and the model-building and testing procedure based on Component L^2 s.

Variable:	Notation:
Power Differential	(P)
Political System Similarity	(S)
Homogeneity	(M)
Additional Parties	(A)
Alignment	(L)
Previous Relations	(R)

Table 5.17 Party Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis

The breakdown of Component L^2 s for the party characteristics cluster can be seen in Table 5.18, while the most theoretically and statistically rigorous models to emerge from the evaluation process can be seen in Table 5.19. Both of these tables reveal that power differential (P) and previous relations (R) remain, as in the bivariate analysis, extremely significant in explaining mediation outcomes.

Furthermore, there are numerous three-way terms that include these variables which are also significant. It is not surprising that these variables emerge as important. In the first case, we have already mentioned how managing the parties' relationship is one of the mediator's primary tasks (see chapter three). A large power differential between the parties can prove an almost insurmountable obstacle to successful mediation, while similarity of capabilities may provide an overlapping set of interests.

Furthermore, the data underlines how important the parties' previous relationship is to the success of mediation. There is a strong correlation between mediation success and friendly relations ($\lambda=.275109$, $Z=1.91136$).

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
PO	10.6452	2	.0049
SO	1.1862	1	.2761
HO	.5626	2	.7548
AO	3.4453	1	.0634
LO	2.7052	2	.2586
RO	9.5409	2	.0085
LRO	21.1191	8	.0085
LSO	5.9413	5	.3120
LAO	21.9596	5	.0005
RPO	24.4725	8	.0019
RSO	15.3557	5	.0089
RAO	15.1702	5	.0097
PAO	29.7804	5	.0000
MAO	10.3691	5	.0654

Table 5.18 Component L^2 s for Party Variables Cluster (Mediation)

Interestingly, while alignment is not statistically significant in the bivariate context, in the presence of other variables, it becomes an important indicator. For example, there is a strong association between mediation success, shared alignment, and no additional intervening parties ($\lambda=-.28348$, $Z=-2.38149$), and a moderate association between mediation success, shared alignment, and low power differential ($\lambda=.214150$, $Z=1.81255$). Clearly, shared alignment also provides an overlapping set of interests which the mediator can exploit. Lastly, there is also an association between mediation success, no additional intervening parties, and both parties being ethnically homogenous ($\lambda=-.14015$, $z=-2.17737$). In other words, complicating factors, such as multiple warring parties, and highly fragmented disputants, decreases the likelihood of successful conflict management.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
PM _O P, S, M, A, L, R, O	3552.6746	636	.0000	----	----
M1 LPA, LAO, PAO	12.00035	8	.151	95%	----
M2 RO, LAO, LRA	13.49554	10	.197	95%	----
M3 LPO, LPM, LMO	10.96382	12	.532	99%	----
M4 MAO, MSA	10.56035	6	.103	94%	----

Table 5.19 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Party Variables Models in Explaining Mediation Outcomes

III Process Variables Cluster

The variables under investigation in this cluster are summarised in Table 5.20. In the bivariate analysis, all of these variables were statistically significant, except for the presence or absence of hostilities (H). Procedurally, we begin with a test of the mutual independence hypothesis. A test of the goodness of fit of the null hypothesis model gives a reading of:

$$L^2RM_O = 962.6077 \quad DF = 420 \quad p = .0000$$

In other words, we can reject the notion that these variables are unrelated, and proceed with a hiloglinear search, and a Component L^2 analysis. A breakdown of the Component L^2 s for process variables, and a summary of the best models to emerge from the analysis, can be seen in Tables 5.21 and 5.22 respectively.

Upon examining these two tables, it quickly becomes obvious just how important process variables are in determining mediation outcomes. As with the bivariate analysis, every term except for the (HO) term is highly significant and shows a strong Component L^2 . This is not surprising, given that mediation is essentially a contingent behaviour (see chapter three). Also, process factors refer to those aspects and activities in the conflict management which are sequentially closest to the outcome. It is

reasonable that what occurs during the actual talks will significantly affect how the talks end.

Variable: *	Notation:
Timing	(T)
Initiator	(N)
Environment	(E)
Hostilities	(H)
Negotiator Rank	(K)

*Mediation strategies were excluded from the analysis in order to retain a set of variables that were directly comparable with negotiation outcomes.

Table 5.20 Process Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis

First, there is a clear association between mediation success and early intervention in the conflict ($\lambda=.21693$, $Z=1.99331$). If mediation takes place before hostility has reached extreme levels and positions have become entrenched, it stands a much greater chance of success than if it is allowed to become intractable.

Component Effect	Component L^2	DF	P-value
TO	10.0738	2	.0065
NO	46.4935	2	.0000
EO	58.4359	2	.0000
HO	3.9850	1	.9950
KO	14.9559	3	.0019
TIO	64.6333	8	.0000
TEO	71.9097	8	.0000
THO	14.0126	5	.0155
TKO	24.0257	11	.0126
NEO	85.5641	8	.0000
NHO	50.1489	5	.0000
NKO	52.3870	11	.0000
EHO	61.9835	5	.0000
EKO	66.0370	11	.0000
HKO	23.4149	7	.0014

Table 5.21 Component L^2 s for Process Variables Cluster (Mediation)

Second, there is a very strong association between mediation success and both parties' willingness to settle their differences peacefully ($\lambda=.43903$, $Z=3.91845$). The willingness of both parties to work with a mediator for a non-violent outcome is perhaps the most important factor in achieving success, while indifference and

intransigence can be the greatest obstacle. In many intractable conflicts, such as during the Bosnian conflict, the primary obstacle to successful mediation was a lack of political will by one or both parties.

Third, the fact that mediation is necessary at all means that the level of hostility between the parties is probably quite high. In such a situation, the environment or site of the talks can become crucial. Neither party may feel at ease being in the territory of the other. The data indicates that there is indeed, a strong association between successful mediation and holding the talks in a neutral environment ($\lambda=.20446$, $Z=4.12245$). A neutral setting provides the minimum level of security required to engage in the mediation process.

Lastly, the data reveals a moderate association between mediation success and the negotiators from each party having an equal, senior ranking ($\lambda=.18249$, $Z=1.79234$). Clearly, different ranking negotiators pose an obstacle to successful mediation, as one party will no doubt feel it is not being accorded equal respect, or that it is dealing with someone incapable of making genuine concessions or commitments.

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
RM _O T, N, E, H, K, O	962.6077	420	.0000	----	----
M1 TO, NEO, TNH, TNE	66.83908	61	.283	84%	18%
M2 TO, NO, RO, TNR	23.88235	28	.688	87%	----
M3 NEO, NEH	11.60120	9	.237	96%	50%
M4 NO, NR, RHO	31.58553	22	.085	77%	31%

Table 5.22 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Process Variables Models in Explaining Mediation Outcomes

IV Combined Variables Cluster

In this section, the variables which demonstrated the strongest effects in each cluster are combined in a final overall cluster, and then examined for their effects on mediation outcomes. That is, as with the combined cluster for negotiation, variables are chosen on the basis of Component L^2 scores, contribution to models, and importance in significant three-way terms. Furthermore, as a comparative test, other marginally significant variables were initially included in the combined cluster, but were discarded after they failed to show significant effects or add to the explanatory power of the models.

From the dispute characteristics cluster, both fatalities (F) and intensity (I) emerged as significant variables. The second cluster, party characteristics, revealed that the power differential (P) and previous relations (R) of the parties were the most important factors. Almost all of the variables from the process cluster were significant, namely, timing (T), initiator (N), environment (E), and negotiator rank (K). The combined variables cluster analysed here is summarised in Table 5.23.

A component L^2 analysis of all these variables and their two-way and three-way interactions with mediation outcomes revealed that they were all highly significant at the $p < .05$ level. For this reason, there was no value in presenting the table here. A large number of useful and statistically robust models were also found which explained the dynamics of this cluster. Some of the best models are summarised in Table 5.24. They all show excellent goodness of fit, and have high explanatory R^2 s.

Variable:	Notation:
Fatalities	(F)
Intensity	(I)
Power Differential	(P)
Previous Relations	(R)
Timing	(T)
Initiator	(N)
Environment	(E)
Negotiator Rank	(K)

Table 5.23 Combined Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate analysis of the combined variables cluster confirms the most important findings from the individual cluster analysis. First, mediation success is strongly associated with low fatalities ($\lambda=.30349$, $Z=3.10530$), and a low power differential between the parties ($\lambda=.17313$, $Z=1.90945$). Second, process variables emerge as extremely important determinants of mediation outcomes. Successful mediation is highly correlated with both party initiation ($\lambda=.39582$, $Z=4.17658$), and a neutral environment ($\lambda=.30938$, $Z=3.49609$). Further, it is moderately correlated with both parties sending senior ranking officials to the talks ($\lambda=.26054$, $Z=1.94890$). In models M1-M4 (see Table 5.24), process variables are present in every term except for the FO, PO, and IO terms.

However, these variables interact in more complex ways than simply at the two-way term level. There were also numerous significant three-way interactions. For example, the (TRO) interaction prominent in models M2 and M4 revealed a strong association between mediation success, a friendly previous relationship, and early intervention in the conflict ($\lambda=-.45542$, $Z=-2.16390$). Similarly, mediation success is also associated with friendly previous relations and low conflict intensity ($\lambda=-.37755$, $Z=-1.88278$).

Model	Goodness of Fit L^2	DF	P-value	% Explanatory R^2	Logit R^2
M1 FO, NO, KO, FN, FK, NK	52.23664	40	.093	75%	----
M2 PO, KO, TRO, TRPO	89.33325	94	.617	87%	----
M3 IO, TO, ITO, IKO	47.0496	36	.103	90%	----
M4 IO, TRO, TRI	12.12081	16	.736	96%	65%

Table 5.24 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Combined Variables Models in Explaining Mediation Outcomes

In short, the combined variables cluster analysis suggests a general profile of situations in which mediation will most likely be successful. That is, mediation has a greater chance of being successful in conflict characterised by low fatalities and low intensity, where the parties have a low power differential and friendly previous relations. At the same time, if the mediation takes place early on in the conflict, after being requested by both parties, and is held in a neutral environment between equally-ranked senior officials, it is likely to be successful.

5.5 Negotiation and Mediation in Multivariate Analysis: Some Conclusions

At the beginning of this chapter, it was suggested that the primary tasks of multivariate analysis are to confirm or deny the bivariate findings, isolate the most important explanatory variables, and identify more specifically those conditions which are strongly associated with negotiation and mediation success (see section 5.1). The analyses in sections 5.3 and 5.4 have done just this. Firstly, the multivariate analysis confirmed that negotiation success was significantly associated with: issue complexity, fatalities, intensity, power differential, alignment, homogeneity, additional parties, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank. On the other hand, it also confirmed that mediation success was significantly associated with fatalities, intensity, power difference, previous relations, timing, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank. In short, the multivariate analysis allows us to be more certain that the findings of chapter four are not spurious, and these factors are important predictors in explaining negotiation and mediation outcomes.

However, the multivariate analysis takes us much further than this, in that it indicates that out of all these factors, only some play a significant role in explaining the variance in negotiation outcomes. For example, the most important variables for negotiation are: issue complexity, power difference, alignment, initiator, environment, and negotiator rank. The multivariate analysis revealed that fatalities, intensity, homogeneity, and additional parties explained little variance overall, even though at the bivariate level they appeared to be important. Interestingly, in the case of mediation, all of the variables identified by the bivariate analysis remained significant in the multivariate context.

Perhaps most importantly, the multivariate analysis revealed more specifically, as well as more emphatically, those conditions which are significantly associated with negotiation and mediation success. For example, negotiation and mediation success was significantly associated with: low issue complexity (negotiation); low fatalities and intensity (mediation); low power difference between the parties (both); shared alignment (negotiation); friendly previous relations (mediation); both party initiation (both); a neutral site (both); shared senior ranking negotiators (both); and early intervention into the conflict (mediation). These results are detailed in sections 5.3 and 5.4. In other words, the multivariate analysis allows us to gain a clearer picture of the specific conditions and circumstances under which international conflict management is likely to be more successful.

In view of this, a few important theoretical conclusions and observations can be drawn from the multivariate analysis, especially in regard to the central question of the thesis; the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation. The first is that, in keeping with the central theoretical conceptualisations of negotiation and mediation in chapters one and three, there are a number of factors that seem to affect both of these methods of conflict management *similarly*. The most significant variables from each cluster for negotiation and mediation are summarised comparatively in Table 5.25¹³.

The table, and the empirical analysis in this chapter, highlights four variables that seem to strongly affect both negotiation and mediation: (i) the power differential between the parties; (ii) the conflict management initiator; (iii) the environment in which the conflict management takes place; and (iv) the rank of the negotiators at the conflict management. Furthermore, these variables appear to affect negotiation and mediation in similar ways. For example, negotiation and mediation are both more successful when the power differential between the parties is low. This is not surprising, as a large power difference makes bargaining difficult. The stronger party may be unwilling to negotiate seriously with a party it sees as inherently inferior. Also, both negotiation and mediation are more successful when both parties initiate

¹³ As mentioned in each combined cluster analysis, more variables than are mentioned in this table were actually tested for negotiation and mediation. For example, fatalities, intensity, and previous relations were also tested in the case of negotiation, while issue complexity and alignment were also tested for mediation. This provided an important test of the differences between them.

the conflict management, indicating a mutual willingness to settle peacefully. Holding the negotiation or mediation in a neutral, non-threatening environment is also conducive to success for both forms of conflict management, as is sending equally-ranked, senior officials.

In fact, it could be argued that these conditions would be conducive to all forms of conflict management, and in this sense, it is not surprising that low power difference, mutual conflict management initiation, a neutral setting, and equally-ranked senior negotiators, affect negotiation and mediation in similar ways. What is important here, is that we have demonstrated it empirically in a comparative study. Previous studies have validated these axioms in regards to mediation singularly (see Bercovitch and associates; Klieboer, 1996), but the fact that this study has found them to be true for both negotiation and mediation, means that we can say something about conflict management in general.

	Negotiation	Mediation
1. Dispute Cluster	Issue Complexity	Fatalities Intensity
2. Party Cluster	Power Difference Alignment	Power Difference Previous Relations
3. Process Cluster	Initiator Environment Negotiator Rank	Initiator Environment Negotiator Rank Timing

Table 5.25 The Most Significant Variable Profiles of Negotiation and Mediation

Following on from this, it is pertinent to note that apart from the power differential, all these variables are process variables. Process variables are all highly correlated with negotiation and mediation success (see sections 5.3, 5.4), and are the most numerous factors summarised in Table 5.25. While again, it would seem axiomatic to suggest that what actually occurs during the negotiation or mediation is the most important part of the conflict management process, little attention has been paid to demonstrating this empirically at the international level. This is especially true of negotiation, which for the most part, has yet to go beyond the confines of the case

study approach. In other words, the importance of this observation lies in the fact that it is demonstrated here in a comparative study involving large numbers of cases. Therefore, we can attempt to say something about international conflict management in general. While antecedent factors, such as the nature of the conflict and the nature of the parties, can exert powerful influences on the attitudes, predispositions, or negotiating positions which the parties take with them into the talks, it can be argued from this study that what transpires once they begin to bargain will have the most immediate effect on the eventual outcome of the conflict management. The importance of this finding for conflict management practice is discussed in chapter six.

However, while negotiation and mediation are both affected in similar ways by a particular set of variables, and while both depend ultimately on the actual process of bargaining, there are also some important *differences* in the factors that they are influenced by. This confirms the theoretical conceptualisations of negotiation and mediation as specified in the Contingency Model, and the findings of the bivariate analysis in chapter four (see section 4.4). While these differences cannot be measured or quantified as such, they are extremely important in the sense that they provide empirical evidence of a theoretical notion. As was discussed in chapters two and three, the theoretical notion of the differences between negotiation and mediation is crucial in current conflict management research. The fact that this study provides some evidence of differences in behaviour between negotiation and mediation then, is vital to the debate.

The main differences between negotiation and mediation uncovered by the multivariate analysis include the following variables. In terms of the dispute characteristics cluster, the most significant variable for negotiation was issue complexity. For mediation, it was fatalities and intensity (see Table 5.25). This makes intuitive and theoretical sense, as most negotiations occur in low intensity conflicts (see chapter four). When the conflict becomes extremely intense, negotiations tend to break down anyway. In other words, because in negotiation the parties are already in dialogue, the most significant factor in terms of the dispute characteristics is the nature of the issues under discussion. At that point, other factors like fatalities, and intensity, become somewhat secondary.

However, in the case of mediation, the level of fatalities (and consequently, the level of intensity), determines most of what occurs during the talks. For example, the level of intensity may determine whether the parties can even meet face-to-face, or whether they have to be kept apart. It may determine whether they discuss the actual issues in dispute, or whether they simply try to find a way to stop the fighting. And it will undoubtedly determine the kind of strategies the mediator employs (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993; Houston, forthcoming).

Turning to the nature of the parties, here we see that both negotiation and mediation are affected by the power difference between the parties. We have already iterated why this is most likely the case. For negotiation, alignment is also a significant factor (see Table 5.25), while for mediation, it is the previous relations of the parties. Chapter four demonstrated that the majority of negotiation cases occur in interstate conflicts between relatively similar types of states. It makes complete sense that the alignment of the states, which reflects their interests, orientations, and participation in intergovernmental structures, should impact on the way they manage their conflicts. Similarly, it is not surprising that mediation is most affected by the parties' previous relations, as the very need for mediation implies a broken relationship. Mediators in effect, have to repair the relationship to the point where communication can resume and compromises can be reciprocated. Clearly, a history of friendship will aid this task immensely, while a history of antagonism and violence will make it all the more difficult.

In short, what these findings suggest is that even though both negotiation and mediation benefit from being held in a neutral environment between parties with a low power differential, for example, there are some conditions which are unique to one or the other. For example, while it is important to have low issue complexity for negotiation, regardless of the level of fatalities or intensity, mediation is more likely to be successful if the intensity of the conflict is low, even if the issue complexity is high. In other words, the multivariate analysis demonstrates that negotiation and mediation do exhibit important differences, and cannot be treated theoretically as essentially the same process.

Chapter 6

NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION: DECIDING HOW TO MANAGE VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

6.1 A Return to the Twin Problems of Managing Complex International Conflicts

The overall context of this thesis has been the ongoing attempt to make international conflict management more effective in order to lessen the destructive effects of violent confrontations between nations. Such a task implies the need for generalisable knowledge, which for the most part, is not being produced in sufficient quantities in the current conflict research milieu. Furthermore, it implies generating knowledge about the comparative effectiveness of different methods of conflict management in actual conflicts. In reality, current conflict management research is divided into separate areas of focus: those concerned with improving international negotiations, and those interested in the work of intermediaries, or third parties. This thesis has been an attempt to bridge the gap between the different foci of current conflict management research, and to provide the context for further generalisable comparative studies into the effectiveness of different methods.

Specifically, I have attempted to address two central problems of current conflict management theory and practice. The *comparative* problem deals with assessing the application of different methods of conflict management to a disparate array of conflict situations. In other words, we need to know what kinds of conflicts there are, and whether different methods of conflict management are best suited to different kinds of conflict. Or, is there one single generic method which can be prescribed indiscriminately to all forms of conflict? Furthermore, the comparative problem forces us to ask: Is there any way of knowing which methods of conflict management would go with which kinds of conflict? What specific factors would we expect to impact on the effectiveness of different methods, and why? And, are there any theories or theoretical frameworks for studying conflict management comparatively?

The *empirical* problem, on the other hand, deals with the limitations of our knowledge about the application of different types of conflict management in the real world of international politics. The challenge here is to expose what we really know regarding what works best in international conflicts, especially violent ones. In other words, here we need to ask the following questions: What comparative studies have been undertaken, and what have been the major findings? Do different methods of conflict management perform better or worse in different conflict settings? And, what factors affect the success rates of conflict management methods, and how exactly?

Dealing with these twin problems has taken us into the realm of the theoretical debates surrounding the nature of international conflict management. In particular, it galvanises the debate over the nature of negotiation and mediation, whether they are essentially the same (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165), or fundamentally different (see Bercovitch, 1985, 1986). Neither of these notions has stimulated much needed comparative research. Furthermore, tackling the empirical problem has brought us face to face with the paucity of current research approaches, and the dearth of generalisable studies, especially in regards to international negotiation. Too often, negotiation and mediation have been studied both in isolation from each other, and in a singular, case-study mode. Consequently, scholars and practitioners have had no empirical basis for choosing between conflict management methods in any given conflict situation.

For example, the decision by former President Carter to mediate in the Bosnian conflict in December 1994 was not based on any knowledge that this was the best way to resolve the conflict between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosnians. In actual fact, other options may have proved more effective (see section 6.4 below). The lack of generalisable, comparative research then, precluded the possibility of any useful prescriptions to this very real, and very destructive conflict.

Specifically, four key questions have guided the inquiry into the twin problems of conflict management in international politics: (1) To what extent does current conflict management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare negotiation and mediation in international politics?; (2) Is there an approach which can facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and mediation?; (3) Can such an approach be applied to the real world of international

conflict management?; and (4) What can this approach add to current conflict management theory, and what are its implications for conflict management practice?

The first three questions have been the central topic throughout the previous chapters, and questions one and two will be reflected upon below. Questions three and four will be dealt with in later sections.

Question 1: The Limits of Current Conflict Management Research

Since they are both obvious and crucial to international politics, one would expect that the comparative and empirical problems we have been discussing would have been examined in great detail by previous analysts of international conflict management. As was noted in chapter one, with a handful of exceptions (see Holsti, 1966, 1968; Northedge and Donelan, 1971; Butterworth, 1976; Dixon, 1996; Raymond, 1994), this remains, sadly, untrue. For the most part, negotiation and mediation have been studied under the rubric of two alternative paradigms, and the issue of their comparison has mostly been avoided altogether. In chapter two, I examined both of these paradigms for their potential as appropriate comparative frameworks.

The first of these paradigms, the Psychology paradigm, begins with the assumption that conflict is generic, and asserts that the essential problem relates to the cognitions and perceptions of the conflicting parties. If perceptions could be realigned, underlying needs met, communication improved, and relationships restored, conflict at any level of the social stratum could be successfully resolved. Furthermore, it is assumed that negotiation is the primary method for achieving this. Here mediation is conceived of simply as “assisted negotiation” (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Touval, 1982; Princen, 1992a). By this conceptual slight of hand, the comparative issue is avoided altogether; negotiation is the appropriate form of conflict management for all levels of social conflict, and mediation is a kind of negotiation. In short, this approach to studying conflict management seems to preclude the possibility of theoretically grounded, systematic research into the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation in

international politics, most simply because it conceives of them as having too few differences to warrant comparison.

The second primary paradigm, termed here the Third Party Intervention paradigm, is a vast improvement on the Psychology approach. Here international conflict is conceived of as a unique form of social conflict, defined by its level of organised collective violence, its complexity, and its resistance to traditional forms of conflict management. Furthermore, not only are there important differences between bilateral and third party methods of conflict management, but mediation is seen to be especially suited to international politics (see Bercovitch, 1985, 1986, 1989). Mediation has the advantages of being extremely flexible, voluntary and non-binding (a trait especially treasured by sovereign states), and powerful mediators can bring extra resources to the bargaining table.

However, the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation are again largely ignored, as their differences are over-emphasised, and studies tend to focus solely on aspects of third party intervention (see Bercovitch and associates; Brown, 1990; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Hume, 1994; Touval, 1975; Touval and Zartman, 1985). Again, the opportunity to examine the comparative aspects of different types of conflict management in systematic empirical analysis has not been realised within this approach.

The limitations of current conflict management research go deeper than the lack of comparative theoretical and empirical studies, however. For the most part, current research relies on two primary methodologies, generally corresponding to the two main paradigms. The Psychology paradigm relies primarily on laboratory research, where participants, usually undergraduate psychology students, are examined for a limited range of responses in carefully controlled bargaining simulations. The problem of applying research from the inter-personal to international levels, and the general limitations of this methodology are well known (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993; Carnevale, 1986; Wall and Lynn, 1993), and pose obvious difficulties for the task set in this thesis.

The second main research methodology, which is the primary method utilised within the Third Party Intervention paradigm, is the historical case study (see Touval,

1982 for an example). In fact, the vast majority of research to date on negotiation and mediation in international politics falls within the case study approach.

The over-reliance on historical case studies with little or no generalising power, and the widespread use of laboratory studies, has hampered the quest for knowledge which could be applied prescriptively by practitioners at the international level. Furthermore, the disparate methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of the primary paradigms within current conflict management research has meant that each approach has remained largely compartmentalised from the other, with virtually no cross-fertilisation of theory and data. This in turn, has set back the project for generalisable knowledge about conflict management methods and their application.

In summary, this thesis makes an important theoretical contribution to current conflict management research in highlighting some of its limitations. Only through constant and rigorous evaluation and self-correction can progress be achieved in any field. By highlighting some of the gaps and weaknesses in current research, this thesis represents an opportunity for self-correction. Methods and approaches should be developed, tested, and then re-evaluated. Comparative studies should be initiated, and new data sets created. Until more is known about, not only how conflict management actually works in international politics, but also how best to study it, the quest to improve it will be stultified.

Question 2: The Appeal of the Contingency Framework

The limitations of current approaches for studying negotiation and mediation comparatively in international politics, meant that an alternative framework had to be developed. The Contingency approach was reconstituted into a comparative framework in chapter three. This was achieved through a synthesis of aspects of the Third Party Intervention paradigm, and the as yet, untested contingency model of conflict management. This particular model attempts to co-ordinate “Track Two Diplomacy” with traditional forms of intermediary assistance (see Fisher, 1995; Fisher and Keashly, 1998, 1991, 1996; Webb et al, 1996). Assuming that conflict, as a social phenomenon, can be differentiated along various dimensions, the Contingency approach also differentiates between types of conflict management

methods. It suggests that different methods may be applicable to different types of conflict. Furthermore, by specifying the most important contextual and process factors in conflict management, as well as their measurement, the researcher is able to systematically collect data on a large universe of cases. Aspects of conflict management can then be compared within or across types using either a qualitative (case study) approach, or a quantitative (large-scale) approach.

In other words, the Contingency framework developed here demonstrates a number of specific advantages over the other current approaches discussed in this thesis. In the first case, the Contingency framework systematises a general typology of conflict from which a comparative study of conflict management can proceed. That is, it articulates a rudimentary theory of conflict management, thus facilitating much needed theory development. Second, it provides a useful model for studying conflict management comparatively by specifying the most important dimensions along which they can be compared. Furthermore, by articulating the similarities and differences between negotiation and mediation more carefully than has been attempted in the past, the Contingency model provides a theoretical basis for interpreting the empirical differences and similarities observed in the data. As well, the Contingency model provides the beginnings of a comparative and integrated theory of negotiation and mediation.

Other advantages of the Contingency approach are that it encourages systematic empirical research, because it stipulates variables and attributes with explicit operational criteria. That is, it encourages data collection. Also, the Contingency approach helps to identify variables which have been observed as associated with successful outcomes. Thus, it permits meaningful comparison between types of conflict management, and offers a useful framework for organising and integrating much of the research on conflict management. Lastly, the Contingency framework is flexible, allowing the researcher to focus on either detailed studies of single cases, or the utilisation of large data sets.

In short, one of the major achievements of this thesis has been to suggest a theoretical approach and framework from which comparative studies can proceed. The lack of such a framework has been a major impediment to both theory development and data collection. The Contingency framework could (and should) be used, in

adapted forms if necessary, in further comparative studies at other levels of social conflict, and of other methods of conflict management.

6.2 What Have We Learned About the Real World of International Conflict Management?

In this section, I will reflect on the empirical contributions of this thesis. The empirical study was undertaken in chapters four and five. The results of the empirical study conducted here are important for a number of reasons. First, as has been mentioned consistently throughout earlier chapters, this is the first study of its kind. That is, it is the first large-scale, comparative study of negotiation and mediation that goes beyond merely comparing success rates, employing as it does, multivariate techniques. This provides a wealth of further statistical material not available in earlier studies, such as by Holsti (1966, 1968) and Frie (1976).

Second, it is important because it utilises a unique and extensive data set. Based on 295 armed international conflicts in the post-war period, the data set comprises 1,154 discrete cases of negotiation and 1,666 cases of mediation, each coded according to 68 variables related to the context, process, and outcomes of the conflict management. This data set is important not only for its comparative aspects and its breadth, however. One of its main contributions is to the field of negotiation studies. It is the first large-scale data set on negotiation in international armed conflicts, and as such, represents an important advance in the field.

Third, the study is important for the notions it confirms from previous research. Independent confirmation is one of the most important steps in the scientific process, and in the following discussion I will highlight some of the important earlier findings that this thesis confirms.

However, the empirical study conducted here is most important for its actual findings; that is, for what it tells us about the real world of international conflict management. In the first instance, what this study tells us is that whether we are speaking about negotiation and mediation specifically, or conflict management in general, the reality is that these phenomena are extremely complex. International conflict management efforts are affected by multiple factors interacting in complex

ways. They cannot be reduced to any single factor causal models, or attributed to only one set of explanatory factors, such as the psychological characteristics of the negotiators. Furthermore, it is clear that a wide range of contextual and process factors are needed to explain their operation satisfactorily.

In the second place, the results of the study allow us to say something about international conflict management in general. It was found that both negotiation and mediation success were negatively associated with a similar set of conditions. It would be axiomatic to argue that all forms of conflict management are negatively affected by these same conditions, but to date, there has been no large-scale empirical study which has confirmed it. For example, the study showed that lack of political will is perhaps the greatest obstacle to successful conflict management. Unless both parties to the conflict demonstrate a genuine commitment to pacific settlement, there is little chance that the negotiation or mediation will succeed. This confirms a number of previous findings that indicate that both party initiation increases mediation effectiveness (Carnevale and Peggnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Klieboer, 1991; Brett and Goldberg, 1983; Skratek, 1990). While the experience of mediators in the Bosnian conflict, or the current Middle East conflict, would seem to confirm this as a self evident fact, until now no empirical study has demonstrated it to be true across a large number of cases.

The empirical study also reveals that complicating factors such as a large difference in capabilities between the parties, high numbers of fatalities, high intensity in terms of the actual military hostilities, and a high level of issue complexity, also negatively impacts on success rates. Large differences in power capabilities depresses the chances of successful conflict management, most likely because the strongest party feels it can win-over its opponent and achieve its goals without having to compromise. The confirmation of this notion in the empirical study here compares favourably with other research which found that unequal power between the parties reduces the likelihood of a mediated settlement (Amy, 1983; Bercovitch, 1989; Dixon, 1996). Similarly, previous research has found that there is a strong relationship whereby as the level of intensity of the conflict increases, the likelihood of successful mediation decreases (Bercovitch, 1989; Carnevale and Peggnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989;

Wall and Lynn, 1993). The study in this thesis found the same effect for both negotiation and mediation.

Again, while it would seem little more than common sense to suggest that highly complicated conflicts between disparate actors, which also exhibit extreme levels of hostility, would be the most difficult to resolve, until now these axioms have remained largely unverified¹ in the real world of international politics. This study allows us to be more confident then, in suggesting that there are some factors which diminish the likelihood of success for any form of conflict management in international politics, whether it be negotiation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication, or referral to an intergovernmental organisation.

Another commonly held assumption that receives empirical verification from this study is the notion that what occurs during the actual process of the conflict management is most likely to have the greatest impact on the overall outcome of the talks. In other words, while contextual aspects such as the issues in dispute, the nature of the parties, their previous relationship, and the intensity with which the conflict is being pursued, are important considerations, once they sit down to bargain it is what goes on during the actual process of bargaining that is the most important. The good news about this is that these factors are the easiest to manipulate. That is, while the intensity of the conflict cannot be immediately altered, or the previous relations of the parties improved as such, the site of the talks and the rank of the negotiators is entirely up to the parties and the mediator. In short, this study demonstrates that all forms of conflict management benefit from a certain level of mutual willingness to settle peacefully, a neutral site for the talks, and a shared set of high ranking officials in attendance.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the empirical study is that its findings also allow us to say something specifically about negotiation and mediation. For example, it is clear that negotiation is more successful than mediation. Overall, negotiation was found here to have a success rate of 47.0%, while the success rate for mediation was only 39.4%. Importantly, this generally conforms to the findings from Holsti's seminal work (1966, 1968 - see chapter one for discussion). That negotiation would

¹ Bercovitch and Langley (1993) came to the same conclusions, but their study was limited to mediation cases only, and included a smaller set of explanatory variables and overall cases.

be more successful than mediation is entirely logical, and makes perfect sense theoretically. When two states can sort out their differences bilaterally, without interference from any outside parties, they normally will. It is only when the level of hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, or they believe they can win over their opponent, that mediation becomes necessary.

In other words, “when a conflict is of low intensity or is narrow in scope the parties feel they can manage nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a mediator” (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 164; see also Rubin, 1980). In fact, in such circumstances many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion. Furthermore, it has been suggested that “mediation is a weak elixir for improving a dispute hostile enough to merit intervention by a third party” (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177). That is, the necessity for mediation in turn, implies the most difficult conditions for conflict management. It is, thus, logical that mediation would be less successful than negotiation, and the study here confirms it.

Related to success rates is the notion of outcome durability, which refers to the effectiveness of the conflict management effort in changing the post-dispute climate. This study found that negotiation produced longer-lasting, much more durable outcomes than mediation did. This finding compares favourably with previous research, which found that mediation does not usually improve the post-dispute climate between the parties (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Touval and Zartman, 1989; Roehl and Cook, 1989; Pearson and Thoennes, 1984). It has been suggested that this is because mediation is often too brief to alter the climate, the problems addressed are too severe, and the mediation as well as the post-mediation process are so stressful and complex that they “swamp” the mediation benefits (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177).

As an aside, these findings also lend some support to the notion that parties in conflict often go through a sequence of conflict management procedures, turning to a new procedure when the old one proves ineffective. For states, such sequences almost invariably begin with negotiation, in the sense of normal diplomatic communications. If this fails, third party intermediary assistance may be called for (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 190). For example, in November 1993, continuing unification talks between North and South Yemen began to break down and the possibility of full-scale war loomed. The failure of bilateral diplomacy led to mediation efforts by Middle

Eastern leaders which resulted in a temporary ceasefire and the beginnings of a settlement.

The results of this study also suggest a little more clearly the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation. While the Third Party Intervention paradigm implies that the two methods of conflict management are very different and should be treated as separate, autonomous topics (see Brett et al, 1986; Dixon, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1996), we have already described a number of conditions or factors, which affect negotiation and mediation similarly. On the other hand, the Psychology paradigm assumes that mediation is simply a "special case of negotiation" (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165), and there are few essential differences between them. One of the major findings of the empirical study in this thesis, is that there are a number of important differences between the occurrence and operation of negotiation and mediation in international politics.

In the first place, they tend to occur under vastly different circumstances. Negotiation occurs primarily in interstate conflicts between states that share a similar level of capabilities, and a basic set of common characteristics. Also, negotiation occurs largely in those conflicts that are at the lower end of the intensity scale. For example, Zaire and Zambia had a number of border-related conflicts in the mid-1980s, which although resulting in a few fatalities, never escalated to the point of all-out war. In each case, they solved the dispute through normal diplomatic bargaining. Typically, most of the negotiation cases found in this study occurred in such conflicts. Mediation, on the other hand, occurs under all the most difficult conditions: intractable intra-state conflicts, with high fatalities and intensity, high complexity, and a general unwillingness among the disputants to settle peacefully. There were more than 150 mediation attempts during the Bosnian conflict (1989-1995), for example.

The importance of this finding is that it confirms empirically the oft repeated, but as yet, unverified notion that mediation tends to occur primarily when:

- (a) disputes are long, drawn out and complex; (b) the disputants' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; (c) neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute; and (d) when the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by co-operating with each other and engaging in some contact and communication. (Bercovitch, 1991: 17).

Furthermore, it seems to indicate quite clearly why mediation is less successful than negotiation; namely, because mediation occurs under the most arduous circumstances, and any dispute requiring mediation is unlikely to be easily solved.

Another important facet of the differences between negotiation and mediation is that they are associated with contrasting profiles of success and failure. In terms of success, for example, negotiation is closely associated with shared alignment, comparably homogenous societies, and few intervening additional parties in the conflict. Mediation success, on the other hand, is associated with opposing alignment, fragmented societies, and no history of conflict between the parties. In terms of the factors associated with failure, negotiation is *least* successful when the parties belong to opposing blocs, both have highly fragmented societies, and the conflict is characterised by large numbers of intervening additional parties. In contrast, mediation is *least* successful in conflicts over sovereignty or ethnicity issues, when the parties belong to different but not necessarily opposing security organisations, and when there are no additional intervening parties. In short, negotiation and mediation demonstrate clearly that they are affected by a different set of conditions. This is empirical confirmation of an important theoretical notion.

A final important aspect of this study relates to the findings about negotiation. As has already been mentioned, it is the first study to examine international negotiation using a large number of cases. To date, the vast majority of studies on international negotiation have been made on single case studies (see Druckman, 1986; Hopmann and Smith, 1977; Koh, 1990). This makes these findings particularly interesting and important. The study here, which in this regard is largely exploratory, suggests that the most important contextual factors in international negotiation are issue complexity, the power difference between the parties, and the alignment of the parties. Importantly, this finding confirms the importance of contextual and relational aspects in international negotiations. Too often negotiation has been viewed as a stand-alone process, divorced from the ongoing relationship between the parties (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 195). That is, we can tentatively suggest that international negotiation is more likely to be successful when issue complexity is low, the parties are fairly well balanced in terms of capabilities, and they share alignment.

However, in keeping with previous negotiation studies (Dupont and Faure, 1991; Cottman, 1985; Pruitt, 1991, 1995; Underdal, 1991; Zartman, 1994), this study also confirms the importance of process factors in successful international negotiations. A mutual willingness by the parties to bargain, a neutral environment, and sending equally-ranked, senior officials to the talks, all enhance the chances of success. These findings are important for both their generalisability, and for their applicability to armed international conflicts. The vast majority of negotiation studies tend to focus on non-armed international conflicts (see Druckman, 1986; Cottman, 1985; Mautner-Markhof, 1989; Kremenyuk, 1991). The findings presented in this thesis should also provide an important foundation for future large-scale empirical studies on international negotiation.

The results of the empirical analysis of negotiation and mediation conducted in chapter four and five should not be over-estimated, however. As has already been mentioned on numerous occasions, this study is primarily exploratory, and the findings are indications only. Statistical associations between variables can only ever be suggestive of relationships. We cannot make hard and fast behavioural rules or predictions, we can only suggest likely outcomes from a given set of conditions. What is required now is a whole new set of studies which investigate some of the same issues and notions set forth here.

The Sequential Problem

In chapter one I mentioned the limitations of the empirical study in terms of the sequential problem. That is, the problem that in the real world of international politics negotiations may take place at some stage, only to be complemented by mediation, and then back again to negotiations. This is suggestive of the interdependence of negotiation and mediation in some cases, and the possibility that the sequencing of different methods of conflict management may be as significant as the specific characteristics of each method.

The effect of this factor on the statistical findings is that using individual negotiation and mediation attempts as the unit of analysis and then looking at their success or failure can lead to real problems. For example, it may be that negotiation or

mediation failure begets more negotiation or mediation attempts. Thus, the attempts are not independent of one another and will tend to “pile up” in problem cases. The statistical analysis will tend to be overwhelmed with these cases, and it may interfere with inferences made. The conditions for failure in 10 consecutive mediation attempts for example, will likely be similar to the conditions surrounding the success of the 11th attempt. A cross-sectional analysis will not be able to detect this.

Although solutions are not easy, the following approach might in future prove useful in this regard. A different view can be gained and different questions asked if one uses the 295 conflicts as the unit of analysis, rather than the episodes of negotiation and mediation. Specifically, it will allow a sequential analysis in which one can understand how and when negotiation or mediation attempts follow each other. It is possible that failures prompt more attempts, and that low durability successes also prompt more attempts. This solution then, would permit an analysis of the question of whether successful negotiation and mediation build off each other in the same conflict, something not easily ascertained in a static, cross-sectional analysis.

The purpose of raising the sequential problem is not to diminish the significance of the empirical findings of this thesis, but rather to place them in perspective. Awareness of potential problems allows for the development of creative solutions, and in this sense, we are suggesting future avenues of research which will enhance and add to the findings presented here.

6.3 Implications for Conflict Management Theory and Practice

The final question which has guided this inquiry is: What can this study add to current conflict management theory, and what are its implications for conflict management practice? In this section, I will reflect on the first part of this question, while section 6.4 will attempt to make a few policy recommendations. As was mentioned in chapter one, and detailed in chapter two, one of the important contributions of this thesis to current conflict management theory has been the identification of a serious gap in current research foci. While studies in the areas of international negotiation and intermediary assistance are laudable in their efforts to improve conflict management practice, they are nonetheless severely weakened by

their failure to examine alternative methods comparatively. This thesis highlights the comparative problem and provides an initial step in the process of redressing the imbalance.

In terms of the current conflict management paradigms discussed in chapter two, another important contribution of this thesis has been to verify, albeit in a tentative, exploratory fashion, an important theoretical notion, namely, that negotiation and mediation are different methods of conflict management. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, as in the vast literature of psychological research into conflict management, for example, mediation has been considered merely as an adjunct of negotiation for too long. This literature needs to accept that mediation, in one sense, is a completely different form of conflict management which is influenced by a different set of factors to negotiation. Its theoretical frameworks should incorporate this important distinction, and studies should be initiated which investigate the nature of the differences between them.

Another important contribution to current conflict management theory has been the development of a theoretical framework that not only identifies the most important contextual, process, and outcome variables in international conflict management, but which can also be used as a comparative framework. That is, although the Contingency framework is a heuristic, exploratory theoretical framework, its successful application in a major study on international negotiation and mediation firmly establishes its credibility as a research tool and an appropriate theoretical model. Furthermore, the empirical results of this study allow us to improve the specificity and refinement of the Contingency model. This is the important interaction between theory and practice that is at the heart of all good research.

For example, it now seems clear that the Contingency Model could specify more clearly the importance of process variables compared to contextual variables. That is, it could be suggested that those factors which are sequentially closest to the outcome in the model (eg, from antecedent to concurrent - see Figure 3.2) would have a greater impact on the consequent variables (eg, negotiation or mediation outcomes). The results also suggest that certain variables, such as the power differential between the parties and the initiator of the conflict management, could be highlighted as being particularly important explanatory variables.

It also seems clear that the predictive abilities of the model have been improved by the results of the study. We can now suggest a number of general scenarios which will improve or diminish the chances of successful conflict management. For example, for conflict management in general, low power difference, low conflict intensity, both party initiation, neutral environment, and shared high-ranking officials, will greatly improve the chances of success. We have already discussed the profiles of success and failure for negotiation and mediation specifically (see section 6.2 above).

As has been mentioned on numerous occasions, an area of theory sorely lacking in current conflict management research is an integrated theory of negotiation and mediation (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993:196). This thesis contributes a unique and vital discussion of the differences and similarities between negotiation and mediation. Furthermore, the empirical analysis lends evidential weight to these differences and similarities. This thesis then, in its attempt to bridge the two foci of research, provides the beginnings of an integrated theory of negotiation and mediation.

A broader theoretical contribution of this thesis has been the confirmation of a number of theoretical notions that until now were considered axiomatic, yet which remained unverified empirically. For example, the notion that mediation occurs in the most difficult conflicts (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 1991) has until now, remained unexamined in the real world of international politics. This thesis clearly demonstrated that the vast majority of mediation attempts in the post-war period involved conflicts which were characterised by high numbers of fatalities, of long duration, highly complex, intractable, and resistant to traditional forms of conflict management. Similarly, the assertion that high intensity impedes conflict management has been oft-repeated, but never demonstrated empirically until now. The confirmation of these notions by a large-scale empirical study adds considerable weight to the general theory-building exercise which is at the heart of current conflict management research. These findings can now be more confidently incorporated into theoretical frameworks and approaches.

Lastly, this thesis contributes a number of observations, notions, and findings which can form the basis of exploratory hypotheses for future research. All the results here will need to be independently re-examined and replicated in further studies, and this thesis provides a wealth of examinable hypotheses. This again, is a vital part of

the knowledge-gathering exercise which will improve our efforts to strengthen international conflict management.

Closely related to any theory construction is the data collection and examination process, and any study such as this always tells us as much about our data as our theory. The problems with empty cells and the inability to calculate logit models in a number of instances (see chapter five) indicates that the data could be improved greatly in terms of both the number of cases (largely for negotiation), and the coding of the variables. Specifically, as the data is most appropriately analysed using the loglinear methodology, variables need to be carefully coded with this in mind. This is not to say that the data should be randomly manipulated to improve the strength of the statistical models, but simply that the coding should more carefully reflect the categorical nature of the data. For example, where-ever possible, dichotomous categories should be employed and multiple categories avoided.

Another aspect of the data collection and analysis process is simply the need for an expansion of the scope of the data to better approximate the complexities of international conflict management. In the first place, the previously discussed sequential problem needs to be examined. Some suggestions have already been made in this regard. Second, the number and type of variables needs to be expanded, especially in regards to process variables. Third, the scope of the study needs to be expanded so that negotiation and mediation are examined under contrasting conditions, such as by issue type (eg, sovereignty conflicts versus ethnic conflicts), by region (eg, Middle East conflicts versus African conflicts), and by the level of violence (eg, low fatality conflicts versus high fatality conflicts). One of the most important needs in this regard, is the need to study negotiation and mediation across the various conflict modes identified in Table 3.1. This study has compared negotiation and mediation at the level of violent international conflict. Other studies should do the same across the non-violent modes (eg, non-violent international, intra-national, inter-group, and intra-group conflicts), and the other violent modes (eg, violent intra-national, inter-group, and intra-group conflicts). Fourth, the study needs to be expanded to include other forms of conflict management, such as arbitration and adjudication, inquiry, conciliation, and referrals to intergovernmental organisations like the UN, the OAU, and the OSCE. Lastly, the study needs to consider non-armed

international conflicts. The present study only includes armed conflicts, and it remains unclear exactly what effects the escalation to violence has on the negotiation or mediation process.

6.4 Implications for Conflict Management Practice

In this section, I will outline some of the implications for conflict management practice that have been raised by the study. This will answer the last of the questions which have guided the inquiry. In other words, does the study enhance our ability to make prescriptions for practitioners? The answer is clearly in the affirmative, and the following discussion will briefly sketch some policy recommendations.

In the first instance, it is clear that direct negotiations should always be the preferred option by diplomats. Negotiation is not only more likely to be successful, but the agreements produced will be more durable and possess greater legitimacy, and the long-term relationships of the parties will be improved. Parties that can open a dialogue and sort out their differences bilaterally should always be encouraged to do so.

We have already mentioned how common practice has been for states to break off all diplomatic contacts when serious conflict erupts (Frankel, 1969: 146). This practice needs to be eschewed in favour of mechanisms which will allow for continued, uninterrupted communication. It is particularly important that states with ongoing rivalries institutionalise negotiations so that dialogue can continue even when disputes escalate towards violence. The Muhuri River Commission between India and Bangladesh has been relatively effective in this regard (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997), providing for regular ongoing contacts to monitor possible issues of conflict and settle disputes. Variations of such a mechanism might prove useful for the ongoing rivalries between India-Pakistan, India-China, Ecuador-Peru, Chile-Argentina, and China-Vietnam.

Related to this is the role that large states, especially superpowers, can play in inducing negotiations between their clients. In Southern Africa, the US and the Soviet Union employed considerable leverage to induce negotiations between their respective clients in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique (see Copson, 1994). Many

conflicts involving small states are sponsored to some degree by Great Powers. These large states can use their leverage to encourage negotiations. An example of a missed opportunity was the Central African Conflict in 1996-1997. At the height of the Zairean conflict in late 1996, Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel ADFL movement, was eager to open talks with the Mobutu regime on terms for Mobutu's secession from power (*Reuter's Online Service*, December 11, 1996). Such talks may have led to a peaceful transition. As it was, Mobutu refused and the US and France, who had been staunch allies of Zaire throughout the Cold War period, did nothing to encourage any negotiations to take place. Given the diplomatic pressure which could have been exerted on Mobutu by Western states, it was a missed opportunity.

Another implication of the finding that negotiations are more successful than mediations, and that they produce more durable outcomes, is that mediation efforts should not be engaged in until it is clear that the parties' own efforts have failed and they are willing to accept outside assistance. That is, mediators should not be too eager to intervene in a conflict too early. As this study has suggested, mediation can, if it is unwanted, interfere with the parties' own conflict management efforts. Furthermore, ill-timed and ill-directed mediation can undermine future conflict management efforts by undermining the legitimacy of agreements, setting the parties up for failure, and so on (see section 3.3).

Once negotiations have been initiated, this study suggests a number of specific measures that will likely enhance the chances of a successful outcome. First, the negotiations should, if possible, be held in a neutral environment. The increasing number of multilateral contexts available to states, and even non-state actors, are ideal sites for talks. Regional organisations in particular, are well-suited to facilitating quiet negotiations. Similar to this, the negotiations should always involve senior and equally-ranked officials with the ability to make authoritative decisions. The analysis of this thesis shows a clear and strong relationship between success and negotiations between officials of the Foreign Ministerial level. Interestingly, there may be a cultural element involved here, in that research on conflict management in Africa shows a strong relationship between success and negotiations between actual Heads of State (see Jackson, 1998).

Other important steps which should be taken include simplifying the overall issue package. Attempting to deal with a large package of complex issues will most likely result in failure. The agenda of the talks should try and deal with a relatively simple issue package, perhaps dealing with the least contentious issues first in order to build momentum towards agreement on the most divisive issues. Related to this is the problem of large power differentials between the parties, a factor which this study clearly demonstrates is likely to engender failure in negotiations. Diplomats need to take concrete steps to try and overcome the negative effect of this. Suggestions here may include holding the talks on the weaker party's terms, or allowing observers at the talks to ensure the stronger party doesn't dominate proceedings.

A final aspect of the findings of the thesis relates to the overall context of the parties' relationship. The study shows that shared attributes (eg, power capabilities, homogeneity) and shared activities (eg, alignment in security arrangements) enhances the chances of successful negotiation. States, then, especially those in potentially conflictual or rivalrous relationships, need to take steps to participate in the same international organisations, and engage in cultural exchange activities. Building a shared base of common interests and activities in organisations will most likely improve the chances of successful negotiations should a violent conflict break out.

Turkey and Greece, for example, have had a series of long-running territorial disputes, the most intractable of which has centred on Cyprus. The Cyprus problem in fact, has resulted in direct armed conflict between them on a number of occasions. However, their shared membership in the NATO alliance has provided opportunities for contact and on-going dialogue, and helped to avert a number of potentially dangerous confrontations. In the mid-1980s, a number of naval incidents and small-scale exchanges of fire threatened to escalate into all-out war, and it was only negotiation facilitated through NATO offices that prevented it (Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997: 218).

An important policy recommendation then, relates to the role of international organisations in improving international negotiations. Multilateralism encourages and facilitates successful negotiation in international relations by providing numerous channels of communications, a neutral environment for talks, opportunities for minimising power differences, observers, and if needed, mediators. In other words,

the growing global multilateralism is a positive development for international conflict management and should be encouraged and supported diplomatically. Furthermore, the conflict management capacities of international organisations need to be expanded and enhanced through the allocation of greater resources and foreign policy attention.

A positive example of a deliberate enhancement of a regional organisation's conflict management capacities is that of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In June 1996 SADC established a special Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (see www.sadc-usa.net). The stated objectives of the Organ include the following:

- * Cooperate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;
- * Mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
- * Use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;
- * Where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means would fail would the Organ recommend that the summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed upon in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution...;
- * Develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for a responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent...;
- * Coordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- * Address extra-regional conflict which impact on peace and security in southern Africa (Ibid).

This is a highly significant development that should see the improvement of conflict management in a region too often plagued by intense and costly conflicts. Such improvements in the institutional capacity of regional organisations to manage conflicts should be encouraged, especially in areas where conflicts continue to pose serious threats to regional stability, such as the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, Central America, West Africa, Central Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

A problem facing conflict management practitioners however, is the changing nature of international conflict. In the 1990s, the predominant form of international conflict has moved from interstate conflicts to internationalised, intra-state conflicts (see Midlarsky, 1992; Sood, 1992; Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 1997). These

primarily civil conflicts tend to be far more complex, intractable, intensely fought, and resistant to traditional forms of conflict management than the typical interstate conflicts that characterised international politics in the immediate post-war period. In other words, negotiation, which is best suited to interstate conflicts, is less likely to be effective in an increasing number of situations.

Mediation then, also needs to be made more effective. Specifically, this study suggests a number of measures which mediators can take to improve the chances of success. In the first instance, mediation should be initiated as early in the conflict as possible, before positions have hardened and the parties have experienced high costs. A caveat to this of course, is that mediators should not intervene if the parties are attempting to resolve the conflict bilaterally. Only when it is clear that the parties' own efforts have failed should mediators intervene.

Once mediation is under way, the chances of success can be enhanced if the mediator(s) make it a priority to reduce the intensity of the conflict and lower the number of fatalities. This study shows that there is a clear correlation between low fatalities and intensity and mediation success. Mediators should also try to carefully manage any large power differences between the parties, lest it lower the chances of success. Mediators can, for example, balance power differences by seeming to give more weight to the weaker party's suggestions. Further, mediators can enhance the likelihood of an agreement by reducing and repackaging the number of issues in dispute. This finding confirms other research on international mediation (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 689).

In terms of the physical and social structure of the conflict management, the mediation should always take place in a neutral environment away from each parties' territory. If possible, mediators should avoid agreeing to shuttle between the two parties' territories. If they are unwilling to talk directly to each other, then the minimal level of political will necessary for success is absent, and mediation will likely be unsuccessful in any case. Such shuttling results in very low success rates. Like negotiation, mediation also benefits greatly from having equally-ranked senior officials at the talks. Mediators should make it a priority to ensure that no side in the conflict sends low-level officials with little real concession-making power to the talks.

Other research suggests that the choice of mediator, that is, the identity of the mediator, also affects the chances of success. In particular, conflicts characterised by high degrees of hostility and complexity require high-ranking individuals with the ability to wield considerable resources (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 317). That is, high-level officials from powerful states such as the US, for example, are always likely to be more successful than UN officials who lack authority and resources. The belated efforts of the UN to send Mohammed Sahnoun to the Central African region in early 1997 clearly illustrates this point (see Jackson, 1998). High-ranking officials from France or the US would have had a greater chance of success.

However, getting the right mediator is only part of the puzzle. Mediation is a contingent social behaviour, and it is extremely important what the mediator actually does during the process of conflict management. We have already mentioned the need to hold the mediation in a neutral environment, and to ensure that both parties are represented by equally-ranked senior officials. Furthermore, in a conflict such as this (eg, characterised by intangible issues, high fatalities, and high power difference), mediators greatly enhance their chances of success if they also employ forceful, directive strategies during the talks, such as making threats or promises, imposing deadlines, or suggesting a compromise solution (Langley, 1993: 167-168; see also Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993).

In short, mediation in international conflict needs to be timely, carefully thought-out, targeted at reducing hostility and repackaging the issues, based on a true assessment of the parties' needs, and utilising powerful mediators who employ forceful tactics. Third party intervention attempted under these conditions will provide the maximum likelihood of success.

A final caveat is in order. The study clearly shows that all conflict management is dependent on the political will of the parties to settle peacefully. That is, in the end, successful conflict management is dependent on the conflicting parties themselves. While outside parties can greatly enhance the chances of success through careful and prudent manipulation of the site of the talks, the timing of the intervention, and the participating officials, ultimately, the success or failure of the conflict management depends on the willingness of the parties. This is not to suggest that the quest to improve international conflict management is a wasted exercise, only to say that its

limitations must be clearly recognised. In the complex world of international politics, there is no easy panacea for violent conflicts. Hard work and tireless enthusiasm must characterise the task of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of international conflict management. Although solving the puzzle of the pacific settlement of disputes does not automatically furnish the political will for such an outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions almost certainly precludes it.

APPENDIX 1: Coding sheet

record 1
Column number 1

DISPUTE CHARACTERISTICS

V1 DISPUTE NUMBER

--	--	--

Each dispute has an individual code number.
See Appendix A.

V2a DISPUTE START DATE (YEAR)

--	--

Year the dispute started:
From -45 to -95

V2b DISPUTE START DATE (MONTH)

--	--

Month the dispute started:
From January = 01 to December = 12

V3a DISPUTE END DATE (YEAR)

--	--

Year the dispute ended:
From -45 to -96 (ongoing)

V3b DISPUTE END DATE (MONTH)

--	--

Month the dispute ended:
As for V2b.

V4 DURATION (GROUPED)

--

- Total duration of the dispute in months
- (1) 0-1 months
 - (2) 1-3
 - (3) 4-6
 - (4) 7-12
 - (5) 13-24
 - (6) 25-36
 - (7) 36+
 - (9) Unknown

column number 15

column number 16

V5 DURATION (RAW)

--	--	--

The actual number of months

V6 FATALITIES (GROUPED)

--

- (1) 0-500
- (2) 501-1000
- (3) 1001-5000
- (4) 5001-10000
- (5) 10000+
- (9) Unknown

V7 FATLAITIES (RAW)

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

The actual number of fatalities

V8 DISPUTE INTENSITY

--

- Fatalities per month
- (1) 0-500
 - (2) 501-1000
 - (3) 1001-10000
 - (4) 10000+
 - (5) Unknown

V9 SYSTEM PERIOD

--

- The system period in which the major part of the dispute occurred.
- (1) 1945-55
 - (2) 1956-65
 - (3) 1966-75
 - (4) 1976-85
 - (5) 1986-90
 - (6) 1991-95

column number 28

V10 GEOGRAPHIC REGION

☐

The geographic region in which the dispute occurred

- (1) North America
- (2) Central and South America
- (3) Africa
- (4) South West Asia
- (5) East Asia and the Pacific
- (6) Middle East
- (7) Europe

V11 ISSUE ONE

☐

- (1) Territory
- (2) Ideology
- (3) Security
- (4) Independence
- (5) Resources
- (6) Ethnic

V12 ISSUE TWO

☐

Coding as for V11.

V13 ISSUE THREE

☐

Coding as for V11.

V14 FINAL OUTCOME

☐

The eventual outcome of the dispute.

- (1) Ongoing
- (2) Lapse
- (3) One party victory
- (4) Abated
- (5) Partial settlement
- (6) Full settlement

V15 DISPUTE INITIATOR

--	--	--	--

Code number of the initiating party.

PARTY CHARACTERISTICS

V16 IDENTITY: PARTY A

--	--	--	--

Party identity code.

V17 IDENTITY:PARTY B

--	--	--	--

Party identity code. See Appendix B.

V18 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY A

--

Length of time in the international system (IS), party A.

- (0) Not applicable
- (1) 0-5 years
- (2) 6-20
- (3) 21-50
- (4) 51-100
- (5) 100+

V19 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY B

--

Length of time in the international system (IS), party B.
Coding as for V18.

V20 ALIGNMENT

--

The political alignment of the disputing parties.

- (1) Members of opposing blocs
- (2) Members of the same bloc
- (3) Bloc member vs. unaligned
- (4) Both unaligned
- (5) Different regional organisation
- (6) Same regional organisation
- (7) Regional organisation vs. unaligned

column number 49

V21 POWER PARTY A (RAW)

--	--

Raw power score for party A. See appendix 4.

V22 POWER PARTY B (RAW)

--	--

Raw power score for party B. See Appendix 4.

V23 POWER PARTY A (GROUPED)

--

Power score for party A. See Appendix 4.

- | | |
|-----|----------------|
| (1) | Not applicable |
| (2) | 1-7 |
| (3) | 8-13 |
| (4) | 14-20 |
| (5) | 21-26 |
| (6) | 27-30 |
| (7) | 30+ |

V24 POWER PARTY B (GROUPED)

--

Power score for party B. See Appendix 4. Coding as for V23.

V25 PREVIOUS. RELATIONS

--

The nature of the parties relationship prior to the dispute.

- | | |
|-----|--|
| (1) | Friendly |
| (2) | No previous relationship |
| (3) | Antagonism |
| (4) | Previous conflict, no (military) hostilities |
| (5) | 1 Previous dispute |
| (6) | More than 1 previous dispute |

V26 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY A

--

Nature of the political system in party A.

- | | |
|-----|-----------------------|
| (1) | Monarchy |
| (2) | Multi-party |
| (3) | One party |
| (4) | Military regime/junta |
| (5) | Other |

column number 56

column number 57

V27 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY B

☐

Nature of the political system in party B.
Coding as for V26.

V28 NUMBER OF PARTIES A

☐

Number of additional parties associated with party A.
(1) No other party involved
(2) Additional 1-2 parties involved
(3) Additional 3-5 parties involved
(4) More than 5 parties involved

V29 NUMBER OF PARTIES B

☐

Number of additional parties associated with party B.
Coding as for V28.

V30 HOMOGENEITY PARTY A

☐

Index of internal homogeneity for party A.
See Appendix 4.

V31 HOMOGENEITY PARTY B

☐

Index of internal homogeneity for party B.
See Appendix 4.

V32 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY A

☐

The political rights score of party A. See Appendix 4.

V33 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY B

☐

The political rights score of party B. See Appendix 4.

column number 63

column number 64

V34 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY A

☐

The civil liberties score of party A. See Appendix 4

V35 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY B

☐

The civil liberties score of party B. See Appendix 4

V36 TYPE OF CONFLICT

☐

The level of internationalisation of the conflict.

- (1) Civil/internal conflict which has been internationalised
- (2) Interstate

V37 NUMBER OF MEDIATIONS

The actual number of mediations attempted in this dispute

V38 NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS

The actual number of negotiations attempted in the dispute.

V39 TOTAL NUMBER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.

The actual number of conflict management attempts made in the dispute.

V40 UNITED NATIONS INVOLEMENT

☐

- (1) United Nations involvement in managing the dispute
- (2) No United Nations Involvement

column number 75

Record number 2
column number 1

V44 REPEATING DATA VARIABLE

--	--	--

This is the key ('occurs') variable in the repeating data format.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

V45 MEDIATION NUMBER

--	--	--	--

A number allocated to the mediation:
According to the actual order of the mediations in the dispute

V46a CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (DAY)

--	--

The actual day of the month of the conflict management attempt:

V46b CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (MONTH)

--	--

Month the conflict management attempt started:
From January = 01 to December = 12

V46c. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (YEAR)

--	--

Year the conflict management attempt started:
From -45 to -95

V47 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TYPE

--

- (0) No conflict management activity
- (1) Mediation
- (2) Negotiation
- (3) Arbitration / Adjudication
- (4) Referral to international organisation
- (5) Multilateral conference

column number 16

column number 17

V48 THIRD PARTY IDENTITY

--	--	--	--

Mediator/Third party code number.

V49 MEDIATOR RANK

--	--

- (0) No mediation
- (1) Private Individual
- (2) Leader of a national organisation
- (3) Representative of a regional organisation
- (4) Leader of a regional organisation
- (5) Representative of an international organisation
- (6) Leader of an international organisation
- (7) Representative of a small government
- (8) Representative of a large government
- (9) Leader of a small government
- (10) Leader of a large government

V50 STRATEGIES

--

The primary strategy employed by the mediator.

- (0) No mediation
- (1) Mediation offered only
- (2) Communication/Facilitation
- (3) Procedural
- (4) Directive
- (5) Supervisory
- (6) Unspecified

V51 PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP

--

The previous relationship of the mediator with the parties.

- (0) No mediation
- (1) No previous relationship
- (2) Different bloc
- (3) Same bloc as one party
- (4) Same bloc as both parties
- (5) Mixed relationship

column number 24

V52 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS

The number of previous mediation attempts in this dispute.

- (0) 0
- (1) 1-2
- (2) 3-4
- (3) 5-6
- (4) 7-8
- (5) 9-10
- (6) 10+
- (9) No mediation

V53 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS THIS MEDIATOR.

Number of previous attempts by this mediator.

- (0) 0
- (1) 1
- (2) 2
- (3) 3
- (4) 4
- (5) 5
- (6) 5+
- (9) No mediation

V54 TIMING (GROUPED)

The timing of the conflict management attempt.
ie. the number of months elapsed at the time of
intervention.

- (1) 1-2
- (2) 3-6
- (3) 7-12
- (4) 13-24
- (5) 25-36
- (6) 36+
- (9) No Management

V55 TIMING (RAW)

As for V54, but in this case the exact figure is given.

V56 INITIATED BY

☐

Request for conflict management initiated by

- (0) No management
- (1) One party
- (2) Both parties
- (3) Mediator
- (4) Regional organisation
- (5) International organisation
- (6) Unspecified

V57 ENVIRONMENT

☐

The physical environment in which conflict management takes place.

- (1) Party A's territory
- (2) Party B's territory
- (3) Third Party territory
- (4) Neutral site
- (5) Composite
- (6) Offered only
- (7) Unspecified
- (9) No management

V58 OUTCOME

☐

The outcome of the conflict management attempt.

- (0) No management
- (1) Mediation offered only
- (2) Unsuccessful
- (3) Ceasefire
- (4) Partial settlement
- (5) Full settlement

V59 HOSTILITIES

☐

Military hostilities during conflict management attempt

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (3) Unspecified
- (9) No Conflict Management

V60 OUTCOME DURABILITY

☐

Number of weeks that the ceasefire or settlement has lasted

- (0) Less than 1 week
- (1) 1 week
- (2) 2 weeks
- (3) 3 weeks
- (4) 4 weeks
- (5) 5 weeks
- (6) 6 weeks
- (7) 7 weeks
- (8) 8 weeks or more
- (9) Unspecified/Not applicable

V61 NEGOTIATORS A

☐

Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party A

- (1) Primary Decision-Maker
- (2) Senior-Level Decision-Maker
- (3) Low-Level Representatives.
- (6) Unspecified
- (9) No Conflict management/Not Applicable

V62 NEGOTIATORS B

☐

Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party B
Same as for V61

V63 NUMBER OF MEDIATORS

☐

Identification of the number of mediators involved in the current
mediation attempts and the interests they represent.

- (1) One mediator
- (2) Two mediators - representing same interests
- (3) Two mediators - representing different interests
- (4) Group mediator -members with same interests
- (5) Group mediator -members with different interests
- (9) no mediation/not applicable

V64 FUNCTIONAL MEDIATOR IDENTITY

☐

The nature of the group the mediator represents.

- (1) Individual
- (2) Regional Organisation
- (3) International Organisation
- (4) Functional Non-Governmental Organisation
- (5) State
- (6) Mixed
- (7) Unspecified
- (9) No mediation/not applicable

25

☐

column number 43

V68 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DURATION



The length of time that the conflict management attempt took to achieve an outcome.

- (1) 1 Day
- (2) 2-5 Days
- (3) 1 Week
- (4) 2-3 Weeks
- (5) 1 Month
- (6) 6-7 Weeks
- (7) 2 Months
- (8) 3+ Months
- (9) Unknown/not applicable

column number 43

APPENDIX 2: DISPUTE LIST

- 001 Chinese Civil War (1945-1949)
- 002 Greek Civil War (1945-1949)
- 003 Britain - India: Independence and Partition (1945-1948)
- 004 France - Levant: Independence Crisis (1945-Dec.1946)
- 005 USSR - Iran: Azerbaijan Crisis (Aug.1945-Oct.1947)
- 006 Indonesian Independence (late 1945-Nov.1949)
- 007 France - Indochina: Independence Struggle (Dec.1945-Jul.1954)
- 008 Yugoslavia - USA: Air Incidents (Aug.1946)
- 009 France - Madagascar: Nationalist Rebellion (Mar.1947-Aug.1947)
- 010 Pakistan - India: First Kashmir War (Oct.1947-Jan.1949)
- 011 Costa Rican Civil War (Mar.1948-Apr.1948)
- 012 Israeli War of Independence (May 1948-Jan.1949)
- 013 USSR - Western Allies: Berlin Crisis (Jun.1948-May 1949)
- 014 The Malayan Emergency (Jun.1948-Jul.1960)
- 015 India - Hyderabad: Secession Attempt (Jul.1948-Sept.1948)
- 016 Burma: Kuomintang Conflict (Aug.1948-1954)
- 017 Costa Rica - Nicaragua: Border Conflict (Dec.1948-Feb.1949)
- 018 Burma: Civil War and Insurgency (Jan.1949-1995)
- 019 Eritrea - Ethiopia: Independence Attempt (Jul.1949-Dec.1950)
- 020 Pakistan - Afghanistan: Border Conflict (Aug.1949)
- 021 China - Taiwan: Straits of Formosa (Oct.1949-Jun.1953)
- 022 USA - USSR: Air Incidents (Apr.1950-Oct.1950)
- 023 Afghanistan - Pakistan: Pathan Conflict (Jun.1950-Oct.1950)
- 024 The Korean War (Jun.1950-Jul.1953)
- 025 China - Tibet: Military Occupation (Oct.1950-May 1951)
- 026 Syria - Israel: Lake Galilee (Apr.1951-May 1951)
- 027 Oman - Saudi Arabia: Buraimi Crisis (1952-Oct.1955)
- 028 Tunisian Independence (Jan.1952-Mar.1956)

- 029 Egypt - UK: Suez Canal Zone Dispute (Jan.1952-Jan.1956)
- 030 Italy - Yugoslavia: Trieste Dispute (Mar.1952-Oct.1954)
- 031 China - Portugal: Macao Conflict (Jul.1952-Aug.1952)
- 032 Argentina - Chile: Beagle Channel Dispute (Jul.1952-1968)
- 033 Kenya - UK: Mau Mau Revolt (Aug.1952-Dec.1963)
- 034 USSR - USA: Air Incidents (Oct.1952-Jul.1956)
- 035 Israel - Jordan: Border Conflict (Jan.1953-Dec.1954)
- 036 China - USA: Quemoy Confrontation (Apr.1954-Apr.1955)
- 037 Guatemalan Civil War and Insurgency (Jun.1954-1995)
- 038 Algerian Independence (Nov.1954-Mar.1962)
- 039 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Invasion Attempt (Jan.1955)
- 040 Turkey - Syria: Cold War Tensions (Mar.1955-1957)
- 041 UK - Cyprus: Enosis Movement (Sept.1955-Feb.1959)
- 042 Yemen - UK: Aden Conflict (1956-1960)
- 043 China - Tibet: Incorporation Struggle (Mar.1956-Sept.1965)
- 044 Taiwan - South Vietnam: Paracel Islands (Jun.1956-Aug.1956)
- 045 Israel - Jordan: Mt Scopus Conflict (Jul.1956-Jan.1958)
- 046 The Suez War (Oct.1956-Nov.1956)
- 047 USSR - Hungary: Reform Intervention (Oct.1956-Nov.1956)
- 048 Syria - Israel: Lake Tiberias (Oct.1955-Dec.1955)
- 049 Cuban Civil War (Dec.1956-Jan.1959)
- 050 Honduras - Nicaragua: Mocoran Seizure (Apr.1957-Jan.1957)
- 051 Israel - Syria: Golan Heights (Jun.1957-Feb.1958)
- 052 Spain - Morocco: Sahara Conflict (Nov.1957-Apr.1958)
- 053 Panama Revolutionaries Conflict (1958-May 1959)
- 054 Egypt - Sudan: Border Dispute (Feb.1958)
- 055 France - Tunisia: Military Bases Conflict (Feb.1958-May 1958)
- 056 India - Pakistan: Surma River Incidents (Mar.1958-Sept.1959)
- 057 First Lebanese Civil War (May 1958-Jun.1959)
- 058 China - USA: Quemoy Islands Bombardment (Jul.1958-Dec.1958)

- 059 Cambodia - Siam: Border Conflict (Nov.1958-Feb.1959)
- 060 First Laotian Civil War (Dec.1958-1962)
- 061 France - Tunisia: Algerian Border Incidents (Feb.1959-Aug.1959)
- 062 Syria - Iraq: Mosul Revolt (Mar.1959-Apr.1959)
- 063 Cuba - Dominican Republic: Exiles Conflict (Jun.1959-Jul.1959)
- 064 Cuba - Haiti: Haitian Exiles Conflict (Aug.1959)
- 065 China - India: Border Conflict (Aug.1959-Feb.1960)
- 066 China - Nepal: Border Dispute (Jun.1959-Jul.1960)
- 067 The Congo Conflict (Jul.1960-mid-1964)
- 068 Pakistan - Afghanistan: Pathan Conflict (Sept.1960-May 1963)
- 069 The Vietnam War (Dec.1960-May 1975)
- 070 African Territories - Portugal: Independence Struggle (1961-Jul.1975)
- 071 Kurds - Iraq: Secession Attempt (Mar.1961-1966)
- 072 USA - Cuba: Bay of Pigs (Apr.1961-May 1961)
- 073 Iraq - Kuwait: Kuwaiti Independence Crisis (Jun.1961-Feb.1962)
- 074 USSR - USA: Berlin Air Corridor (Jul.1961-Nov.1961)
- 075 France - Tunisia: Bizerte Conflict (Jul.1961-Sept.1961)
- 076 India - Portugal: Goa Conflict (Dec.1961)
- 077 Indonesia - Malaysia: Borneo Conflict (1962-Nov.1965)
- 078 Netherlands - Indonesia: West Irian (Jan.1962-Aug.1962)
- 079 China - Taiwan: Invasion Threat (Mar.1962-Dec.1962)
- 080 Nepal - India: Border Incidents (Apr.1962-Nov.1962)
- 081 Syria - Israel: Lake Tiberias (Jun.1962-Aug.1963)
- 082 USSR - USA: Cuban Missile Crisis (Sept.1962-Nov.1962)
- 083 North Yemen: Royalist Rebellion (Sept.1962-Oct.1967)
- 084 India - China: Border War (Oct.1962-Nov.1962)
- 085 Somalia - Kenya; Ethiopia: Somali Expansionism (Nov.1962-Sept.1967)
- 086 China - USSR: Ussuri River Conflict (Mar.1963-Sept.1969)
- 087 First Sudan Civil War (Sept.1963-Mar.1972)
- 088 Algeria - Morocco: Tindouf War (Oct.1963-Feb.1964)

- 089 Cyprus Civil War (Dec.1963-Nov.1967)
- 090 Somalia - Ethiopia: Ogaden War (Jan.1964-Mar.1964)
- 091 Panama - USA: Flag Riots (Jan.1964-Apr.1964)
- 092 Rwanda - Burundi: Ethnic Violence (Jan.1964-Jan.1965)
- 093 North Vietnam - Laos: Second Civil War (Apr.1964-Dec.1966)
- 094 France - Gabon: Aubanne's Coup (Feb.1964)
- 095 South Vietnam - Cambodia: Border Conflict (Mar.1964-Dec.1964)
- 096 Syria - Israel: Border Incidents (Jun.1964-Jul.1966)
- 097 North Vietnam - USA (Aug.1964-May 1975)
- 098 Israel - Jordan: Border Incidents (Dec.1964-Apr.1966)
- 099 India - Pakistan: Border Skirmishes (1965-1970)
- 100 Eritrea - Ethiopia: Secession War (1965-May 1993)
- 101 Irian Jaya - Indonesia: Secession Insurgency (1965-1995)
- 102 Colombian Guerilla Insurgency (1965-1995)
- 103 Ghana - Togo: Border Incidents (Jan.1965-May 1965)
- 104 Uganda - Zaire: Border Incidents (Feb.1965-Mar.1965)
- 105 USA - Dominican Republic: Constitutionalist Rebellion (Apr.1965-Sept.1966)
- 106 North Korea - South Korea: Border Incidents (mid-1965-Mar.1968)
- 107 India - Pakistan: Kashmir War (Aug.1965-Sept.1965)
- 108 China - India: Border Incidents (Sept.1965)
- 109 Lebanon - Israel: Houle Raids (Oct.1965)
- 110 Chad - Sudan: Intervention and Civil War (Nov.1965-1972)
- 111 Namibian Independence Struggle (1966-Mar.1990)
- 112 Ivory Coast - Guinea: Overthrow Plot (Mar.1966-Apr.1966)
- 113 Ghana - Guinea: Nkrumah Tensions (Oct.1966-Nov.1966)
- 114 Bolivian Guerilla Insurgency (Nov.1966-Jul.1970)
- 115 Zimbabwean Independence Struggle (1967-Jan.1980)
- 116 Guinea - Ivory Coast: Hostage Crisis (Feb.1967-Sept.1967)
- 117 Cuba - Venezuela: Invasion Attempt (Apr.1967-May 1967)
- 118 Israel - Arab States: Six Day War (Jun.1967)

- 119 Nigeria - Biafra: Secession Attempt (Jul.1967-Jan.1970)
- 120 Zaire - Rwanda: Mercenaries Dispute (Aug.1967-Apr.1968)
- 121 USSR - Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring (Aug.1968)
- 122 Iraq - Kurd: Suppression Attempt (Oct.1968-Mar.1970)
- 123 China - Burma: Border Incidents (Jan.1969-Nov.1969)
- 124 El Salvador - Honduras: Football War (Jul.1969)
- 125 Guyana - Surinam: New River Triangle (Aug.1969-Nov.1970)
- 126 North Yemen - Saudi Arabia: Border Conflict (Nov.1969-Jan.1970)
- 127 Cambodia - South Vietnam; USA: Bombing Campaign (Jan.1970-Apr.1975)
- 128 Mindanao - Philippines: Secession Insurgency (Jan.1970-1995)
- 129 PLO - Jordan: Coup Attempt (Feb.1970-Aug.1971)
- 130 Guinean Security: Conakry Raids (Nov.1970)
- 131 Iran - Iraq: Border Tensions (1971)
- 132 Uganda - Tanzania: Border Conflict (1971-Oct.1972)
- 133 The Bangladesh War (Mar.1971-Feb.1974)
- 134 Iran - United Arab Emirates: Tunb Islands (Nov.1971)
- 135 Oman - South Yemen: Dhofar Rebellion (1972-Aug.1974)
- 136 Iran - Iraq: Border War (Jan.1972-Feb.1975)
- 137 Syria - Israel: Golan Conflict (Mar.1972-Jan.1973)
- 138 North Yemen - South Yemen: Border Conflict (Oct.1971-Oct.1972)
- 139 Equatorial Guinea - Gabon: Corisco Bay Islands (Jun.1972-Nov.1972)
- 140 Ethiopia - Somalia: Second Ogaden War (mid-1972-1985)
- 141 Iraq - Kuwait: Border Incidents (Mar.1973-Jul.1975)
- 142 Israel - Egypt: Yom Kippur War (Oct.1973)
- 143 Israel - Syria (Oct.1973-Dec.1974)
- 144 South Vietnam - China: Paracel Islands (Jan.1974)
- 145 Cyprus Conflict: Turkish - Greek Invasion (Jan.1974-Jun.1978)
- 146 Kurds - Iraq: Secession Attempt (Mar.1974-Jul.1975)
- 147 Israel - Lebanon: Arab Infiltrators (Apr.1974-Jul.1975)
- 148 Western Saharan Conflict: Morocco-Mauritania (Oct.1974-1995)

- 149 Mali - Upper Volta(Burkina Faso): Border Conflict (Dec.1974-Jun.1975)
- 150 Angola - South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1975-1995)
- 151 Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict (1975-1995)
- 152 North Korea - South Korea: Border Crisis (Feb.1975-Jul.1975)
- 153 Lebanese Civil War (Feb.1975-end of 1992)
- 154 Syria - Iraq: Euphrates Dispute (Apr.1975-late 1975)
- 155 Cambodia - USA: "Mayaguez Incident" (May 1975)
- 156 Laos - Thailand: Border Incidents (Jun.1975-Jan.1976)
- 157 China - India: Border Incidents (Oct.1975)
- 158 East Timor - Indonesia: Independence Struggle (Oct.1975-1995)
- 159 Zaire - Angola: Border War (Nov.1975-Feb.1976)
- 160 Cambodia - Thailand: Border Incidents (Dec.1975-Feb.1976)
- 161 Iranian Civil War (1976-1980)
- 162 Mozambique - South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1976-Oct.1992)
- 163 Uganda - Kenya: Border Incidents (Feb.1976-Aug.1976)
- 164 Bangladesh - India: Border Incidents (Apr.1976)
- 165 Kurds - Iraq: Kurdish Separatism (May 1976-1995)
- 166 Chad - Libya: Aozou Strip (Jun.1976-Nov.1979)
- 167 El Salvador - Honduras: Border Incidents (Jul.1976-Oct.1980)
- 168 Thailand - Kampuchea: Border Incidents (Nov.1976-Dec.1976)
- 169 El Salvador Civil Conflict (Jan.1977-end of 1992)
- 170 Kampuchea - Thailand: Border Incidents (Jan.1977-Oct.1978)
- 171 Zaire - Angola: Shaba Invasion (Mar.1977-May 1977)
- 172 Israel - Lebanon: Border Incidents (mid-1977-late 1977)
- 173 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (Jun.1977-Jan.1978)
- 174 Egypt - Libya: Border War (Jul.1977-Sept.1977)
- 175 Argentina - Chile: Beagle Channel (Jul.1977-Nov.1984)
- 176 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Oct.1977)
- 177 First Chad Civil War (Jan.1978-Jun.1982)
- 178 Israel - Lebanon: Border Conflict (Mar.1978-Jun.1978)

- 179 Second Invasion of Shaba (May 1978)
- 180 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Sept.1978-Dec.1978)
- 181 Tanzania - Uganda: Amin Overthrow (Oct.1978-May 1979)
- 182 USSR - Afghanistan: Intervention and Civil War (1979-1995)
- 183 Kampuchea - Vietnam: Invasion and Civil War (Jan.1979-1995)
- 184 China - Vietnam: Border War (Aug.1979-Jun.1982)
- 185 North Yemen - South Yemen: Border War (Feb.1979-Feb.1980)
- 186 Afghanistan - Pakistan: Peshawar Rebellion (Mar.1979-Jul.1979)
- 187 Algeria - Morocco: Border Conflict (Jun.1979-Oct.1979)
- 188 Israel - Syria: Air Incidents (Jun.1979-Feb.1980)
- 189 India - Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Nov.1979)
- 190 Iran - USA: Hostage Crisis (Nov.1979-Jan.1981)
- 191 Kampuchea - Thailand: Border Conflict (Dec.1979-Oct.1980)
- 192 Honduras - Nicaragua: Contra War (Jan.1980-Feb.1994)
- 193 Saudi Arabia - North Yemen (Feb.1980)
- 194 The Iran-Iraq War (Feb.1980-1989)
- 195 Santo - Vanuatu: Secession Attempt (May 1980-Sept.1980)
- 196 Ecuador - Peru: Border War (Jan.1981-Apr.1981)
- 197 Cameroon - Nigeria: Border Incident (May 1981-Jul.1981)
- 198 Pakistan - India: Border Incidents (Jul.1981-Aug.1982)
- 199 Libya - USA: Air Incidents (Aug.1981)
- 200 Poland Crisis (Dec.1981-Feb.1982)
- 201 Ugandan Civil War (Dec.1981-1995)
- 202 Israel - Lebanon: Lebanon Invasion (early 1982-mid-1983)
- 203 Zaire - Zambia: Border Dispute (Feb.1982-Sept.1982)
- 204 The Falklands War (Apr.1982-Jun.1982)
- 205 Indonesia - PNG: Border Incidents (May 1982-Oct.1985)
- 206 Libya - Chad: Intervention and Civil War (mid-1982-1995)
- 207 Laos - Thailand: Border Incidents (Jun.1982)

- 208 Sri Lanka - Tamil Conflict (Jul.1982-1995)
- 209 Ghana - Togo: Border Incidents (Aug.1982-Oct.1982)
- 210 Guatemala - Mexico: Border Incidents (Sept.1982-Jan.1983)
- 211 South Africa - Lesotho: Anti-ANC Raid (Dec.1982)
- 212 Second Sudan Civil War (Jan.1983-1995)
- 213 Liberia - Sierra Leone: Doe Tensions (Feb.1983-Mar.1983)
- 214 China - Vietnam: Border Conflict (Apr.1983)
- 215 Chad - Nigeria: Lake Chad Conflict (Apr.1983-Jul.1983)
- 216 Israel - Lebanon: Security Zone (mid-1983-1995)
- 217 Zaire - Zambia: Border Dispute (Sept.1983-Jan.1984)
- 218 USA - Grenada: Invasion (Oct.1983-Dec.1983)
- 219 India - Bangladesh: Border Conflict (Dec.1983-Jun.1984)
- 220 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (Jan.1984)
- 221 Vietnam - China: Border Conflict (Jan.1984-Mar.1987)
- 222 India - Pakistan: Siachin Glacier (Apr.1984-Sept.1985)
- 223 Burma - Thailand: Border Incident (Mar.1984)
- 224 Turkey - Greece: Naval Incidents (Mar.1984-Jan.1988)
- 225 Guatemala - Mexico: Border Incident (Apr.1984)
- 226 Thailand - Laos: Border War (Jun.1984-Dec.1988)
- 227 Kurds - Turkey: Secession Struggle (Aug.1984-1995)
- 228 South Africa - Botswana: Anti-ANC Raids (Oct.1984-May 1986)
- 229 Third Invasion of Shaba (Nov.1984)
- 230 North Korea - South Korea: Border Incidents (Nov.1984)
- 231 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Border Incidents (May 1985-Jun.1985)
- 232 Fourth Invasion of Shaba (Jun.1985)
- 233 Mali - Burkina Faso: Border War (Dec.1985-Jan.1986)
- 234 India - Pakistan: Siachin and Kashmir Conflicts (1986-1995)
- 235 USA - Libya: Sea Incidents (Jan.1986-Apr.1986)
- 236 India - Bangladesh: Muhuri River Incidents (Feb.1986-Apr.1986)
- 237 Qatar - Bahrain: Hawar Islands (Apr.1986)

- 238 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Apr.1986)
- 239 Surinam Guerilla Insurgency (Jul.1986-Dec.1992)
- 240 Togo Overthrow Attempt (Sept.1986)
- 241 Zaire - Congo: Border Incident (Jan.1987)
- 242 Ethiopia - Somalia: Ogaden Conflict (Feb.1987-Apr.1988)
- 243 South Africa - Zambia: Anti-ANC Raid (Apr.1987)
- 244 Congo Rebellion (Sept.1987-Jul.1988)
- 245 Uganda - Kenya: Border Conflict (Dec.1987)
- 246 Vietnam - China: Spratlys Dispute (Mar.1988)
- 247 Somalia Civil War (May 1988-1995)
- 248 Hutu - Burundi Conflict (Aug.1988-1995)
- 249 Bouganville - Papua New Guinea: Secession Attempt (Oct.1988-1995)
- 250 Maldives Invasion (Nov.1988)
- 251 USA - Libya: Mediterranean Incident (Jan.1989)
- 252 Uganda - Kenya: Border Conflict (Mar.1989)
- 253 Georgia - South Ossetia; Abkhazia: Secession War (Mar.1989-1995)
- 254 Mauritania - Senegal: Ethnic Conflict (Apr.1989-Jan.1990)
- 255 Yugoslavian Civil War (mid-1989-1995)
- 256 USA - Panama: Anti-Noreiga Invasion (Dec.1989)
- 257 Liberian Civil War (Dec.1989-1995)
- 258 USSR - Lithuania: Independence Crisis (Mar.1990-late 1991)
- 259 Guinea-Bissau - Senegal: Border Conflict (Apr.1990-May 1990)
- 260 Tuareg - Niger Conflict (May 1990-Oct.1994)
- 261 Senegal - Casamamnce: Secession Struggle (mid-1990-1995)
- 262 Kirghizia Ethnic Violence (Jun.1990)
- 263 Tuareg - Mali Conflict (Jun.1990-1995)
- 264 The Gulf War (Aug.1990-Mar.1991)
- 265 Azerbaijan - Armenia: Nagorno Karabkh Conflict (Aug.1990-1995)
- 266 Rwanda Invasion (Sept.1990-1995)
- 267 Gagauz; Dnestr - Moldova: Secession Attempt (Oct.1990-Jul.1992)

- 268 USSR - Latvia: Independence Crisis (Jan.1991)
- 269 Liberia - Sierra Leone: Intervention and Civil War (Mar.1991-1995)
- 270 Djibouti Civil War (Nov.1991-Jul.1993)
- 271 Myanmar(Burma) - Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Dec.1991)
- 272 Iran - UAE; Egypt: Tunb Islands (Apr.1992)
- 273 North Korea - South Korea: Border Incident (May 1992)
- 274 Tadjikistan Conflict (May 1992-1995)
- 275 Saudi Arabia - Qatar: Border Incidents (Sept.1992-Oct.1992)
- 276 Russia: Caucuses Conflict (Oct.1992-1995)
- 277 Egypt - Sudan: Halaib Dispute (Dec.1992)
- 278 Allies - Iraq: Incidents (Dec.1992-Jul.1993)
- 279 Myanmar(Burma) - Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Mar.1993-Sept.1993)
- 280 Cyprus Incidents (Apr.1993)
- 281 Yemen Civil War (Nov.1993-Jul.1994)
- 282 Nigeria - Cameroon: Diamond Islands (Dec.1993-Mar.1994)
- 283 Ghana - Togo: Border Incidents (Jan.1994-Feb.1994)
- 284 Greece - Albania: Border Tensions (Apr.1994)
- 285 Myanmar(Burma) - Bangladesh: Border Incidents (May 1994-Aug.1994)
- 286 USA - Haiti: Aristide Return (Sept.1994)
- 287 Iraq - Allies: Kuwaiti Border Tensions (Oct.1994)
- 288 Taiwan - China: Shelling Incident (Nov.1994)
- 289 Saudi Arabia - Yemen: Border Conflict (Dec.1994)
- 290 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (Jan.1995-Mar.1995)
- 291 China - Philippines: Spratlys Incidents (Jan.1995-Feb.1995)
- 292 Taiwan - Vietnam: Spratlys Clash (Mar.1995)
- 293 Belize - Guatemala: Border Incidents (Aug.1995)
- 294 Comoros Coup Attempt (Sept.1995-Oct.1995)
- 295 Eritrea - Yemen: Hunaysh Islands (Nov.1995-Dec.1995)

APPENDIX 3: DATA FORMAT

The data is set up in a standard SPSSx data file (MED97.dat). There are two records per case (mediation event). The first record contains the dispute and party data, incorporating 75 columns. The second record contains the conflict management data incorporating 43 columns including a 39 column repeating data format. The position of the data within the records is shown below.

Variable	Labels	Column
		<u>Record 1</u>
V1	Dispute Number	1-3
V2a	Dispute Start Date - month	5-6
V2b	Dispute Start Date - year	7-8
V3a	Dispute End Date - month	10-11
V3b	Dispute End Date - year	12-13
V4	Duration (grouped)	15
V5	Duration (raw)	16-18
V6	Fatalities (grouped)	19
V7	Fatalities (raw)	20-26
V8	Dispute Intensity	27
V9	System Period	28
V10	Geographic Region	29
V11	Primary Issue	30
V12	Secondary Issue	31
V13	Peripheral Issue	32
V14	Final Outcome	33
V15	Dispute Initiator	34-37
V16	Identity Party A	38-41
V17	Identity Party B	42-45
V18	Time in International System A	46
V19	Time in International System B	47
V20	Alignment	48
V21	Power A (raw)	49-50
V22	Power B (raw)	51-52
V23	Power A (grouped)	53
V24	Power B (grouped)	54
V25	Previous Relation	55
V26	Political System A	56
V27	Political System B	57
V28	Number of Parties A	58
V29	Number of Parties B	59
V30	Homogeneity A	60
V31	Homogeneity B	62
V32	Political Rights A	62
V33	Political Rights B	63
V34	Civil Liberties A	64
V35	Civil Liberties B	65

V36	Type of Conflict	66
V37	Number of Mediations	67-69
V38	Number of Negotiations	70-71
V39	Total Number Conflict Management	72-74
V40	United Nations Involvement	75

Record 2

V44	Repeating Data Variable	1-3
V45	Mediation Number	5-8
V46a	Conflict Management Start Date - day	10-11
V46b	Conflict Management Start Date - month	12-13
V46c	Conflict Management Start Date - year	14-15
V47	Conflict Management Type	16
V48	Third Party Identity	17-20
V49	Mediator Rank	21-22
V50	Strategies	23
V51	Previous Relationship of Mediator with Parties	24
V52	Previous Attempts at Mediation in this Dispute	25
V53	Previous Attempts by this Mediator	26
V54	Timing (grouped)	27
V55	Timing (raw)	28-30
V56	Initiated by	31
V57	Environment	32
V58	Outcome	33
V59	Hostilities	34
V60	Durability Outcome	35
V61	Rank Negotiator Party A	36
V62	Rank Negotiator Party B	37
V63	Number of Mediators	38
V64	Functional Mediator Id.	39
V65	Nature of Mediation	40
V66	Mediator Experience	41
V67	United Nations Mediator	42
V68	Conflict Management Duration	43

DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES

The following is a list of all the variables in the Med97 dataset. Included are the variable names and the variable labels that can be found in the original SPSSX command file, along with the value labels and codes for each variable's characteristics. Where necessary a brief description of the given variable is given. Calculation criteria and codes for the more complex variables can be found in appendix 4.

DISPUTE CHARACTERISTICS

- V1 DISPUTE NUMBER
 Each dispute has an individual code number.
 See Appendix 2.
- V2a DISPUTE START DATE (YEAR)
 Year the dispute started:
 From -45 to -95
- V2b DISPUTE START DATE (MONTH)
 Month the dispute started:
 From January = 01 to December = 12
- V3a DISPUTE END DATE (YEAR)
 Year the dispute ended:
 From -45 to -96 (ongoing)
- V3b DISPUTE END DATE (MONTH)
 Month the dispute ended:
 As for V2b.
- V4 DURATION (GROUPED)
 Total duration of the dispute in months
 (1) 0-1 months
 (2) 1-3
 (3) 4-6
 (4) 7-12
 (5) 13-24
 (6) 25-36
 (7) 36+
 (9) Unknown
- V5 DURATION (RAW)
 The actual number of months

V6 FATALITIES (GROUPED)

- (1) 0-500
- (2) 501-1000
- (3) 1001-5000
- (4) 5001-10000
- (5) 10000+
- (9) Unknown

V7 FATALITIES (RAW)

The actual number of fatalities

V8 DISPUTE INTENSITY

Fatalities per month

- (1) 0-500
- (2) 501-1000
- (3) 1001-10000
- (4) 10000+
- (5) Unknown

V9 SYSTEM PERIOD

The system period in which the major part of the dispute occurred.

- (1) 1945-55
- (2) 1956-65
- (3) 1966-75
- (4) 1976-85
- (5) 1986-90
- (6) 1991-95

V10 GEOGRAPHIC REGION

The geographic region in which the dispute occurred

- (1) North America
- (2) Central and South America
- (3) Africa
- (4) South West Asia
- (5) East Asia and the Pacific
- (6) Middle East
- (7) Europe

V11 ISSUE ONE

- (1) Territory
- (2) Ideology
- (3) Security
- (4) Independence
- (5) Resources
- (6) Ethnic

V12 ISSUE TWO

Coding as for V11.

V13 ISSUE THREE

Coding as for V11.

V14 FINAL OUTCOME

The eventual outcome of the dispute.

- (1) Ongoing
- (2) Lapse
- (3) One party victory
- (4) Abated
- (5) Partial settlement
- (6) Full settlement

V15 DISPUTE INITIATOR

Code number of the initiating party.

PARTY CHARACTERISTICS

V16 IDENTITY: PARTY A

Party identity code.

V17 IDENTITY: PARTY B

Party identity code.

V18 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY A

Length of time in the international system (IS), party A.

- (0) Not applicable
- (1) 0-5 years
- (2) 6-20
- (3) 21-50
- (4) 51-100
- (5) 100+

V19 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY B

Length of time in the international system (IS), party B.

Coding as for V18.

V20 ALIGNMENT

The political alignment of the disputing parties.

- (1) Members of opposing blocs
- (2) Members of the same bloc
- (3) Bloc member vs. unaligned
- (4) Both unaligned
- (5) Different regional organisation
- (6) Same regional organisation
- (7) Regional organisation vs. unaligned

V21 POWER PARTY A (RAW)

Raw power score for party A. See Appendix 4.

V22 POWER PARTY B (RAW)

Raw power score for party B. See Appendix 4

V23 POWER PARTY A (GROUPED)

Power score for party A. See Appendix 4.

- (1) Not applicable
- (2) 1-7
- (3) 8-13
- (4) 14-20
- (5) 21-26
- (6) 27-30
- (7) 30+

V24 POWER PARTY B (GROUPED)

Power score for party B. See Appendix 4.

Coding as for V23.

V25 PREVIOUS. RELATIONS

The nature of the parties relationship prior to the dispute.

- (1) Friendly
- (2) No previous relationship
- (3) Antagonism
- (4) Previous conflict, no (military) hostilities
- (5) 1 Previous dispute
- (6) More than 1 previous dispute

V26 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY A

Nature of the political system in party A.

- (1) Monarchy
- (2) Multi-party
- (3) One party
- (4) Military regime/junta
- (5) Other

V27 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY B

Nature of the political system in party B.

Coding as for V26.

V28 NUMBER OF. PARTIES A

Number of additional parties associated with party A.

- (1) No other party involved
- (2) Additional 1-2 parties involved
- (3) Additional 3-5 parties involved
- (4) More than 5 parties involved

V29 NUMBER OF PARTIES B

Number of additional parties associated with party B.

Coding as for V28.

- V30 HOMOGENEITY PARTY A
Index of internal homogeneity for party A.
See Appendix 4.
- V31 HOMOGENEITY PARTY B
Index of internal homogeneity for party B.
See Appendix 4.
- V32 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY A
The political rights score of party A. See Appendix 4.
- V33 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY B
The political rights score of party B. See Appendix 4.
- V34 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY A
The civil liberties score of party A. See Appendix 4.
- V35 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY B
The civil liberties score of party B. See Appendix 4.
- V36 TYPE OF CONFLICT
The level of internationalisation of the conflict.
(1) Civil/internal conflict which has been internationalised
(2) Interstate
- V37 NUMBER OF MEDIATIONS
The actual number of mediations attempted in this dispute
- V38 NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS
The actual number of negotiations attempted in the dispute.
- V39 TOTAL NUMBER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.
The actual number of conflict management attempts made in the dispute.
- V40 UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
(1) United Nations involvement in managing the dispute
(2) No United Nations Involvement

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

V44 REPEATING DATA VARIABLE

This is the key ('occurs') variable in the repeating data format.

V45 MEDIATION NUMBER

A number allocated to the mediation:

According to the actual order of the mediations in the dispute

V46a CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (DAY)

The actual day of the month of the conflict management attempt:

V46b CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (MONTH)

Month the conflict management attempt started:

From January = 01 to December = 12

V46c. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (YEAR)

Year the conflict management attempt started:

From -45 to -95

V47 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TYPE

- (0) No conflict management activity
- (1) Mediation
- (2) Negotiation
- (3) Arbitration / Adjudication
- (4) Referral to international organisation
- (5) Multilateral conference

V48 THIRD PARTY IDENTITY

Mediator/Third party code number.

See Appendices F & G.

V49 MEDIATOR RANK

- (0) No mediation
- (1) Private Individual
- (2) Leader of a national organisation
- (3) Representative of a regional organisation
- (4) Leader of a regional organisation
- (5) Representative of an international organisation
- (6) Leader of an international organisation
- (7) Representative of a small government
- (8) Representative of a large government
- (9) Leader of a small government
- (10) Leader of a large government

V50 STRATEGIES

The primary strategy employed by the mediator.

- (0) No mediation
- (1) Mediation offered only
- (2) Communication/Facilitation
- (3) Procedural
- (4) Directive
- (5) Supervisory
- (6) Unspecified

V51 PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP

The previous relationship of the mediator with the parties.

- (0) No mediation
- (1) No previous relationship
- (2) Different bloc
- (3) Same bloc as one party
- (4) Same bloc as both parties
- (5) Mixed relationship

V52 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS

The number of previous mediation attempts in this dispute.

- (0) 0
- (1) 1-2
- (2) 3-4
- (3) 5-6
- (4) 7-8
- (5) 9-10
- (6) 10+
- (9) No mediation

V53 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS THIS MEDIATOR.

Number of previous attempts by this mediator.

- (0) 0
- (1) 1
- (2) 2
- (3) 3
- (4) 4
- (5) 5
- (6) 5+
- (9) No mediation

V54 TIMING (GROUPED)

The timing of the conflict management attempt.
ie. the number of months elapsed at the time of
intervention.

- (1) 1-2
- (2) 3-6
- (3) 7-12
- (4) 13-24
- (5) 25-36
- (6) 36+
- (9) No Management

V55 TIMING (RAW)

As for V54, but in this case the exact figure is given.

V56 INITIATED BY

Request for conflict management initiated by

- (0) No management
- (1) One party
- (2) Both parties
- (3) Mediator
- (4) Regional organisation
- (5) International organisation
- (6) Unspecified

V57 ENVIRONMENT

The physical environment in which conflict management takes place.

- (1) Party A's territory
- (2) Party B's territory
- (3) Third Party territory
- (4) Neutral site
- (5) Composite
- (6) Offered only
- (7) Unspecified
- (9) No management

V58 OUTCOME

The outcome of the conflict management attempt.

- (0) No management
- (1) Mediation offered only
- (2) Unsuccessful
- (3) Ceasefire
- (4) Partial settlement
- (5) Full settlement

V59 HOSTILITIES

Military hostilities during conflict management attempt

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (3) Unspecified
- (9) No Conflict Management

V60 OUTCOME DURABILITY

Number of weeks that the ceasefire or settlement has lasted

- (0) Less than 1 week
- (1) 1 week
- (2) 2 weeks
- (3) 3 weeks
- (4) 4 weeks
- (5) 5 weeks
- (6) 6 weeks
- (7) 7 weeks
- (8) 8 weeks or more
- (9) Unspecified/Not applicable

V61 NEGOTIATORS A

Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party A

- (1) Primary Decision-Maker
- (2) Senior-Level Decision-Maker
- (3) Low-Level Representatives.
- (6) Unspecified
- (9) No Conflict management/Not Applicable

V62 NEGOTIATORS B

Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party B
Same as for V49

V63 NUMBER OF MEDIATORS

Identification of the number of mediators involved in the current mediation attempts and the interests they represent.

- (1) One mediator
- (2) Two mediators - representing same interests
- (3) Two mediators - representing different interests
- (4) Group mediator -members with same interests
- (5) Group mediator -members with different interests
- (9) no mediation/not applicable

V64 FUNCTIONAL MEDIATOR IDENTITY

The nature of the group the mediator represents.

- (1) Individual
- (2) Regional Organisation
- (3) International Organisation
- (4) Functional Non-Governmental Organisation
- (5) State

- (6) Mixed
- (7) Unspecified
- (9) No mediation/not applicable

V65 MEDIATION TYPE

Wider diplomatic context of mediation effort.

- (1) Ongoing effort
- (2) Solo effort
- (3) Unspecified
- (4) Not applicable

V66 MEDIATOR EXPERIENCE

Known previous experience of the mediator in any international conflict situation

- (1) No previous experience
- (2) 1-2 previous mediations
- (3) 3-4
- (4) 5-6
- (5) 7-8
- (6) 9+
- (7) At least 1 experienced mediator in Group/Pair
- (8) Unknown Mediators' Experience
- (9) Not applicable

V67 UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR

- (1) United Nations Mediator
- (2) Non United Nations Mediator

V68 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DURATION

The length of time that the conflict management attempt took to achieve an outcome.

- (1) 1 Day
- (2) 2-5 Days
- (3) 1 Week
- (4) 2-3 Weeks
- (5) 1 Month
- (6) 6-7 Weeks
- (7) 2 Months
- (8) 3+ Months
- (9) Unknown/not applicable

APPENDIX 4: CALCULATION CRITERIA

1. POWER

This measure of the power of a disputing party is a modified version of the Cox-Jacobson Scale¹.

The power index score for a nation is calculated by adding its scores on the following measures. All currency-based measures are in US dollars at current prices. Since the purpose of the modified scale was to compare states at a particular point in time, it was felt unnecessary to convert figures to constant prices, as was done in the original.

GNP		MILITARY SPENDING	
Score	\$Billion	Score	\$ Million
1	0-0.9	1	0-9
2	1-3	2	10-50
3	4-6	3	51-100
4	7-9	4	101-250
5	10-19	5	251-500
6	20-29	6	501-750
7	30-39	7	751-1,000
8	40-59	8	1,001-5,000
9	60-99	9	5,001-10,000
10	100-199	10	10,001-25,000
11	200-499	11	25,001-50,000
12	500+	12	50,000+

GNP per CAPITA		TERRITORY	
Score	\$	Score	Km ²
1	0-199	0	0-50,000
2	200-599	1	50,001-200,000
3	600-999	2	200,001-500,000
4	1,000-4,999	3	500,001-900,000
5	5,000-10,000	4	900,001-2,500,000
6	10,000+	5	2,500,001+

POPULATION

Score	Millions
0	0-1.9
1	2-19
2	20-59
3	60-99
4	100-249
5	250+

2. HOMOGENEITY

The internal homogeneity of each each of the disputing parties is to be measured on the basis of religion, language, and race, with the index of homogeneity an average of the three scores. Each measure is coded according to the following criteria:

Score	Criteria
1	Homogeneous - No single significant majority (10% or more of the population) or significant combination of smaller minorities (15% or more of the population).
2	Having a single significant minority (10-25% of the population) or a significant combination of smaller minorities (15-25% of the population).
3	Having a majority population (51% or more) but also having a large single minority or group of minorities (26-49% of the population)
4	No majority group, but only one very large minority/plurality population (>30% of population and >10% more of population than any other single group).
5	Greater fragmentation - More than one very large minority or several smaller minorities, but no majority or plurality population

3. DOMESTIC POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

This is coded according to two seven-point scales developed by the Freedom House Survey Team¹. The domestic political behaviour (or human rights record) of each state can be given a rating with respect to both 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. On each scale, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. The following is our slightly modified version of the Freedom House coding criteria².

POLITICAL RIGHTS

Score	Criteria
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Free and fair elections; those elected rule -Competitive parties or other political groupings -The opposition has an important role and power -Self determination or high degree of autonomy -Self determination for minority groups, or minority participation in government through informal consensus -Decentralised political power and free subnational elections
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Still free, but elements such as violence, political discrimination against minorities and foreign or military influence on politics may be present.
3, 4, 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -As well as the elements noted in category 2, polities in these three categories have increasing levels of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -military involvement in politics -lingering royal power -unfair elections and one-party dominance -civil war And decreasing levels of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -freedom to organise non-governmental parties and political groups -reasonably free referenda or other significant means of popular influence on government
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Repressive polity -Military junta, one-party dictatorship, religious hierarchy, or autocracy -Only minimal political rights, such as competitive local elections

(This category can include traditional monarchies which mitigate their lack of political rights through toleration of political discussion and acceptance of petitions from the ruled)

- 7
- Political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent
 - Extremely oppressive regime

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Score	Criteria
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, religion, and association -The individual is protected from political violence and harms inflicted by the courts and security forces -Free economic activity -Equality of opportunity -Government free of corruption
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Minor deficiencies in some aspects of civil liberties, eg: some human rights abuses in the courts, or some press censorship
3, 4, 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Polities in these categories have increasing levels of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -state oppression -censorship -prevention of free association -racial, religious, or sexual inequalities -State and anti-state political terror -And decreasing levels of : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -personal freedom -freedom of expression, movement, and association
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Little religious freedom -Few personal social freedoms -Restricted private business activity -Restricted expression and association -Political prisoners and other political terror

7

- Virtually no freedom
- Society shaped by an overwhelming and justified fear of a repressive state

1. Freedom House Survey Team, 1990, *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, New York.

2. *ibid*, pp.22-23.

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